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Abstract
Enforcement activities in the road traffic context have shown to be one of the
key factors for reducing fatalities. However, despite their evolution (both in their
underlying legislation and their technical means), there are several aspects that
may be subject to improvement. Three of them are on the focus of this thesis.
First, victims of offenders are usually not able to report them, as there are not
enough data to support their claims. Second, there is a significant delay between
the offence and its notification, which negatively affects to its educational purpose.
Third, the offender does not have the practical chance to defend herself (i.e. claim
her innocence or, at least, that it was a less serious offence) as there are no suitable
attesting elements.
In order to contribute on these issues, recent advances on data processing, com-
munication and sensing capabilities of vehicles conform an interesting technological
context. These new capabilities are the basis over which a new family of services,
called Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are being developed. Despite the
new opportunities provided by ITSs, it does not exist an adequate framework to
guide the introduction of these new techniques in the surveillance of the adherence
to the road traffic rules. Thus, there is a lack of a clear view on how these techniques
may help on the aforementioned problems.
The general goal of this thesis is to provide the technical basis for the realiza-
tion of an ITS-enhanced electronic road traffic administrative enforcement process.
Particularly, four contributions are developed in this thesis. First, an enforcement
process model is proposed, based on the results of the European VERA2 project.
The model describes the entities, the stakeholders, the data at stake and the un-
derlying security considerations. It conforms the aforementioned framework that
enables identifying where to introduce the required ITS enhancements.
Based on the previous model, the remaining contributions focus on the develop-
ment of specific mechanisms where the enforcement actors (the offender, the offence
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witnesses, the victims and the Authority) participate actively through ITS-related
technologies. Thus, the second contribution is a mechanism that enables victims
to report their offenders. In order to prevent this action to be noticeable by the
reported driver, the report information is embedded into innocuous-looking mes-
sages by means of steganography. As the educational purpose of the punishment
grows with its immediacy, the third contribution is a protocol to send an offence
notification to the offending vehicle. Thanks to the human-machine interface of the
vehicle, the offender is able to realize about the fine even during the same trip in
which the offence was committed. Finally, in order to ensure that the driver has
adequate means to defend herself against unfair punishments, a protocol to create
evidences on its recent driving behavior has been proposed. Such evidences are
based on the sensorial perceptions by surrounding vehicles, which are contacted
using ITS communication technologies.
At the light of these contributions, this thesis opens the door to upcoming
developments that may end into a fully automated enforcement process.
Keywords: Enforcement process, Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS),
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET)
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Resumen
Uno de los factores ma´s criticos para la reduccio´n de la siniestralidad en las ca-
rreteras es la vigilancia del cumplimiento de las normas de circulacio´n. A pesar de
la evolucio´n de los procedimientos y te´cnicas para efectuar dicha vigilancia (tanto
en el a´mbito normativo como en el te´cnico), existen algunos factores que son suscep-
tibles de mejora. Tres de ellos constituyen el foco principal de esta tesis. En primer
lugar, las v´ıctimas de los infractores no disponen de medios pra´cticos para denun-
ciarles, pues habitualmente no existen datos que permitan acreditar la descripcio´n
de los hechos manifestada. En segundo lugar, existe un intervalo significativo de
tiempo entre la comisio´n de la infraccio´n y la recepcio´n de la notificacio´n de la
correspondiente denuncia, lo que afecta negativamente a la capacidad educativa de
las sanciones. En tercer lugar, el supuesto infractor no dispone de medios pra´cticos
para defenderse, pues habitualmente no se cuenta con elementos que soporten su
argumento.
Con el fin de contribuir a estas cuestiones, los avances recientes en materia de
procesamiento de informacio´n, transmisio´n de informacio´n y percepcio´n sensorial en
los veh´ıculos constituyen un contexto tecnolo´gico interesante. Estas nuevas capaci-
dades son la base sobre la que se construyen los Sistemas Inteligentes de Transporte
(habitualmente referidos mediante sus siglas en ingle´s, ITS). A pesar del desarrollo
constante de dichos sistemas, no existe un marco adecuado para la utilizacio´n de
dichas capacidades en el a´mbito de la vigilancia del cumplimiento de las normas de
circulacio´n. As´ı, se detecta una carencia de una visio´n clara de co´mo estas nuevas
te´cnicas pueden contribuir a resolver los aspectos problema´ticos identificados ante-
riormente.
El objetivo general de esta tesis es proporcionar la base te´cnica para el desarro-
llo de un procedimiento administrativo sancionador en el a´mbito del tra´fico que
aproveche las oportunidades que plantean los ITS. En particular, en esta tesis se
desarrollan cuatro contribuciones. En primer lugar, se propone un modelo de pro-
xcedimiento administrativo sancionador, extendiendo los resultados del proyecto de
investigacio´n europeo VERA2. Este modelo describe las entidades participantes,
los interesados, la informacio´n en juego y las consideraciones de seguridad subya-
centes. Este modelo constituye el antedicho marco y permite identificar la forma
de introducir las tecnolog´ıas ITS en dicho proceso.
Basa´ndose en este modelo, las contribuciones restantes se centran en el desarrollo
de mecanismos espec´ıficos en los que los actores del proceso (el infractor, los tes-
tigos, las v´ıctimas y la Autoridad) participan activamente empleando tecnolog´ıas
relacionadas con los ITS. As´ı, la segunda contribucio´n es un mecanismo que per-
mite a las v´ıctimas denunciar a los infractores. Con el objetivo de impedir que dicha
denuncia sea conocida por el infractor, el mensaje es introducido mediante te´cnicas
esteganogra´ficas en otro mensaje aparentemente inofensivo. La tercera contribucio´n
es el env´ıo de la notificacio´n de forma directa al veh´ıculo infractor, lo cual pretende
incrementar la inmediatez del proceso (ya que se le puede presentar al infractor du-
rante la conduccio´n) y, con ello, su eficacia educativa. Finalmente, para promover
que el conductor disponga de los medios adecuados para defenderse de sanciones
supuestamente injustas, se propone un protocolo para la creacio´n de evidencias que
describan su comportamiento reciente en lo que respecta a la conduccio´n. Dichas
evidencias se basan en las percepciones sensoriales de los veh´ıculos cercanos, los
cuales son contactados empleando tecnolog´ıas de comunicacio´n relacionadas con los
ITS.
A la vista de estas contribuciones, esta tesis abre la puerta al futuro desarrollo
de un proceso sancionador completamente automatizado.
Palabras clave: Procedimiento sancionador, Sistemas Inteligentes de Trans-
porte (ITS), redes vehiculares (VANET).
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Introduction

Chapter 1
Introduction
This Chapter introduces the context of the thesis, the statement of the problem,
the main objectives of the thesis, the contributions achieved and the document
organization.
1.1 Context
Nowadays, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are being more
and more integrated in daily activities of modern societies. One of such activities
is the public government, which is evolving towards the concept of e-government,
defined by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
as the use of ICT, specially Internet, as a tool to achieve better government [1].
The thesis is related to a particular process within the e-government: the en-
forcement process. Specifically, the focus is on the road traffic administrative en-
forcement one. There are two main issues in the context of this thesis, namely
the legal provisions and the technical environment (see upper part of Figure 1.1).
Concerning the legal issues, the regulations of the enforcement process define how it
must work in order to be valid. With respect to the technical issues, the approach
selected in this thesis is based on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Ac-
cording to the definition provided by the European Parliament, ITSs are advanced
applications that without embodying intelligence as such aim to provide innovative
services on transport modes and traffic management and enable various users to be
better informed and make safer, more coordinated and “smarter” use of transport
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networks [2].
Both the legal and technical issues are the main inputs required to design any
enhancement in the enforcement process. It should be noted that both areas are
not independent, but instead they are related to another area – the ICT security
issues. They comprise the study of the protection methods and mechanisms against
revealing, alteration or destruction of the data at stake. It also covers the failures in
the processing, storage or transmission of such data [3]. Thus, the legal nature of
the enforcement process and its underlying data at stake imposes a set of security
requirements to be addressed in the technical environment. OECD states that
security and privacy issues have to be addressed prior to the development of any
electronic process within the e-administration [1].
In order to give an overview of such related legal and technical issues, the fol-
lowing Sections present a brief introduction of each one.
Legal issues Technical issues
Road-traffic enforcement 
process
Intelligent Transportation Systems 
(ITS)
ITS-enhanced road traffic enforcement process
ICT Security
Legal 
regulation
Organizational 
adjustment
Process model
System architecture
Offence 
detection
Offence processing
Improved 
notification
Improved 
evidence 
collection
Improved 
offence 
reporting
Cost-benefit assessment
Scope of this thesis
Figure 1.1: Context and scope of this thesis
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1.1.1 Legal issues
The road traffic administrative enforcement process is applied to all traffic offences
detected by the Authority that are not considered as criminal. For example, light
speeding is considered as an administrative offence in several European countries.
Enforcement activities have been shown to be one of the key factors in reducing
traffic fatalities [4]. The effectiveness and efficiency of such procedure are critical
to ensure the educational capacity of sanctions. To achieve these goals, the Spanish
Law 11/2007 enabled the use of electronic means in the administration (and thus,
in all its processes), not only for internal application but also for the communi-
cation with citizens [5]. Apart from the use of electronic means, the road traffic
enforcement process was recently reformed in 2009, aiming to simplify the process
while preserving the underlying legal provisions [6]. This reform is also intended to
help offenders to know whenever they are involved in such a process.
The active participation of the citizen within the process has been taken into
account in its design. Thus, all phases enable stakeholders to participate. On the
one hand, offenders may defend their interests, giving more data or appealing exist-
ing arguments in order to guarantee that the imposed fine is accurately established
according to the severity of the facts. On the other hand, citizens have the chance
to report offences witnessed by them.
1.1.2 Technical issues
In order to develop the aforementioned ITS applications and services, it is nec-
essary to explode the growing data processing and communication capabilities of
vehicles. Concerning data processing, vehicles are incorporating a growing number
of electronic devices, in form of sensors, embedded systems and processors. They
are included to increase the comfort and safety, as well as assisting the driver in her
task. Moreover, a growing number of vehicles already incorporate electronic devices
that record the vehicle driving behavior (e.g. speed, last actions, use of brakes or
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warning lights, etc.) [7].
With respect to the communication features of vehicles, they incorporate one
device usually referred to as On-Board Unit (OBU). Such device enables them to
exchange data not only with other (nearby) vehicles, but also with a dedicated
infrastructure arranged along the roads. Through this infrastructure, vehicles can
interact with ITS service providers. This kind of communication has given place
to the vehicular network, which is a specific type of network that is adapted to the
special features of this environment (i.e. mobility, amount of nodes, etc.).
All these technologies are being developed taking into account the underlying
data security issues. Great investments are being performed by carmakers, as well
as research institutions, to achieve a high level of security. In fact, the IEEE 1609
family of standards on vehicular networks contains one (IEEE 1609.2) specifically
focused on data security [8].
1.2 Motivation
The general purpose of this thesis is related to the improvement of the road traffic
administrative enforcement process. Particularly, there are two areas of the current
road traffic administrative enforcement process that may be subject to improvement
– its immediacy and the citizen interaction on it. Concerning the first one, the
European Commission has pointed out the need for offences “to be notified and
sanctions to be executed within a short time period” [9]. To this regard, European
research projects such as ESCAPE (Enhanced Safety Coming from Appropriate
Police Enforcement) have highlighted the benefits of automatising this process [4].
The use of electronic means within the process, as mandated by Law 11/2007, allow
for a moderate reduction of processing times. However, this reduction is currently
insufficient for the specific area of road traffic. It must be noted that this specific
field requires greater immediacy as the reappearance of the punishable behaviour
may lead to serious damage to other road users.
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Regarding the citizen interaction, it is currently not possible to have a real-time
interaction between all the stakeholders involved in a traffic offence, namely the
offender, witnesses, the affected victim(s) and the road traffic Authority. In fact,
current communication with the Authority usually implies a non-negligible time
period, which makes the process to last for a long time.
The previous issues, along with the fact that ITS technologies may be applied to
solve them, have led us to detect four specific problems that need to be addressed.
P1. Lack of a complete enforcement process model that helps on
identifying the chances to integrate ITS technologies in this context
In order to improve the enforcement process, the VERA series of projects (Video
Enforcement for Road Authorities) focused on the cross-border enforcement, that
is, to ensure that an offence committed by a foreign driver is punished in its coun-
try of residence. Particularly, the VERA2 project proposed an enforcement process
model consisting of a set of flowcharts and a data dictionary [10]. Such flowcharts
constitute a basic model, as it details what has to be done. However, it does not
specify how to perform each step nor its involved data. On the other hand, con-
cerning the data dictionary, it covers the data elements that may be sent between
countries for delegating the enforcement. Thus, it does not contain all elements
produced in each process phase that is addressed in a single country. In this situ-
ation, the VERA2 model is not enough to clarify how to integrate ITS techniques
in this process and, in fact, this issue is not addressed by such project.
P2. Victims of offenders do not have the practical chance to report
such misbehavior
From the legal point of view, any person that knows about a traffic offence is
enabled to report it to the Authority [6]. However, in practice, there is no practical
mechanism to perform this operation. The situation is particularly worse in the case
of drivers that suffer the consequences of the traffic offence. As their task is focused
on driving, they may proceed with the reporting once the car is stopped. In this
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way, they are forced to memorize all the data related to the offence (e.g. involved
cars, date, location, event description), which in practice is not usually performed.
Furthermore, there is a need to attest the claimed description in order to prevent
unsupported reports. According to data provided by the Spanish National Traffic
Authority for the context of this work, most voluntary reports are discarded because
of the lack of supporting evidences1.
P3. Current notification mechanisms cause offenders to be aware of
the punishment long after the offence
Existing legislation enables the use of not only regular (i.e. paper-based postal
services) mechanisms, but also electronic ones, to deliver a fine notification. All
these alternatives introduce a time gap. On the one hand, the postal service may
take up to some days. On the other, even if the electronic notification may be
performed in the order of minutes, the current goal of the Spanish Traffic Authority
is to reduce this gap from 45 days to 12 [11]. This does not seem a very convenient
goal from the road safety point of view, because the immediacy of the notification
has a positive effect on its educational effect [4]. Thus, previous theoretical works
have pointed out that the immediacy of feedback after an offence is crucial to
promote a higher behavioural impact2 [13]. The most convenient goal should be to
make this effect to be real as soon as possible, even within the same trip in which
the offence was committed. Such time reduction could also help drivers to defend
themselves, as the moment of the offence would be more recent [14].
Apart from the previous fact, current mechanisms enable a passive behavior from
the offender side. In this way, she is allowed to not taking any decision regarding
the notification (i.e. neither accepting nor rejecting it). In this particular case, the
offender is never aware of such notification and she will only be once the process
reaches the next notifiable state.
P4. Drivers do not have effective mechanisms to defend themselves
1This information was provided to the author of this thesis in a private e-mail conversation with
the Chief of Research and Studies of the Spanish Road Traffic Safety Observatory.
2For a detailed explanation of the underlying behavioural mechanisms, please refer to [12].
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against received fines
Once a traffic fine is received, drivers have the right to give evidences and
allegations that may offer another view of the facts. Their main purpose is to clarify
the situation, potentially leading to a fine reduction or removal. Nevertheless, there
is currently no practical mechanism to create these defensive elements that help the
driver on attesting its driving behavior or the surrounding circumstances. What is
more, the legislation determines that the truth of the facts given by type approved
equipments or police officers leaves little room for doubt [6].
To illustrate this fact, in 2006 the Spanish Traffic Authority imposed 2.588.890
fines, and only 148.066 (i.e. 5,71 % of the total) were contested [15]. Nevertheless,
36.4 % of drivers believe that it is an unfair enforcement system, according to a
survey conducted by the Traffic Authority [16]. It would be expected that such a
significant proportion of unsatisfied drivers be followed by a proportional amount
of contests, if it were practical to proceed.
1.3 Objectives and contributions
The general goal of this thesis is to provide the technical basis for the realization of
an ITS-enhanced electronic road traffic administrative enforcement process. Partic-
ularly, the intended consequence is to enable an enriched real-time interaction with
the stakeholders related to a given traffic offence. In this way, offences are rapidly
reported (even by witnesses) and notified to the offender, who is now enabled to
defend herself.
In our opinion there was a need to address the previous research topics, which
have been reflected in the objectives of this thesis:
O1. Design a complete model of the enforcement process that helps to
identify the chances to integrate ITS-related technologies.
O2. Create a mechanism that enables victims of misbehaving drivers to
report them. It should ensure that this action is not likely to be noticeable by
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the reporting driver.
O3. Create a mechanism to deliver the notification to the vehicle respect-
ing the legal requirements. It should promote the immediacy of the process.
O4. Create a mechanism that enables drivers to build electronic evi-
dences attesting their driving behaviour. The reliability of the created evidences
must be characterized. The verification process should be defined as well.
The achievement of these objectives has led to the next four contributions:
C1. An enhanced enforcement process model based on the VERA2
one (see Chapter 4) that describes the phases, the data at stake, the data exchanges
and the underlying security considerations. This model will be focused on speeding
offences, based on the corresponding model proposed in the aforementioned VERA2
project. Nevertheless, it is expected that other traffic offences will follow a simi-
lar process, although such issue is a matter of future work. The suitability of the
proposed model to represent current enforcement systems (particularly the Spanish
ESTRADA and the French CSA) is evaluated. In general words, almost all func-
tionalities have been identified in the proposed model. Only two components were
not successfully identified – one because of the lack of detail on the aforementioned
systems and the other because it was out of the scope of the CSA one. As a result,
the suitability of these parts of the proposed model is not completely contrasted.
Furthermore, based on this model, the integration of ITS-related technologies is
analysed, as well as their suitability compared to current approaches. In general
words, although ITS requires a non-negligible investment, it enables a greater im-
mediacy in the offender identification and in the notification process. Furthermore,
it promotes having a more complete description of the offence.
C2. An application of steganographic principles to ITS-related messages
(see Chapter 5) that enables vehicles to embed data within them. For the context
of this thesis, this mechanism enables reporting other misbehaving vehicles
by embedding their current identifier and the type of misbehavior perceived. The
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approach is to embed such information into beacon messages. The scope of this
mechanism is the embedding and revealing operations. Therefore, the posterior
processing of the embedded report and particularly its trustworthiness analysis is
left to future work. Results show that the proposed steganographic system is com-
putationally feasible taking into account realistic vehicular constraints (processing
capabilities, communication reliability and bandwidth), and that at least one con-
figuration setting exists in which the system is operational for common scenarios
(highways, secondary roads and urban environments). The analysis of the imposed
requirements shows that the undetectability is subject to ensuring that sensor errors
are truly random and that the future improvement of sensor accuracy will reduce
the capacity of this mechanism.
C3. A protocol to send an offence notification to the offending vehicle
by means of ITS-related communication media, respecting the security requirements
derived from the legal provisions for the validity of the notification (see Chapter
6). The impact of the protocol on vehicular devices and communication channels is
evaluated. The analysis shows that the proposed protocol fulfils all security require-
ments that do not require a real implementation for their validation. Regarding its
performance, results show that in absence of OBU compromise, the notification
message must be sent 7 times to achieve a probability of successful transmission of
99%. Concerning the processing costs, it takes around 1.46 seconds for the vehicular
computational device.
C4. An inter-vehicle protocol (called EVIGEN, see Chapter 7) that enables
a vehicle to build an evidence of its recent driving behavior by retrieving the
sensorial perceptions of surrounding vehicles. The protocol covers not only
the evidence creation but also its verification. Nevertheless, the trustworthiness
evaluation of the data provided by such surrounding vehicles is left to future work.
The suitability of the protocol for vehicular networks and computational devices
is analysed. The amount of available witnesses depends on the gap between the
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moment to which the evidence may be referred and the time in which the evidence
is requested to witnesses. Simulation results show that for an interval of 5 seconds,
90 % of witnesses are available in urban environments and a maximum average of
38 testimonies per evidence is achieved in highways. Other road scenarios and time
gap options are also analysed. The security analysis shows that all requirements
are adequately fulfilled and thus the associated threats are countered.
The relationship between the problems detected, the research objectives and the
contributions achieved is shown in Table 1.1.
Problem Objective Contribution
P1. Lack of a com-
plete model of the en-
forcement process
O1. Design a complete
model
C1. Enhanced enforcement
process model based on the
VERA2 one
P2. Lack of a practi-
cal technique to report
misbehaving drivers by
their victims
O2. Creation of a mech-
anism for inter-vehicle
reporting
C1. Enhanced enforcement
process model based on the
VERA2 one
C2. Steganography-based
protocol for covert inter-
vehicle reporting
P3. Time gap between
offence and fine notifica-
tion
O3. Improve the im-
mediacy of notification
mechanisms
C1. Enhanced enforcement
process model based on the
VERA2 one
C3. Protocol to send an of-
fence notification to the of-
fending vehicle
P4. Lack of self-
defending mechanisms
for drivers
O4. Design of a
mechanism that enables
drivers to create evi-
dences
C1. Enhanced enforcement
process model based on the
VERA2 one
C4. EVIGEN protocol for co-
operative evidence generation
Table 1.1: Relationship between problems, objectives and contributions
We find that these issues are a step towards the complete automation of the road
traffic enforcement process. Figure 1.2 shows the improvements that are enabled in
such a process by means of the mechanisms proposed in this thesis. Therefore, the
process may now be started by every vehicle that detects an offence (step 1 in Figure
1.2, contribution 2). Once the verifier has checked the authenticity of the report,
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the adjudicator prepares and sends the offence notification (step 2, contribution 3).
Finally, the offender may create an electronic evidence in order to defend herself,
in the case that she finds that the offence is unfair (step 3, contribution 4).
The scope of the proposed mechanisms is on the data processing and exchange,
leaving out its trustworthiness analysis. Thus, the reporting mechanism and, par-
ticularly, the operations described to retrieve such report, does not address how
the verifier decides about the reliability of the report. Analogously, once a notifica-
tion is received, the decision algorithm to establish whether it is fair or not is not
considered. Similarly, the reliability analysis of the data provided by vehicles for
building the electronic evidence is not detailed. It should be noted that this kind
of evaluation is a matter of open research. Currently, plausibility checks (e.g. [17])
and reputation-based mechanisms (e.g. [18]) are two significant trends on this area.
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RSU / 
Access 
point
OBU
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Dev
Dev
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Adjudicator
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2 . 
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Figure 1.2: Graphical view of the contributions 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis
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It must be noted that the automation of the road traffic enforcement process
is one of the goals of the research project “Security Architecture and generation of
forensic electronic evidences in vehicular environments” (E-SAVE), which is funded
by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion under grant TIN2009-13461.
Therefore, this thesis is conducted within the scope of such research project.
The research results published in scientific journals and conferences during the
development of the present thesis are listed in Appendix B.
1.4 Document organization
This thesis is composed by several chapters distributed along five parts:
Part I. Introduction. This part introduces the whole document, and contains
the present Chapter.
Chapter 1. Introduction. This is the present Chapter, and contains the
thesis context, the statement of the problem, the research objectives and the main
contributions achieved.
Part II. State of the art. This part analyses the state of the art that is
closely related to this thesis. The reviewed topics have been organised into two
chapters.
Chapter 2. Intelligent Transportation Systems and Vehicular net-
works. This chapter describes the technological context of this thesis concerning
the vehicular technology. It introduces the main concepts and technologies that are
used in the contributions presented in this work. The related security issues are
also presented herein.
Chapter 3. Enforcement process. Technical and legal issues. This
chapter introduces the enforcement process, its particular realization in Spain and
the legal provisions regarding the electronic notification and the electronic evidence.
Part III. Proposal. This part includes the proposal elaborated to fulfil the
research objectives established above. Each of the four contributions is presented
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in a separate chapter.
Chapter 4. Enhanced road traffic administrative enforcement pro-
cess model for speeding offences and ITS realization. In this Chapter, an
enhanced enforcement model is proposed based on the previous VERA2 one. The
stakeholders, the enforcement entities, the data at stake including their interchanges
and their security and privacy concerns are also addressed. Based on this model, it
is discussed how ITS technologies may help on addressing the problems of this pro-
cess. Furthermore, this Chapter describes the parts of the model that are related
to each of the remaining contributions. Moreover, the decisions and assumptions
taken over the vehicular scenario for the remaining contributions of this thesis are
also introduced here.
Chapter 5. Mechanism for covert reporting of misbehaving vehicles.
This Chapter describes the steganography-based mechanism proposed to enable
victims of offenders to covertly report them. The details on the cover message
selected, its capacity, the selected protection mechanism and the embedding and
revealing functions are presented herein.
Chapter 6. Vehicular-enhanced electronic notification protocol. The
proposed electronic notification protocol is described here. For this purpose, the
considered model is presented, along with the architecture and a comparison with
other alternatives. The protocol itself is formalized at the end of this Chapter.
Chapter 7. EVIGEN: A protocol for vehicular cooperative EVIdence
GENeration. The protocol proposed to enable the generation of evidences describ-
ing a recent driving behavior by a vehicle (in this context, specially the offender) is
described in this Chapter. The model, architecture and protocol steps are presented
herein, along with a discussion on different design alternatives.
Part IV. Evaluation and Conclusions. The evaluation of the thesis con-
tributions and the conclusions are presented in this part, which is formed by two
chapters.
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Chapter 8. Evaluation. This Chapter contains the evaluation of the thesis
contributions:
– The enforcement model. It is assessed its suitability to represent current
enforcement systems, and the suitability of ITS techniques in this context.
– The reporting mechanism. It is analyzed its computational and operational
feasibility, its robustness and the fulfilment of the identified security requirements.
– The notification protocol. The achievement of the security requirements de-
rived from the legal provisions is verified. Furthermore, the computational and
network impact for different degrees of probability of success is measured, consid-
ering the unreliability of the vehicular communication network.
– The evidence generation protocol. It is evaluated its suitability to different
road scenarios. The amount of testimonies and witnesses available under different
assumptions is evaluated. The security requirements are also analysed.
Chapter 9. Conclusions and Future Work. In this Chapter, the conclu-
sions of this thesis are provided. A critical discussion of the work performed in this
thesis is presented. In addition, future research directions that may be derived from
this thesis are outlined.
Part V. Bibliography and Appendices. This part includes the bibliography
in use, the scientific publications derived from the underlying research, and a set of
appendices that complement the main content.
Bibliography. The bibliography contains the list of references to other research
papers, technical documents and standards used in the thesis.
Acronyms and abbreviations The set of acronyms and abbreviations that
are used throughout this thesis are presented herein.
Publications. The papers related to this thesis work in which the author has
participated are listed herein.
Specification of the data exchanges in the proposed model. This Ap-
pendix complements the proposed model in Chapter 4.
Part II
State of the art

Chapter 2
Intelligent Transportation
Systems and Vehicular networks
The increasing demand for connectivity due to the evolution of the Information
Society leads to the emergence of new communication scenarios. These are in-
creasingly integrated in the environment, giving access to networks anytime and
anywhere. Because of this constant change, some daily activities are evolving to
incorporate data sharing in its development. In the last years, this trend is being
also present in the vehicle and its environment. It is expected that both the traffic
management and the driving task are simplified with this technical improvement.
This Chapter introduces, first, the main concepts related to these new services,
called Intelligent Transportation Systems (Section 2.1). Some representative ap-
plications related to enforcement are also described therein. As these services are
usually based on a specific type of communication network referred to as Vehicular
Ad-hoc Network (VANET), it is briefly described in Section 2.2. Given the inci-
dence of security issues of such network in the contributions of this thesis, they are
introduced in Section 2.3.
2.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems
2.1.1 Description
The European Parliament, in its Directive on Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS) of 2009, defined these systems as advanced applications that without embodying
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intelligence as such aim to provide innovative services on transport modes and traffic
management and enable various users to be better informed and make safer, more
coordinated and “smarter” use of transport networks [2].
Such applications enable improvements over traditional procedures, such as ac-
cident reconstruction. For example, previous works have focused on combining the
vehicle-provided data with other information received from other vehicles in order
to rebuild the situation [19].
For these applications to be real, there is a set of enabling technologies that are
in constant evolution. Thus, vehicles are equipped with a growing set of sensors
that enable them to perceive their status and its surroundings [7]. Moreover, they
are equipped with a computational device and a communication unit that allows
them to exchange information with other nodes.
2.1.2 ITS applied to promote compliance to traffic rules
There are several applications devoted to promote the driver’s compliance to traffic
rules. Thus, Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) tries to ensure that the vehicle is
being driven at a safe speed. For this purpose, the vehicle either receives the speed
limit in force from a service provider, or it has this information pre-loaded (for
example, in the navigation system). ISA systems may also be classified according
to the level of intervention in the driving task. Thus, they may be limited to
informing the driver whenever she is speeding (passive ISA) or they may actively
decrease the speed once it happens (active ISA).
On the other hand, in-vehicle signage is intended to electronically transmit the
speed limit to passing by vehicles. In this way, the driver may be informed using
the human-machine interface of the vehicular communication systems. Thanks to
this application, the driver does not have to memorize the speed limit in force and,
moreover, dynamic speed limits may be implemented without requiring the driver
to pay excessive attention to the current limit.
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Finally, the Electronic Fee Collection (EFC) is a widespread tolling system that
enables an electronic payment of the entrance fee that is applied in some high-
ways. Thus, the vehicle electronically interacts with the toll booth and performs
the vehicle’s authorization of payment, which also requires its identification.
At the light of these descriptions, it is possible to identify that ITS systems are
intended to assist the driver (passive ISA, in-vehicle signage), to correct the driver
actions (active ISA) or even to act on behalf of the driver (EFC).
2.2 Overview of vehicular networks
VANETs are considered as a specific type of mobile network (in English, Mobile
Ad-hoc NETwork) [20]. In the following subsections, the entities that participate
in such network are introduced (Section 2.2.1), as well as their communication
patterns (Section 2.2.2). The specific challenges that are faced by these networks
are described in Section 2.2.3. Finally, Section 2.2.4 is devoted to the devices that
a vehicle uses to actively participate in a VANET to receive any ITS service.
Service 
providerManufacturer
RSU
Infrastructure environment
Ad-hoc environment
OBU TPM
TTPs
Service data 
(DVB, LBS, etc.)
Sensors
Legal 
Authority
TTP services data
(certification, 
timestamping, etc.)
V2I / I2V data
OBU TPM
Sensors
V2V data
Figure 2.1: Overview of a vehicular network
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2.2.1 VANET entities
Several different entities are usually assumed to exist in VANETs. To understand
the internals and related security issues of these networks, it is necessary to analyze
such entities and their relationships. Figure 2.1 shows the typical VANET scheme,
where two different environments are generally considered:
Infrastructure environment. In this part of the network, entities can be perma-
nently interconnected. It is mainly composed by those entities that manage the
traffic or offer an external service. On one hand, manufacturers are sometimes
considered within the VANET model. As part of the manufacturing process, they
identify uniquely each vehicle. On the other hand, the legal authority is commonly
present in VANET models. Despite the different regulations on each country, it is
habitually related to two main tasks - vehicle registration and offence reporting.
Every vehicle in an administrative region should get registered once manufactured.
As a result of this process, the authority issues a license plate. On the other hand,
it also processes traffic reports and fines. Trusted Third Parties (TTP) are also
present in this environment. They offer different services like credential manage-
ment or timestamping. Both manufacturers and the authority are related to TTPs
because they eventually need their services (for example, for issuing electronic cre-
dentials). Service providers are also considered in VANETs. They offer services
that can be accessed through the VANET. Location-Based Services (LBS) or Digi-
tal Video Broadcasting (DVB) are two examples of such services.
Ad-hoc environment. In this part of the network, sporadic (ad-hoc) communi-
cations are established from vehicles. Apart from other devices (that will be intro-
duced in Section 2.2.4), vehicles are equipped with a communication unit (OBU, On-
Board Unit) that enables Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
(V2I, I2V) communications. Such infrastructure is formed by some communica-
tions devices located aside the roads, called Road-Side Units (RSU). In this way,
RSUs become gateways between the infrastructure and vehicles and vice versa.
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2.2.2 VANET communication patterns
Depending on the nature and purpose of each ITS application, the way in which
messages have to be spread may be different. Four different communication patterns
may be identified in these networks.
 V2V warning propagation. There are situations in which it is necessary to
send a message to a specific vehicle or a group of them. For example, when
an accident is detected, a warning message should be sent to arriving vehicles
to increase traffic safety. On the other hand, if an emergency public vehicle
is coming, a message should be sent for preceding vehicles. In this way, it
would be easier for the emergency vehicle to have a free way. In both cases,
a routing protocol is then needed to forward that message to the destination.
 V2V group communication. Under this pattern, only vehicles having some
features can participate in the communication. These features can be static
(e.g. vehicles of the same enterprise) or dynamic (e.g. vehicles on the same
area in a time interval).
 V2V beaconing. Beacon messages are sent periodically to nearby vehicles.
They contain the current speed, heading, braking use, etc. of the sender
vehicle. These messages are useful to increase neighbor awareness. Beacons
are only sent to 1-hop communicating vehicles, i.e. they are not forwarded. In
fact, they are helpful for routing protocols, as they allow vehicles to discover
the best neighbor to route a message.
 I2V/V2I warning. These messages are sent either by the infrastructure
(through RSUs) or by a vehicle when a potential danger is detected. They are
useful for enhancing road safety. As an example, a warning could be sent by
the infrastructure to vehicles approaching to an intersection when a potential
collision could happen.
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2.2.3 Challenges of this type of network
VANETs have to face three main challenges that are not common in other net-
work environments – the mobility of some nodes, the network volatility and the
concentration of nodes. Concerning the mobility, it must be noted that vehicles
move at high speed (and can even exceed 120 kmph) and with different itineraries.
The network volatility is caused because in such networks the existence of a stable
communication infrastructure is not assumed. The aforementioned high mobility of
vehicles, with their limited communication range, causes the networks to be estab-
lished in an ad-hoc fashion, that is, networks of a limited temporal scope. Finally,
many vehicles can concentrate in one area (e.g. at traffic lights or in a traffic jam),
leading to networks with a large number of nodes.
2.2.4 In-vehicle devices required to participate in a VANET
Apart from the aforementioned OBUs, there are other in-vehicle devices that are
related to the participation in ITS applications and their underlying communica-
tion networks. Such devices are organized following an in-vehicle architecture. The
OVERSEE project1 proposes an architecture that focuses on security issues. Par-
ticularly, OVERSEE proposes a three-layer architecture, where the software and
hardware components are connected through a middleware layer (Figure 2.2). The
middleware ensures data confidentiality and integrity, as well as reliable message
delivery between sender and receiver.
In the software layer, there are three main components, namely the crypto-
graphic module, the secure I/O partition and the secure application partition en-
vironment. The cryptographic software is the only component that may access to
the Hardware Security Module (HSM), in order to perform the cryptographic needs
that are defined in IEEE 1609.2. HSMs are especially interesting for security pur-
poses, as they offer reliable storage and computation. They usually have a reliable
1https://www.oversee-project.com/
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Figure 2.2: Elements of the OVERSEE in-vehicle architecture related to this thesis
internal clock and are supposed to be tamper-resistant or at least tamper-evident
[21]. In this way, sensitive information (e.g. user credentials or pre-crash informa-
tion) can be reliably stored. The secure I/O partition establishes the access control
mechanisms to ensure that only the authorized applications make use of the differ-
ent in-vehicle devices such as in-vehicle sensors (which are connected to a recorder
component called Event Data Recorder [22]) or human-machine interface devices.
The Secure Application Environment (SAE) contain the software that implements
the different services offered to the driver. Other non-secured environments (called
partitions) are devised by OVERSEE for applications that do not require security.
Given that the mechanisms proposed in this thesis are related to the enforcement
process, their security needs impose that the corresponding application code be in
this secured environment.
In order to clarify the terminology, some projects use the term OBU to refer
to the whole set of the aforementioned in-vehicle devices. For example, the tolling
device developed by Toll Collect in Germany2 is referred to as OBU, and it is in
charge of not only the transmission but also the processing of the data at stake. In
this thesis, according to the definition provided by standard IEEE 1609.1, the OBU
only refers to the communication unit [23].
The inherent security properties offered by the HSM are the ultimate security
2http://www.toll-collect.de/en/home.html
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guarantee of the complete system. Thus, the system is booted in the following way.
Before starting the system, it is assumed that the root public key certificate of
the HSM manufacturer (and those of the software developers, if any) are securely
installed in the HSM. The first operation in the system boot-up is the integrity check
of the middleware software. If it is the case, the middleware continues loading the
remaining software elements, previously checking their integrity as well. It must be
noted that this procedure ensures that, once the boot-up is finished, the system is in
a secure status, that is, there are no compromised software elements and, moreover,
the middleware is offering its regular security services [24].
Once the boot-up is finished, the system is able to operate regularly. For the
focus of this work, this is translated into sending and receiving messages by the
running applications, with other nodes such as RSUs or back-end servers. In order
to send a message that requires some cryptographic operation (e.g. encryption,
signature, hash), the application requests the secure I/O partition to perform the
cryptographic operation. This request is redirected to the crypto software module,
which interacts with the HSM to get the required result. It is sent back to the
requesting application, which is now able to prepare the message. Afterwards, the
application asks the secure I/O partition to send the message to the OBU for its
transmission. All these interactions are performed through the middleware. The
process in the reception is similar. Once a cryptographic operation is needed over
an incoming message by the OBU, it is sent to the secure I/O partition. Based
on the message type, this component decides which application is in charge of its
management. The message is then sent to the appropriate application, which may
require the interaction of the crypto software module (again through the secure I/O
partition) in order to perform the cryptographic operation.
All the aforementioned considerations reveal that all components that are un-
der the control of the middleware are trustworthy, in the sense that they operate
correctly. Such components are highlighted in Figure 2.2. However, it must be
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noted that the HMI devices, the in-vehicle sensors and the OBU may be physically
altered.
For the sake of brevity, the interaction with the Secure I/O partition and the
Cryptographic software controller is omitted in the description of the mechanisms
proposed in this thesis. Therefore, it is shown as a direct interaction between the
SAE and the HSM.
2.3 Security issues in VANETs
This Section introduces the security requirements related to VANETs (Section 2.3.1)
and the corresponding attacks (Section 2.3.2). Furthermore, given that a signifi-
cant part of the data exchanged in a VANET is related to sensorial measurements,
Section 2.3.3 presents their security issues. Particularly, given that steganography
has been used to prove ownership or integrity of such data (by inserting some infor-
mation within), previous approaches on this direction are reviewed. This particular
technique is of relevance for this thesis as it enables embedding information within
transmitted data, which will be the basis for the contribution C2 concerning the
covert reporting of misbehaving vehicles.
2.3.1 Security requirements
Taking into account the different entities and data at stake, in this Section a cata-
logue of security requirements for each VANET setting is built. Although I2V and
V2I were considered to be the same setting, they have different security require-
ments and so they have been distinguished here.
First of all, entity identification imposes that each participating entity should
have a different and unique identifier. However, identification itself does not imply
that the entity proves that it is its actual identity - this requirement is called en-
tity authentication. Each of the application groups (enabled by the communication
patterns previously introduced) has different needs regarding to these requirements.
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V2V warning propagation needs identification to perform message routing and for-
warding - identifiers are essential to build routing tables. Sender authentication is
also needed for liability purposes. Imagine that a regular vehicle sends a notification
as if it were a police patrol. It should be then needed to prove the identity of the
emitting node. In group communications it is not required to identify or authen-
ticate the communicating peers. The only need is to show that both participating
entities have the required attributes to become group members - this is the at-
tribute authentication requirement. In fact, this is the only communication pattern
that needs this requirement. In beaconing, identification and authentication of the
sender is needed. Nearby vehicles can then build a reliable neighbour table. Both
requirements are also present in I2V warnings, where only messages sent by the
infrastructure are credible. Infrastructure warnings are sent to all passing vehicles
within an area, so identification or authentication of the receiver is not needed. On
the contrary, V2I warnings also require the emitting vehicle to be identified and
authenticated. In this way, only vehicles with a trustworthy identity will be able to
send such messages.
Accomplishing the cited requirements should not imply less privacy. In fact,
privacy preservation is critical for vehicles. In the vehicular context, privacy is
achieved when two related goals are satisfied - untraceability and unlinkability [25].
The first property states that vehicle’s actions should not be traced (i.e. different
actions of the same vehicle should not be related). On the other hand, the second
property establishes that it should be impossible for an unauthorized entity to link
a vehicles identity with that of its driver/owner. However, this privacy protection
should be removed when required by traffic authorities (i.e. for liability attribu-
tion). This requirement is present in all V2V communications. In fact, privacy
should not get compromised even if different messages (no matter if under different
communication patterns) are sent by the same vehicle. It does not apply to I2V
warnings, as the sender (i.e. the infrastructure) does not have privacy needs.
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Non-repudiation requirement assures that it will be impossible for an entity
to deny having sent or received some message. It is needed for the sender in V2V
warnings and beacons. In this way, if a vehicle sends some malicious data, there will
be a proof that could be employed for liability purposes. In group communications
it is not generally required, as the emitting node could be any of the group members.
With respect to I2V and V2I warnings, non-repudiation of origin is needed, so wrong
warning messages can be undoubtedly linked to the sending node. Non-repudiation
of receipt is not currently needed, but it will be in the future. Currently, accident
responsibility relies only on the human driver. However, in the future there are some
envisioned applications that would automate partially the driving task. In such
situation, not receiving a warning message could be critical for liability attribution.
Another important security requirement in vehicular communications is confi-
dentiality, that is, to assure that messages will only be read by authorized parties.
This requirement is present in group communications, in which only group members
are allowed to read such information. Furthermore, some I2V/V2I warnings may
be particular for a given vehicle, thus requiring a confidential communication.
The availability requirement implies that every node should be capable of send-
ing any information at any time. As most interchanged messages affect road traffic
safety, this requirement is critical in this environment. Designed communication
protocols and mechanisms should save as much bandwidth and computational power
as possible, while fulfilling these security requirements. It is present on all commu-
nication patterns, that is, it affects not only V2V communications, but also I2V
ones.
Finally, related to the information itself, data integrity and accuracy must be
assured. Both needs are globally referred as data trust. Data at stake should not be
altered and, more importantly, it should be truthful. It also implies that received
information is fresh (i.e. refers to the current state of the world). False or modified
data should lead to potential crashes, bottlenecks and other traffic safety problems.
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For this reason, data trust must be provided on all VANET communications.
2.3.2 Overview of attacks in VANETs
Once the security requirements have been established for VANETs, many attacks
can be identified to compromise them [26]. In this Section we elaborate on these
attacks, explaining how they can be performed and their potential consequences.
For the sake of clarity, attacks have been classified depending on the main affected
requirement.
Attacks on identification and authentication
There are two main attacks related to identification and authentication:
Impersonation. The attacker pretends to be another entity. It can be performed
by stealing other entity’s credential. As a consequence, some warnings sent to (or
received by) a specific entity would be sent to (or received by) an undesired one.
There exists a subtype of impersonation, called false attribute possession, in which
the attacker tries to show the possession of an attribute (e.g. to be a member of an
enterprise) to get some benefit. It could be performed if false credentials could be
built, or if revoked credentials could be used normally. As a consequence, a regular
vehicle could send messages claiming to be a police patrol, letting it to have a free
way.
Sybil. The attacker uses different identities at the same time. In this way,
a single vehicle could report the existence of a false bottleneck. As presented in
the VANET model, TPMs mounted on vehicles can store sensitive information
like identifiers. In this way, the Sybil threat is alleviated. However, security mecha-
nisms must be designed to provide identification and authentication, thus protecting
against impersonation attacks.
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Attacks on privacy
Attacks on privacy over VANETs are mainly related to illegally getting sensitive
information about vehicles. As there is a relation between a vehicle and its driver,
getting some data about a given vehicle’s circumstances could affect its driver pri-
vacy. These attacks can then be classified attending to the data at risk:
Identity revealing. Getting the owner’s identity of a given vehicle could put its
privacy at risk. Usually, a vehicle’s owner is also its driver, so it would simplify
getting personal data about that person.
Location tracking. The location of a vehicle in a given moment, or the path fol-
lowed along a period of time are considered as personal data. It allows building that
vehicle’s profile and, therefore, that of its driver. Mechanisms for facing both at-
tacks are required in VANETs. They must satisfy the trade-off between privacy and
utility. In this way, security mechanisms should prevent unauthorized disclosures
of information, but applications should have enough data to work properly.
Attacks on non-repudiation
The main threat related to non-repudiation is denying some action by some of the
implicated entities. Non-repudiation can be circumvented if two or more entities
share the same credentials. This attack is different from the impersonation attack
described before - in this case, two or more entities collude to have a common cre-
dential. In this way, they get indistinguishable, so their actions can be repudiated.
Credential issuance and management should be secured in VANETs to alleviate this
threat. Although reliable storage has been assumed in vehicles (by their TPMs),
having identical credentials in different vehicles should be avoided. Moreover, mech-
anisms that provide a proof of participation have to be also implemented.
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Attacks on confidentiality
Eavesdropping is the most prominent attack over VANETs against confidentiality.
To perform it, attackers can be located in a vehicle (stopped or in movement) or in a
false RSU. Their goal is to illegally get access to confidential data. As confidentiality
is needed in group communications, mechanisms should be established to protect
such scenarios.
Attacks on availability
As any other communication network, availability in VANETs should be assured
both in the communication channel and in participating nodes. A classification of
these attacks, according to their target, is as follows:
Network Denial of Service (DoS). It overloads the communication channel or
makes its use difficult (e.g. interferences). It could be performed by compromising
enough RSUs, or by making a vehicle to broadcast infinite messages in a period of
time. A particular case of network attack is routing anomalies, which could lead to
a DoS. In this case, attackers do not participate correctly in message routing over
the network. They drop all received messages (sinkhole attack) or just a few ones
according with their interests (selfish behavior).
Computation DoS. It overloads the computation capabilities of a given vehicle.
Forcing a vehicle to execute hard operations, or to store too much information,
could lead to this attack.
Attacks on data trust
Data trust can be compromised in many different ways in VANETs. Inaccurate
data calculation and sending affects message reliability, as they do not reflect the
reality. This could be performed by manipulating in-vehicle sensors, or by altering
the sent information. Imagine that a vehicle reports an accident in road E-7, while
it really took place in E-9. Such information should compromise such messages’
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trust. Even worse, sending false warnings (e.g. the accident did not take place)
would also affect the whole system reliability. In this way, mechanisms to protect
against such inappropriate data should be put in practice in vehicular contexts.
2.3.3 Security over sensorial information: Steganography-based
approaches
This Section gives a brief background on steganography and how it has been applied
over sensorial data. For the sake of brevity, only the most basic notions on this issue
are introduced herein. Interested readers may refer to [27].
Definition
Steganography is the science that studies the techniques to hide the existence of
messages [28]. Steganography shall not be confused with cryptography, which main
aim is to conceal the content of the message so only allowed parties are able to read
it. On the contrary, steganography aims to hide the message itself.
The first informal description of steganography was given by Simmons as the
prisoners problem [29]. Simmons described two prisoners (Alice and Bob) who want
to plot an escape plan. As they are not in the same cell, they must communicate
through a warden (Willie) that will analyse any communication between them. If
Willie ever suspects that Alice and Bob are exchanging secret information he will
put them into isolation cells and the escape plan will be frustrated. In this scenario,
Alice and Bob will not be able to directly use cryptography as the unintelligible
messages between them will raise suspicions on Willie. In order to achieve their
goal, they should hide their messages into innocuous looking ones, so Willie will
not be aware of the real meaning of those messages.
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Elements of a steganographic system
The prisoners problem shows the different elements that take part in a stegano-
graphic communication (Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Elements of a steganographic system
Let M be the secret message to be covertly sent. Let C be the innocuous
message (cover) used to embed the hidden information. Let K be a pre shared
password known by both the sender and the recipient of the message. The em-
bedding function, Fe(M,C,K), takes as input the cover C, the secret message M
and the password K and outputs a Stego-object C ′ which looks like the original
cover. To improve the security of the embedded data, Fe usually encrypts the secret
message before embedding it into the cover. The stego-object is sent to its recipient
through an insecure channel that may be controlled by a warden. On reception,
the revealing function Fr(C ′,K) is applied. Fr takes as input the stego-object C ′
and the pre-shared password K and outputs the secret message M .
Desirable properties
The main goal of steganography is to build embedding functions that allow partici-
pants to embed practical amounts of information into covers in such a way that an
attacker cannot detect the presence of hidden information [30]. To produce unde-
tectable stego-objects, there should not be statistical differences between the set of
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all possible covers C and the set of generated stego objects C ′. Thus, it should not
be possible to detect whether an object has embedded information or not without
the knowledge of the key. In this regard, true randomness found in covers is the
best carrier for steganographic information [31]. Replacing this with encrypted in-
formation would not change the statistical properties of the cover, given that the
encryption result is assumed to be random.
Apart from the effectiveness of the mechanism, it is desirable that it offers
the maximum capacity to embed information while remaining undetected. Fur-
thermore, two desirable properties are the resistance against passive attacks (e.g.
eavesdropping) as well as against active ones (e.g. data alteration).
Previous approaches
Steganography and other information hiding techniques have been used to embed
some information within sensor generated data. These approaches are usually de-
voted to prove ownership or integrity of sensor-generated data.
The work in [32] proposed a system that was able to watermark raw sensor data
in real time by modifying sensor constraints such as its position, resolution and
data gathering frequency. Similarly, Zhang et al. use watermarking techniques to
authenticate sensor-generated data [33]. Sensor data is transformed in an image in
which each pixel intensity is related to the sensor measurement. Sensor images are
then watermarked. Transmission of gathered sensor data uses a lossy compression
algorithm, producing slight differences on gathered data at the other end of the
communication. Checking the embedded watermark allows to verify if produced
differences are acceptable.
A more general approach to sensor data watermarking was proposed in [34]. The
proposed system requires, besides the numeric set to be watermarked, the definition
of usability metrics for the numerical set. The set is divided into non overlapping
subsets. For each subset, the algorithm tries to embed a bit of the watermark
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without exceeding the restrictions imposed by the usability metrics. Sets that can
not be altered without exceeding the usability metrics are ignored.
Despite the relevance of sensorial data in VANETs, to the best to this thesis
author’s knowledge there are not previous contributions related to the application
of steganography for the particular sensor information at stake in these networks.
Chapter 3
Enforcement process. Technical
and legal issues
This chapter introduces the technical and legal issues of the road traffic enforcement
process, which are the context of this thesis. First, a description on the current pro-
cess and its implementing systems is given in Section 3.1. After this general view
of the process, the following Sections focus on the specific issues related to the
contributions of this thesis. Particularly, Section 3.2 introduces the electronic noti-
fication and its legal framework and Section 3.3 describes the electronic evidence.
Section 3.4 is devoted to identify the main problems of the road traffic enforcement
process. Finally, the parts of the European ITS architecture providing support for
law enforcement are described in Section 3.5. It should be noted that the European
ITS architecture seems to be the most outstanding contribution for the context of
this thesis, as it is intended to be the general framework for ITS systems.
3.1 Current model and implementing systems
This Section describes the considered enforcement model, which is the result of
the VERA2 (Video Enforcement for Road Authorities 2) project. Such model is
composed by a set of flowcharts and a data dictionary. In this Section, only the
speeding enforcement flowchart will be presented, as it is in the scope of this thesis.
Furthermore, the Spanish and French systems that implement the enforcement in
these countries are introduced.
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3.1.1 VERA2 model
The enforcement process starts when the illegal action is detected and finishes
when the punishment has been established. In between, several steps may take
place. Countries like Spain group them into four phases - starting, preliminary
investigation, resolution and appealling [35]. For the sake of clarity, such division
will be employed to describe the process. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the different
steps that happen during the process, grouped in the aforementioned phases.
Starting
The enforcement process starts with the detection of the illegal action. It may be
detected either by the Authority or by any person that knows about the offence.
Supporting evidences are collected and sent to the Authority for evaluation. If the
Authority considers the action as an offence, a fine notification is issued and sent
to the vehicle owner. In order to retrieve the owner information, the vehicle license
plate is analysed. In case that it is a foreign vehicle, its corresponding national
database or the EUCARIS one (EUropean CAR and driving licence Information
System1) is contacted.
Preliminary investigation
There are two actions that may be performed by the offender in this phase. First, the
owner2 can nominate another person as the offending driver. Then, the notification
is sent to this person. It must be noted that these notifications may be ignored
by its receiver and, in some cases, re-sending them is allowed. In case that the
notification is finally not ignored, the second action is to contest the fine. As a
result, if the fine is cancelled, this decision is sent to the offender.
1https://www.eucaris.net/
2The vehicle’s owner is the person who is legally responsible for the vehicle. It is also commonly
referred to as vehicle keeper. Both concepts will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
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Resolution
If the previous phase has not cancelled the fine, an independent revision of the whole
process is conducted. It verifies whether the process development is law respectful
and thus if the offence is uphold. In any case, the revision result is notified to the
offender.
Appealling
After receiving such notification, if the penalty is imposed the offender may accept
or appeal it. In the latter case, she creates a document expressing the reasons to
proceed, and sends it to the Authority for evaluation. The result of this process is
notified to the sender. In case that the appeal has not removed the fine, the penalty
is executed.
3.1.2 Overview of current enforcement systems. Case studies:
Spanish ESTRADA and French CSA
Most enforcement systems in developed countries have some of their steps automa-
tised. However, such automated devices are usually only employed in the Starting
phase. Systems like the Spanish ESTRADA [36] or the French CSA [37] are good
representatives of this enforcement trend. Both systems are composed by fixed and
mobile speed cameras that are connected to a central processing office. Here, the
license plate is extracted from the pictures taken, and the vehicle holder is identi-
fied by retrieving this information from the official register. The fine notification
is prepared to be sent by post to the vehicle holder. All these steps are performed
automatically.
Beyond this point, there are some slight differences between both systems. In the
Spanish case, a recent revision of the traffic law has allowed sending this notification
by electronic mail [6]. The notification receiver may also receive a short text message
in her mobile phone indicating that such notification has been sent. The French
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case does not provide with this option. Moreover, the French system requires the
vehicle holder to pay the fine prior to identifying the real driver in the Preliminary
investigation phase [38].
3.2 Spanish legal framework on electronic notifications
This Section describes the legal framework regarding the requirements on the noti-
fication system, the notification process and the contents of an offence notification.
A significant part of the legal regulation of the electronic notification is focused
on establishing the guarantees that must be provided to ensure the notification va-
lidity. Thus, Section 3.2.1 describes the general mechanisms and their requirements.
Section 3.2.2 describes the contents of a road traffic notification.
3.2.1 Mechanisms for electronic notification. Requirements
The Royal Decree 1671/2009 establishes four ways in which the electronic notifica-
tion may be performed, namely (1) the use of a specific (authorized, ‘habilitada’)
electronic address, (2) the use of a mail system which attests the message recep-
tion, (3) the access to the electronic site of the notifying party, or (4) any other
mechanism that attests the reception of the message within the time interval and
satisfies its own regulatory issues [39].
Even if the notification mechanism proposed in this thesis (see Chapter 6) lays
into the last type (thus being subject to its own regulation), it is convenient to
analyze the requirements imposed to the remaining types in order to predict which
ones will be applied to this new mechanism in the future. It should be noted that all
mechanisms should protect the citizens’ rights to the same extent, no matter how
they internally work. Concerning the authorized electronic address, it must attest
the date and time of the availability of the notification. The same information must
be attested for the moment in which the notification is accessed. It must provide
a permanent access and there should be an authentication mechanism that ensures
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the identity of the accessing person as well as its exclusive access. Additionally,
the Legal Order PRE-878/2010 imposes a set of additional requirements for those
entities that do not have their own regulatory framework [40]. Thus, it imposes the
data confidentiality, the use of physical security measures, the protection of storage
devices and the temporal attestation based on the data provided by the Spanish
Real Observatorio de la Armada.
With respect to the electronic mail, a receipt must be issued in an automatic
and unavoidable way. It must be issued once the notification content is accessed
by the receiver. Regarding the mechanism based on the electronic access to the
notifier site, the user must be authenticated and, prior to accessing to the content,
a warning message must be displayed. Once such warning is accepted, the system
must record the date and time of this action.
Road traffic electronic notifications. Spanish Direccio´n Electro´nica Vial
(DEV)
The Spanish Law 18/2009 defines one specific type of authorized electronic address
called Direccio´n Electro´nica Vial (DEV) [6]. Thanks to the DEV, the physical home
becomes a virtual home, as the place to receive notifications3. Such mechanism aims
to ensure that the citizen is always aware of his/her legal procedures4.
Once a notification has been received, the receiver may accept, reject or ignore
it. In order to avoid the process to get stopped in this point, if the notification is
not accepted or rejected in ten days, it will be considered as rejected. This interval
will be cancelled if there is a way to prove that it was not possible to access to the
notification5.
3Translated from the Spanish: “El tradicional concepto de domicilio f´ısico se transforma ahora
en domicilio virtual”.
4Derived from the Spanish: “Las notificaciones mediante boletines oficiales (...) no ofrecen
garant´ıa material alguna al ciudadano de que tenga siempre conocimiento de los procedimientos
que contra e´l se dirigen. En estas circunstancias se crea la Direccio´n Electro´nica Vial (DEV)”.
5Translated from the Spanish: “Si existiendo constancia de la recepcio´n de la notificacio´n en
la Direccio´n Electro´nica Vial, transcurrieran diez d´ıas naturales sin que se acceda a su contenido,
se entendera´ que aque´lla ha sido rechazada, salvo que de oficio o a instancia del destinatario se
compruebe la imposibilidad te´cnica o material del acceso.”.
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The legal requirements on the DEV are very similar to those applied to the
authorized address. Particularly, the date and time of the notification availability
must be attested, as well as the moment of the access to the notification.
3.2.2 Road traffic notification contents
Based on Law 18/2009, road traffic notifications must contain the following five sets
of data [6]:
 Offender: identification of the vehicle, identification of the offender (if known),
address to perform notifications (or DEV, if the offender has enabled it ).
 Offence: offence description (place, date and time), violation purportedly
committed.
 Reporting entity: name and address of the reporting entity (or professional
identification, in case of road traffic agents).
 Punishment: Authority enabled to set the punishment and legal reference
of such designation. Punishment description and demerit points that are at
stake.
 Future actions: Amount of payment already satisfied, legal consequences of
partial payment. Legal explanation on the process, place and time interval to
introduce allegations and counterevidences.
3.3 Electronic evidence. Description and precedents
in ITS-related environments
Electronic evidences are the main mechanism to build attestations in the electronic
context. In the road traffic enforcement process, they may serve to attest some
driving behavior.
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Electronic evidences have suffered a great evolution in the recent years, as a
consequence of the generalization of computer forensics techniques. This Section
describes electronic evidences (Section 3.3.1), their associated management cycle
(Section 3.3.2) and the previous works that have focused on applying these concepts
in vehicular environments (Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Definition and principles
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary6, an evidence is defined as something
legally submitted to a tribunal to ascertain the truth of a matter. In order to capture
the specific issues of the electronic world, a refined version has been built for elec-
tronic evidences. Thus, it has been defined as any trace that has been created by, or
stored in, a computational system, that may be used as a proof in a legal process7
[41].
At the light of the previous definitions, electronic evidences are intended to be
submitted for their consideration in Courts. It is a matter of the Authority in force
(e.g. judge, administrative supervisor, etc.) to evaluate its relevance and impact
within the process at stake. Prior to such evaluation, evidences must satisfy some
principles in order to be accepted as a legal proof. Although these principles may
vary between different countries, four generic ones have been identified [42]:
 Authenticity and reliability. The evidence must be genuine and must contain
reliable data.
 Completeness, containing all the data required to support the claim or hy-
pothesis at stake.
 Law conformance, remarkably ensuring that it has been obtained without
threatening other rights.
6http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
7Translated from the Spanish: “Cualquier registro generado por, o almacenado en, un sistema
computacional que puede ser utilizado como prueba en un proceso legal”.
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Figure 3.3: Evidence management process as defined by Cano [41]
3.3.2 Management cycle
In order to ensure that the evidence will respect the aforementioned principles,
a management cycle is required (see Figure 3.3). Such cycle should preserve the
evidence during the whole process, from the moment in which it is obtained and
until it is used in Courts. Despite the fact that an international, worldwide standard
does not exist, an essential sequence of steps have been identified by Cano [41].
The first step involves designing the evidence, that is, setting its format and the
information that should be contained in it. The second phase creates the evidence,
whereas the third step collects it. In the fourth step, it is analysed to establish
whether it is suitable or not to support (or refute) a given hypothesis. If it is the
case, the evidence is transferred to the adjudicator (i.e. the entity that will take a
decision to solve the current controversy). In the last step, the evaluation by the
adjudicator is performed.
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3.3.3 Precedents in vehicular networks
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are little scientific contributions on
evidence generation in these scenarios. The most representative ones are related to
accident reconstruction. In [43], Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are employed
to register all the events produced by the own car. Once the crash has happened,
involved vehicles send informative beacons to the surrounding vehicles to alert them
on the situation. Furthermore, HSMs of crashed vehicles become a black box.
The aforementioned existence of black boxes in vehicles have been generalized
in a family of devices called Motor Vehicle Event Data Recorders (MVEDR). These
devices, normalized under IEEE 1616 standard, are intended to register the own
vehicle’s sensor measurements [22]. The main problem of these devices is that they
only ensure that the stored data is securely managed. However, before arriving
to this device the information is created by a sensor and transmitted through an
in-vehicle communication network. Unless they are properly secured, both the
sensor and the communication network may be compromised. In such a situation,
evidences based on data stored in MVEDRs may be called into question.
Evidence generation is also present in the security framework presented by Lin
et al. [44]. Their focus is on building a secure and private communication protocol
that ensures efficient traceability when needed. Thus, they consider the signed
traffic messages sent by one entity as an evidence. Once an incident happens, two
Authority-related entities (Tracing Manager and Membership Manager) collaborate
to reveal the signer’s identity based on the aforementioned evidence.
3.4 Problems of the enforcement process
Based on [4][45], current automated systems face three main problems. Each one
is introduced in the following subsections.
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3.4.1 Problem 1. Lack of a reliable and immediate offender iden-
tification
Current automated systems have a lack of reliable offender identification. Auto-
mated devices such as cameras have to combine their effectiveness with the drivers
right of privacy protection. Thus, graphic evidences (i.e. pictures or videos) usually
only show the vehicle’s rear [46].
To solve this liability-privacy tradeoff, the fine is firstly referred to the vehicle’s
owner who identifies the actual driver (as explained in Section 3.1.1). This method
has two main drawbacks. First, the process is delayed, as the owner has to perform
the mentioned identification. For example, Spanish legislation enables up to 15
days for this purpose, added to the time to deliver the notification. Second, it can
lead to identification frauds. This is especially relevant in those countries where
sanctions can have consequences over the driving licence (i.e. demerit points, license
withdrawal).
Using pictures or videos to identify the vehicle has another drawback. The
effectiveness of current Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems is
not complete, but around 90 per cent [47]. Moreover, singularities of the number
plates in different countries make difficult to identify foreign offending vehicles.
3.4.2 Problem 2. Notification delays
Notifications introduce a delay in the process composed by three factors: the time
to prepare the notification (tprep.notif ), to send it (tsend.notif ) and to access to it
by the receiver (tdelay.access). Recent estimations in Spain showed that such delay
was 45 days for postal notifications and 12 days for electronic ones [11]. Manual
notifications are usually performed in some minutes, as they only require to fill
up a form. Even if such notifications are the most immediate ones, they may
only be applied to a short proportion of offences due to the limitation of human
resources. Therefore, for most offences its notification arrives after several days,
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which decreases its educational purpose [4].
3.4.3 Problem 3. Unfairness: Incomplete offence descriptions and
lack of witnesses
Nowadays, automated surveillance devices (such as cameras) or even police agents
are the main data sources employed to describe the offence. Such data sources
observe the situation from a single point outside the vehicle. However, sensorial
errors (for devices) as well as perception limitations or even psychological factors
(for persons) may offer inaccurate offence descriptions, thus leading to unfair pun-
ishments. This situation may not be countered by drivers, as usually there are no
witnesses to support their claims [45].
3.5 Support for law enforcement by the European ITS
architecture
The European architecture on ITS provides support for the enforcement process
[48]. This support is focused on the initial evidence collection and transfer to the law
enforcement agency. Figure 3.4 shows the Data Flow Diagram (DFD) that describes
the data flows and operations related to this process. First, the Detect Fraud or
Violation determines whether a given action is against the rules. For this purpose,
it is assisted by the Identify Violator function, which returns the identification of
the vehicle involved and that of the person who is responsible for such vehicle. It
should be noted that this function takes into account the chance of retrieving data
from the on-board vehicular equipment. Thus, it considers requesting the Driver for
some data produced by the on-board vehicular equipment, such as speed, pollution,
driving schedule, etc. Furthermore, it also uses the vehicular identification provided
by such devices.
Based on the initial determination of the type of offence, the vehicle identifica-
tion and that of its responsible person, the Process Fraud and Violation Notifica-
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tions function creates the prosecution file. Such file contains all the data required to
prosecute a violator – description of the offence (date, place, description, means used
to detect it, available proofs ), of the offender (vehicle identification, owner/driver
identification, previous offences) and the consequences of this action.
Once the file is built, it is sent to the Law Enforcement Agency to start the
prosecution process. Therefore, the way in which such file is made available to the
affected person, as well as the rest of the enforcement process (allegations, further
investigations, etc.) is out of the scope of this architecture.
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Figure 3.4: European ITS architecture – ‘Provide support for law enforcement’
DFD [49]
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Part III
Proposal

Chapter 4
Enhanced road traffic
administrative enforcement
process model for speeding
offences and ITS realization
The VERA2 project provided an enforcement process model, particularly applied
to speeding offences, that allows understanding its main steps. Nevertheless, this
model is not enough to determine which ITS-related technologies are more suitable
for this context, or their specific scope.
This Chapter introduces an enhanced model, based on the VERA2 one. It is
focused on road traffic administrative offences caused by speeding. It complements
the previous one by the identification of enforcement entities, stakeholders, data
structures and interchanges. The data security and privacy considerations are also
analysed. It is also identified the way in which ITS technologies may be applied in
this context to contribute on the current problems of enforcement systems.
In order to perform the aforementioned enhancements, the system that real-
izes the enforcement process is considered. Section 4.1 presents the methodology
employed to derive the enhancements. Section 4.2 describes the refinements made
over the VERA2 process model to make it suitable to represent current enforcement
practices. For this purpose, the Spanish case has been considered. Section 4.3 in-
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troduces the stakeholders that interact with the system to establish the appropriate
fine. The legislation establishes several data structures to be present at each part
of the process. Section 4.4 presents such data structures, which will be managed by
enforcement entities (described in Section 4.5). The main data interchanges that
happen during the process are depicted in Figure 4.1, whereas Appendix C speci-
fies all of them in detail. Section 4.6 discusses the arising data security and privacy
issues.
The selection of ITS technologies that may be applied to contribute on the
identified enforcement problems (recall Section 3.4), as well as the parts of the
proposed model affected by such integration, is presented in Section 4.7.
4.1 Methodology
In order to identify the proposed enhancements, two sources of information have
been analysed: the VERA2 flowchart [10] and the Spanish traffic law [6]. As a result,
some refinements over the VERA2 flowchart have been introduced. Afterwards,
the flowchart steps have been grouped whenever they form a conceptual set of
operations that may be addressed by an enforcement entity. Each of these groups
(and thus, enforcement entities) has been given a name, leading to an initial set of
entities.
The flowchart does not detail the stakeholders that participate in each step in
the process. For this purpose, the Spanish traffic law has been analysed to extract
this information. These stakeholders have enabled a classification of the aforemen-
tioned enforcement entities based on the relationships between such entities and the
stakeholders (see Figure 4.1).
Finally, the legislation has also been analysed to determine the data at stake in
each enforcement entity, along with their data interchanges. The data security and
privacy needs have also been identified. A new block of enforcement entities was
identified to store these data.
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4.2 Refinements over the VERA2 process model
Four refinements are performed over the VERA2 process model. The first one aims
to extend it to enforcement actions performed by police patrols, instead of only
considering those registered by automated devices. Thus, the person identified as
the offender (called designated-as-offender role, from now on) in the Starting phase
may be not only the owner, but also the driver. Related to this point, the second
refinement is that the legislation enables the owner to nominate another person as
the usual driver. Therefore, she will receive the fine notifications at first, instead of
the owner.
The third refinement is to specify the ways to contest the fine in the Preliminary
investigation. Thus, there may be allegations and counterevidences. Allegations en-
able to have another view of the offence context, trying to decrease its severity. For
example, medical emergencies may be considered as an alleviating factor for speed-
ing. Regarding counterevidences, they are a piece of verifiable data describing the
facts. As an example, a counterevidence could show that the vehicle speedometer
did not reach that illegal speed. It may be built by the Authority after proposal
from the offender or by its own initiative. For example, it may consist on checking
whether the radar was properly calibrated.
The fourth refinement is related to the notification of the Intermediate fine (data
structure described in Section 4.4). Such notification happens only once the fine
has been contested and this action has not been upheld because of data or facts
unknown to the offender. Moreover, only in this case the offender is enabled to
defend herself by sending new allegations at the beginning of the Resolution phase.
4.3 Stakeholders
There are three groups of stakeholders in this process. The first one contains the
participants related to the process management (see Figure 4.1, upper part). These
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are the administrative Authorities and the auxiliary law enforcers that support their
work.
The second group (see Figure 4.1, lower left corner) contains the participants
that have been witnesses of the offence, but are not the offender. According to the
Spanish law, three types of witnesses may report an offence – persons, automated
sensor devices or police officers [6]. Moreover, technically enabled vehicles could
also become electronic witnesses.
The third group (see Figure 4.1, lower right corner) is composed by the entities
directly related to the offence. Apart from the offending vehicle, it may be any
entity that plays the designated-as-offender role (recall Section 4.2).
4.4 Data at stake
In this Section the data structures involved in the enforcement process are described
(see Table 4.1), detailing their composing data elements based on the Spanish legis-
lation [6]. For the sake of uniformity, the catalogue of information elements provided
by the VERA2 dictionary is used when possible [10]. In Table 4.1, the element iden-
tifiers from that dictionary are marked in parenthesis (where n/a indicates that this
data item is not in the dictionary).
In the Starting phase, two structures exist - the initial evidence and the ini-
tial fine. The initial evidence is the first description of the violation, whereas the
initial fine is the first evaluation of the aforementioned violation conducted by the
Authority.
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There are three data structures in the Preliminary investigation, namely the
allegation, the counterevidence and the intermediate fine. The allegation contains
the alleged element and the motivation. A very similar structure is used by coun-
terevidences, where only the allegation content is substituted by the evidence data.
In this case, it may contain a testimony, a graphical proof (i.e. picture or video) or
any probatory element. Regarding the intermediate fine, it is a revision of the initial
fine based on the previous data elements. Thus, it is formed by the assessment of
the counterevidences and allegations at stake and the revised fine amount.
In the Process resolution, apart from the aforementioned allegations, only the
final fine is managed. The main difference between this structure and the previous
one is that it establishes the definitive fine, showing its motivation. It also details
the legal basis for the posterior appeals by the offender.
Finally, the Appealling phase manages the appeal and its result. Although the
appeal has a different legal status, its contents are the same as the allegations one,
except from the vehicle data. On the other hand, the appeal result mainly describes
the appeal assessment by the Authority and the remaining legal actions that may
be taken by the offender.
4.5 Enforcement entities
The entities that compose the enforcement system are organized in four blocks
(see Figure 4.1), namely the Witness data retrieval, the Offender communication
management, the Data management and the Enforcement process management.
Following there is a description of each block.
4.5.1 Witness data retrieval
This block gathers the two entities (Evidence Collector and Data Requester) that
communicate with the witness stakeholders (see lower left part of Figure 4.1). The
Evidence Collector gathers the initial evidence, delivers it to the appropriate entity
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in the Enforcement process management group, and registers it within the Data
management block.
The Data Requester retrieves additional information from stakeholders. It may
be required by the Authority to contrast a given allegation or counterevidence.
It may also enable the offence-related stakeholders to contact with witnesses to
retrieve information for a later counterevidence.
4.5.2 Offender communication management
The two entities (Notifier and Designated-as-offender contact point) that enable the
communication with the offence-related stakeholders are placed here (see lower right
part of Figure 4.1). The Notifier performs the legal notification of every fine (initial,
intermediate, final) and resolution (appeal resolution). The Designated-as-offender
contact point allows the offence-related stakeholders to introduce allegations, coun-
terevidences and appeals.
4.5.3 Data management
This block is formed by three entities that manage all the process-related data (see
right part of Figure 4.1). First, the Designated-as-offender personal data manager
gathers all the personal data (including the driving licence information) related to
the designated-as-offender. Second, the vehicle data is managed in the Vehicle data
manager. These two entities may be implemented using national registers or the
EUCARIS database. Third, the Process data manager stores the data exchanged
with stakeholders, and the results of such transmissions, thus ensuring the process
traceability.
It should be noted that the Designated-as-offender personal data manager is
closely related to another entity which is in charge of managing the credentials
associated with persons. Analogously, the Vehicle data manager cooperates with
the entity that manages the vehicular credentials. Such entities are not depicted in
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Figure 4.1 as they are not exclusive of the enforcement context, but instead shared
with all the remaining management processes of the Traffic Authority.
4.5.4 Enforcement process management
This block is divided into four groups, each one called as the phase which it is
related to (see upper part of Figure 4.1). The Starting group contains two entities.
First, the Evidence analyser completes the offender personal data and vehicle de-
scription (if not contained within the initial evidence) and scrutinizes the evidence
authenticity and its reliability. In case that this evidence is determined to be valid,
the Initial fine issuer establishes the initial fine considering the described facts and
the legislation in force.
The Preliminary investigation group is formed by four entities - the Liable driver
analyser, the Counterevidence analyser, the Allegation analyser and the Intermedi-
ate fine issuer. The Liable driver analyser receives allegations that identify another
person as the offending driver. This entity verifies the plausibility of such iden-
tification trying to decrease the chance of frauds. The remaining allegations are
evaluated by the Allegation analyser, which establishes their authenticity and their
relevance in the process. The Counterevidence analyser operates in the same way
over the counterevidences. Based on their evaluation results, the Intermediate fine
issuer confirms, revokes or decreases the initial fine.
The Process resolution contains the Process analyser and the Final fine issuer.
The former revises the process development and determines if the legal framework
has been respected. Excessive delays or unreliable data elements are examples
of illegal process executions. Moreover, it evaluates the allegations sent after the
Intermediate fine. Using these analysis results, the Final fine issuer establishes the
final fine. Although the task performed by this entity is quite similar to that of the
Intermediate fine issuer, they must be independent entities to mitigate the threat
of collusion.
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Finally, in the Appealling group the Appeal analyser determines the relevance of
a given appeal and, based on such assessment, the Appeal result issuer definitively
confirms or cancels the fine.
4.6 Data security and privacy analysis
Data security and privacy are paramount in the enforcement process. First, because
of the legal consequences it may have. Second, because during the process, entities
must deal with personal data of the designated-as-offender, the human witnesses,
etc. The detailed model just presented allows to perform a preliminary analysis of
these issues, which is presented in this subsection. First, the specific security and
privacy goals that should be fulfilled are introduced. Afterwards, the threats that
put at risk these goals are described, along with the corresponding countermeasures.
4.6.1 Goals
Apart from the reliable offender identification, there are four goals that must be
achieved within the process development. First, the privacy protection (i.e. the
right of an individual to control who has access to his or her personal informa-
tion and under what circumstances [50]) must be fulfilled for all involved physical
persons (i.e. the offender and the human witness, if any). This requirement has
already been set for all applications of the aforementioned ITS technologies [2]. A
related (but different) goal is the need of confidentiality, which implies that only the
entities involved in the creation or delivery of a data element (according to the data
exchanges defined in Appendix C) may be able to access it. The legislation regard-
ing personal data protection does not impose the need for encryption to provide
confidentiality over data which is related to an administrative punishment1 [52].
However, it seems a reasonable practice to require the more strict security goals
whenever they do not imply an excessive, unjustified overload on the implementing
1For an in-depth explanation on the security implications of the aforementioned legislation,
please refer to [51].
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systems. For this reason, providing confidentiality is set as the second goal in this
model.
The third goal is that all the data at stake must be trustworthy, which implies
that the information is created by an authorized sender and that the content is reli-
able. In particular, all the fines and the appeal resolution should be properly issued
by the corresponding Authority and it should exist a method to verify their content.
On the other hand, all the data inserted by witnesses and the designated-as-offender
must faithfully describe the offence, its context and identify the offender. Otherwise,
the whole enforcement process would be unreliable, thus losing its effectiveness.
The last goal refers to the non-repudiation, that is, avoiding an entity to deny
having performed some action [53]. In particular, all the data exchanges between
entities and stakeholders must be non repudiable regarding origin (i.e. avoiding the
false denial of having created and sent a message) and receipt (i.e. avoiding the
false denial of having received a message). In this way, the possibility of denying the
relationship with some data exchange is prevented. Particularly, this goal ensures
a complete traceability of the data exchange process, as both the sending and
receiving operations may be accurately traced back to their originating parties.
Such traceability is critical in a potential dispute resolution process related to this
issue. For example, the offender may claim not having received the notification to
allege that the process is not conforming to the legislation and thus it should be
invalidated.
4.6.2 Threats and countermeasures
Each of the aforementioned goals has some threats that make its achievement
harder. Such threats are described below, along with countermeasures that may be
applied to mitigate them.
Regarding the personal privacy, the threat of tracking (i.e. to discover the path
that has been followed by a given vehicle) has raised a remarkable concern among
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researchers [54]. Regarding the offender, it may happen if not privacy-respectful
surveillance methods are employed to detect offences. Although this threat may
always exist in the physical environment (as it may be possible to install a network
of surveillance cameras), the use of pseudonyms has been proposed to mitigate it
in the electronic vehicular network [54].
With respect to the data confidentiality, the unauthorized data disclosure threat
allows undesired third parties to access to confidential information. Although each
entity participating on a data exchange is subject to this threat, in this context it is
specially focused on the Data Management entities (see Section 4.5), as they hold
all the data related to the process, the existing drivers and their vehicles. Thus,
protection mechanisms such as access control measures must be put in place to
mitigate this threat. Moreover, such confidentiality may also be provided during
all the associated data exchanges. Depending on the underlying reliability of the
communication network, this threat may be present to a different extent. In any
case, encryption techniques may be applied to mitigate this threat.
The false data spreading is a threat against the data trustworthiness that can
be employed by any stakeholder to alter the regular process development. In this
context, this threat may be interesting for the offender, as she may try to avoid the
fine by sending a false (beneficial) counterevidence in case that the illegal action
was really done. It may also be employed by a human witness to falsely accuse a
person of having committed an offence. In order to mitigate this threat, the use of
plausibility checks has been proposed to assess the reliability of a given sensorial
data, such as those that may be employed in this context [17].
Finally, the repudiation threat may be present in the behaviour of the offender,
the witness and the Authority in general. Regarding the offender, she may claim
that she did not receive any notification, as a means of invalidating the whole pro-
cess. With respect to the witness, it may deny having created a testimony once it
is found to be false. Related to the Authority, it may deny having received a coun-
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terevidence as a way of imposing the maximum punishment and thus maximizing
the economic revenue. In order to avoid this threat, non-repudiation mechanisms
must be introduced in the data exchanges of the enforcement process [55].
4.7 ITS-based enhancements on enforcement systems:
Integration in the proposed model
This Section focuses on how ITS-related technologies may contribute on solving the
problems of current enforcement systems described in Section 3.4. Moreover, the
parts of the model affected by each of these improvements are identified.
4.7.1 Improvements on offender identification
ITS-related identification techniques for vehicles (EVI) and also for its driver (elec-
tronic identification card or electronic driving license), enable a more immediate
electronic offender identification. An automatic remote verification may be per-
formed using the Driver credentials reader, as envisioned by TISPOL2. Such iden-
tification is required for offences related to the traffic rules, where the driver is the
responsible person. In this way, notifications could be referred to the actual driver,
avoiding the need for the vehicle holder to nominate her afterwards. However, it
raises privacy concerns as it would enable tracking a given person. The development
of a privacy-compliant enforcement process is a matter of open research. Particu-
larly, the PRECIOUS research project funded by the Autonomous Community of
Madrid is focused on using anonymous credentials to enable a privacy-respectful
remote verification of vehicular authorizations [56].
2https://cleopatra.tispol.org/cleopatra/europe/general/technology/identifying-and-fining-
owner-vehicle/identifying-and-fining-owne, accessed on January 2012
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Integration in the proposed model
Apart from the Offending vehicle (which should be ITS-enabled, as described in
Section 2.2.4), only the Automatic sensor devices are affected as they should perform
the electronic authentication protocol. The remaining entities (starting by the
Evidence Collector) are not aware of this issue as the initial evidence structure was
already prepared to contain the real offender identification.
4.7.2 Improvements on notification delays
ITS communication technologies are suitable to timely send notifications to the
offender through her vehicle. Even if the speed of this transmission is subject to the
availability of network and computational resources, the message may be delivered
either during the journey or, if required, using periodic resilient connections (i.e.
gas or electricity stations). Moreover, the vehicular human-machine interface may
present notifications in real time without causing a distraction.
Integration in the proposed model
The notification improvements only affect to the Offending vehicle (which should
be again ITS-enabled, as described in Section 2.2.4) and the Notifier. The first
one should be ready to receive (and present to the driver) the notification message.
The Notifier encapsulates the mechanism to deliver such message to the appropriate
stakeholder. Thus, any future variation on this mechanism would be confined in
this entity.
4.7.3 Improvements on the offence description and the lack of wit-
nesses
In-vehicle sensors and the data shared through VANETs may help on the offence
description. Thus, sensors may give a complementary description of the situation
from inside the vehicle [17]. Even if sensorial errors may happen, several surrounding
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vehicles may be contacted to gather their viewpoints, thus clarifying the situation.
Integration in the proposed model
The use of vehicular sensorial data may be implemented through the interaction
between the Surrounding vehicles (which will offer the information using the ITS
equipment) and the Data Requester (which will gather it).
4.8 General model for the remaining contributions of
this thesis
Contributions C2, C3 and C4 (recall Section 1.3) of this thesis are focused on differ-
ent protocols and mechanisms that address the implementation of parts of the road
traffic enforcement process. In this Section, the parts of the model related to each
contribution are identified (Section 4.8.1). On the other hand, from the vehicular
point of view there are several decisions and assumptions that have to be taken.
They conform the technical framework in which the proposed contributions will be
applied. Section 4.8.2 introduces a summary of these decisions and assumptions.
However, in order to ensure that each Chapter describing the remaining contribu-
tions is self-contained, the particular model and considerations that affect to each
of them will be detailed in each Chapter.
4.8.1 Parts of the enforcement model related to each of the pro-
posed mechanisms
Figure 4.2 depicts graphically the parts of the model related to each contribution.
First, the steganographic mechanism that enables the covert reporting of misbehav-
ing vehicles is a way to enable witnesses to send evidences that may indicate that an
offence has been committed. Thus, the parts of the model related to this contribu-
tion are, apart from the ITS-enabled vehicle (which will act as the offence witness),
the Evidence Collector (EC) and the Evidence Analyser (EA). It should be noted
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that the complete analysis that should be conducted (by the EA) to determine the
reliability of the data at stake is out of the scope of this thesis. However, as the
extraction of the embedded data (that is, recovering the evidence data itself) is also
addressed by this contribution, we find that such process could be a collaborative
task between EC and EA – although it is a prerequisite for the analysis itself, this
task is conceptually bigger than the responsibility assigned to the EC.
Concerning the notification protocol, the enforcement entities related to this
contribution are the respective message issuers (especially the Initial Fine Issuer,
although it may be adapted to serve for the Intermediate Fine Issuer, the Final
Fine Issuer and the Appeal Result Issuer), the Notifier, the ITS-enabled vehicle
and its driver. Specifically, the fine issuers act as the message generator, whereas
the Notifier delivers it. The vehicle will receive the notification and will transmit it
(in a way compatible with the task of driving) to the driver.
Finally, the cooperative evidence generation protocol affects to the ITS-enabled
vehicles, the Data Requester, the Designated-as-offender Contact Point (DCP) and
the CounterEvidence Analyser (CEA). Thus, ITS-enabled vehicles will get in con-
tact and will send their corresponding data to the CEA through the Data Requester
(for the witness stakeholders) and the DCP (for the offence-related stakeholder).
The CEA will be in charge of verifying these data, as a preliminary step for the
future adjudication process made by the Intermediate Fine Issuer.
4.8.2 Decisions and assumptions on the vehicular environment
Concerning the vehicular environment, there are several issues that have to be de-
fined in order to determine the real scenario in which the remaining contributions
may be applied. They affect to the reliability of the vehicular components, the man-
agement process for the vehicular credentials and the organization of the vehicular
infrastructure.
In general terms, the set of vehicular devices are organized following the OVER-
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SEE architecture (recall Section 2.2.4). It should be noted that it does not only
determine the way in which these devices are organized, but also their assumed
degree of reliability. Particularly, the Hardware Security Module (HSM) is assumed
to be protected against manipulation. The HSM also provides with a secure storage
which is used to store vehicular credentials. Concerning these credentials, it is as-
sumed that vehicles will be identified by means of a set of short-lived pseudonyms.
They have an associated public-private keypair, which is certified by means of a
public key certificate. Such credential is issued by the traffic authority, and it is as-
sumed that a preloading operation is performed in such a way that they are securely
transferred to the HSM prior to their use in the contributions presented herein.
Related to the vehicular infrastructure, it is assumed that there will be a set
of RSUs available to participate in the proposed protocols and mechanisms. Such
RSUs are assumed to be independent one to each other. In other words, there is
no interconnection among these devices.
On the other hand, it is assumed that there exists a reliable entity in the in-
frastructure, which is trusted to take a fair decision whenever several (potentially
contradictory) descriptions of one situation are given. Particularly, it will be present
in both the notification and the evidence generation mechanisms. In general words,
it will be accessible by vehicles through a resilient communication channel, that
is, a channel that ensures that the data is delivered after a finite amount of time.
Thanks to this assumption, it is possible to establish the cause of an unsuccessful
data exchange that is performed over an unreliable network (such as the vehicular,
DSRC-based one). Such failure may be caused by the unreliability of the network
or because the vehicular device was not working properly. It should be noted that
in the second case, some consequences may be applied over the vehicle, starting by
calling it for maintenance in order to reset the vehicular communication devices.
In order to ensure that the aforementioned reliable channel exists, it is assumed
that vehicles will get connected to this channel periodically, typically at a daily
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basis (e.g. at the end of the day, using the wireless connection of the parking lot).
4.9 Summary of the chapter
In this Chapter, an enhanced enforcement model has been proposed based on the
previous VERA2 one. Such model is composed by a set of refinements over the
VERA2 model (to make it suitable to current Spanish legislation), the stakeholders,
the enforcement entities, the data at stake including their interchanges and their
security and privacy concerns. Based on this model, it has been discussed the way
in which ITS technologies may help on addressing the problems of the enforcement
process, and how they would be integrated into the proposed model. Furthermore,
as the presented model is the basis for the remaining contributions of this thesis, the
parts of such model that are at stake on each contribution are identified. The set
of general assumptions that are considered in such contributions is also identified.
Chapter 5
Mechanism for covert reporting
of misbehaving vehicles
Despite the huge promise of ITSs, some road safety related applications cannot be
currently developed in VANETs. One example of these applications is the automatic
reporting of misbehaving drivers by other drivers (or their vehicles). The reasons are
illustrated next: Consider a dangerous driver that is not respecting some essential
rules like the safety distance or that performs unsafe overtaking. It would be quite
interesting for observing drivers to report this attitude, as it is done in [57]. In this
way, police patrols could be more effective in their surveillance tasks, removing such
undesirable attitudes from the road more efficiently.
Although this application is beneficial for road safety, drivers would rarely send
these report messages over a VANET. This is because the reporting message can
be observed by the dangerous driver himself. Thus, he can decide to take reprisals
against the reporting vehicle. Even if encryption is applied, the mere detection of an
encrypted message can raise suspicions on the reported vehicle. It would therefore
be useful to introduce a mechanism that allows VANET users to send messages
through the VANET while remaining hidden for those that are not the expected
receivers.
Steganography is a technique that allows hiding data within an innocuous mes-
sage called cover. Thus, hidden data remain undetectable for unauthorized parties.
To the best of the author of this thesis’ knowledge, the use of steganography in this
specific kind of network has not been explored yet.
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The use of systematic encryption (that is, sending an encrypted reporting mes-
sage at a fixed time interval [58]) could be an alternative to such steganography-
based approach. However, the efficiency of such a system could be low if the amount
of reports is small compared to the aforementioned time interval. In such situation,
most messages would not contain meaningful information but they should be sent
anyway. As the occurrence of reportable actions is not periodic, there will always
periods in which it would not be necessary to send any encrypted message. For this
reason, such solution is undesirable for a vehicular scenario, in which saving band-
width and computation is critical to ensure the proper operation of safety-related
ITS applications.
Taking into account the previous considerations, in this Chapter a
steganography-based mechanism for covert reporting of misbehaving vehicles is pre-
sented. The mechanism enables the transmission of the main data that describe the
offence (i.e. perceived offence and the alleged offender identifier). Other supporting
data (such as pictures) must be sent using an alternative channel. The scope of
this mechanism is the embedding and revealing operations. Therefore, the posterior
processing of the embedded report and particularly its trustworthiness analysis is
left to future work. Section 5.1 gives an overview of the proposed inter-vehicle re-
porting application. Section 5.2 identifies the parts of the entities model proposed
in Chapter 4 that are related to this mechanism, as well as the considered architec-
ture. The following sections focus on the mechanism itself, describing respectively
the secret message M structure (Section 5.3), the cover message C and its capacity
(Section 5.4), how the secret message is protected (Section 5.5), and, finally, the
embedding and revealing functions Fe and Fr (Sections 5.6 and 5.7).
5.1 System overview
The proposed system enables a vehicle to covertly send a report of another misbe-
having vehicle to a Road-Side Unit (RSU). For this purpose, a source of redundancy
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is required to embed information without altering the intended purpose of the cover
data. In the VANET domain, measurements from in-vehicle sensors are prone to in-
accuracies. These measurements could be changed without altering significantly the
reliability of the data at stake. Particularly, in the proposed system, to minimize the
consequences of the embedding operation, the least significant bits of sensorial data
fields are altered such that the distance of the new provided value to the original
one is within the accuracy of the sensorial measurement. Such decision limits the
capacity of each data field to embed secret data. For this reason, this mechanism
is intended to enable vehicles to send the minimum set of data that describes the
offence (e.g. the misbehaving action and the purported offender identifier). Other
supporting data, such as pictures, should be sent using an alternative channel, such
as a cellular one. Such channel must ensure that the offender is unable to detect
the transferred message and must offer an acknowledged reception, which enables
the reporting vehicle to delete the data at stake.
The VANET message which has more sensorial information is the beacon. Es-
sentially, a beacon contains the current speed, location and heading of the sender
vehicle. The sensorial data is obtained first by the Event Data Recorder (subject
to IEEE 1616 [22]) and then the beacon message is constructed according to the
SAE J2735 standard [59]. Figure 5.1 shows the beacon structure without optional
parts.
Beacons are received by any other VANET entity (i.e. OBU or RSU) which is
located within a range of 1 kilometre [59]. As they are sent at a high frequency (one
each 100 ms), they enable an almost constant channel with surrounding parties.
Particularly, reporting messages will be prepared to be sent to nearby RSUs. As
RSUs are usually assumed to be reliably connected to the Authority, this allows
distributing the workload among them at the same time that it is assured that the
Authority will receive the reports.
To protect the secret message from unauthorized access, it will be encrypted
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Figure 5.1: Beacon structure without optional parts
using ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme). The main reason
for this choice is that it is the only encryption technique among those proposed
in the IEEE 1609.2 VANET security standard that allows an unnoticed online key
agreement, thus avoiding the need to count with a preshared secret [8]. Additionally,
as all VANET participants should comply with this standard, the selection of ECIES
guarantees that they will be able to execute the required cryptographic operations.
Replacing the least significant bits of sensor measurements introduces errors
that can affect road safety. To minimize this effect, a maximum rate of messages
(embedding interval K) that may contain embedded information can be imposed1.
Moreover, as VANET communications suffer from certain degree of unreliability, it
is necessary to introduce a mechanism that guarantees with some probability that
a report message is received by the RSU. For the sake of simplicity, in the proposed
system each report message is sent R times. Other alternatives to contribute on
1Note that reducing the number of least significant bits used to embed information would also
reduce the introduced error.
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ensuring the reception of this message are studied in Section 5.6.
In order to guarantee that the embedded message is not detected, no statistical
differences should exist between the original cover data and the embedded data.
In this work it is assumed that the inaccuracies (or errors) present in the sensor
measurements are random. Therefore, as the message to be embedded is composed
by encrypted data and a message authentication code, it is also random by nature
and no statistical differences should exist in theory. However, in the cases that this
assumption is not hold, techniques as the ones described in [60] could be applied.
5.2 Model and architecture
In this Section, the considered model and architecture are presented. The entities
at stake, along with their architectural realization, are presented in Section 5.2.1.
Afterwards, the requirements that have to be fulfilled are described in Section 5.2.2.
Finally, the working assumptions are introduced in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.1 Participant entities
The parts of the entities model of the enforcement process that are related to
this mechanism are highlighted in Figure 5.2. Thus, an ITS-enhanced surrounding
vehicle, which has been victim of an offence, is able to send to the Evidence Collector
(EC) the corresponding embedded report. This entity will be in charge of, first,
extracting such information from the cover message and, second, of delivering these
data to the Evidence Analyzer (EA). The latter will evaluate the received report.
The proposed mechanism is focused on the communication between the vehicle
and the RSU, which will act as the receiver of the embedded report (i.e. EC).
The communication between EC and EA (i.e. the processing systems of the Traffic
Authority) will not be considered. Therefore, the architecture is formed by two
elements, namely the vehicle and the RSU, which are communicating through a
VANET using DSRC as the underlying transmission technology. Concerning the
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Figure 5.2: Parts of the entities model of the enforcement process related to the
proposed reporting mechanism
vehicle, it follows the OVERSEE architecture as described in Section 2.2.4. Par-
ticularly, apart from the in-vehicle sensors, three elements will be involved in this
architecture, namely the Secure Application Environment (SAE), the Hardware Se-
curity Module (HSM) and the On-Board Unit (OBU). Particularly, the SAE holds
the computer code that performs the embedding operation. The HSM performs the
cryptographic operations and the OBU serves as the communication unit to trans-
mit data to other entities, particularly the RSU for the context of this contribution.
5.2.2 Requirements
Based on the desirable properties of any steganographic system (Section 2.3.3) and
the purpose of the considered application, a set of requirements to be fulfilled is
established:
Undetectability. The reporting message must remain undetectable to the
reported vehicle.
Maximum capacity. The proposed mechanism must provide with the maxi-
mum capacity. This requirement must not threat the undetectability one.
Computational feasibility. The embedding operation must be computation-
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ally feasible for the sender. Similarly, the revealing procedure must be feasible for
the receiver.
Resistance against data losses. The proposed mechanism must counter (as
much as possible) the data losses that may happen in transmissions over unreliable
channels.
Embedded message integrity. The proposed mechanism must be able to
detect any manipulation over the embedded report.
5.2.3 Working assumptions
The proposed mechanism is to be executed where the following two assumptions
hold. First, it is assumed that RSUs are able to interact with the certification
authority to determine whether two pseudonyms belong to the same entity. Second,
even if the receiving entities may be different RSUs, it is assumed that if a message
is sent to a specific RSU it is not received by any other one. It avoids unnecessary
burden on RSUs, which could compromise the feasibility of this mechanism.
5.3 Secret message structure
The misbehavior report to be embedded contains the following fields:
 Magic header (16 bits), which helps the receiver on identifying whether there
is an embedded message or not. The probability of finding a beacon that does
not include the beginning of a reporting message but includes the aforemen-
tioned magic header is 2−16.
 Message type (4 bits), as there may be other applications enabled by this
steganographic scheme, a message type field has been introduced.
 Misbehaving action (4 bits), it will identify the type of misbehaving action
that it is reported.
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 Message payload (32 bits), in this case it will be filled with the misbehaving
vehicle identifier. Although this is a pseudonym and may change over time,
it is the only identifying information from the misbehaving vehicle available
to the reporting one.
5.4 Cover message and capacity analysis
In the proposed system, beacon messages are selected as covers because they con-
tain sensorial data (positioning, speed, heading...) subject to inaccuracies (or er-
rors). In order to covertly send information, in this work it is assumed to be
acceptable to change the value provided by the sensors vmeasured to a value vstego
that is within the range determined by the sensor’s accuracy accy, i.e., vstego ∈[vmeasured − accy, vmeasured + accy].
The capacity of one data element di (see Equation 5.1), i.e., the number of
values that can be encoded in certain sensorial data element, will be given by the
ratio between the accuracy accy of the element and its resolution res plus one (to
take into account the value provided by the sensor).
Capacitydi(bits) = ⌊log2 (accydiresdi + 1)⌋ (5.1)
It must be recalled that the sensorial data is obtained first by the Event Data
Recorder (subject to IEEE 1616 [22]) and then the beacon message is constructed
according to the SAE J2735 standard [59]. To calculate the capacity of each sen-
sorial data element we have analysed the accuracy and resolution defined in the
aforementioned standards. While the EDR standard establishes the required reso-
lution and accuracy, the J2735 standard describes only the resolution of each field.
Thus, in the calculations, the accuracy described in the IEEE 1616 standard has
been used. We assume that vehicles’ sensors are compliant with these standards.
Table 5.1 specifies the maximum capacity of each beacon sensor field and the whole
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capacity of the message, 24 bits, considering the minimum capacity provided by
both standards (as it is not assumed a specific point in the process to insert the
covert information and it must be preserved in all cases).
Considered Ratio Ratio Capacity Capacity Maximum
sensorial fields
accyIEEE1616
resIEEE1616
accyIEEE1616
resJ2735
IEEE 1616 J2735 introduced error
Latitude 600 600 9 bits 9 bits 0.0512’ = 94.8 m
Longitude 600 600 9 bits 9 bits 0.0512’ = 94.8 m
Speed 50 180 5 bits 7 bits 0.64 m/s = 2.34 km/h
Heading 10 91 3 bits 0 bits −
X Acceleration 0 9 0 bits 3 bits −
Y Acceleration 0 9 0 bits 3 bits −
V Acceleration 0 1 0 bits 0 bits −
Yaw Rate 1 10 1 bits 3 bits 0.1 ○
Overall (independ.) 27 bits 34 bits
Overall (combined) 24 bits
Table 5.1: Capacity of each beacon sensorial data field calculated according to Eq.
5.1 and overall capacity of beacon messages. The maximum error that could be
introduced in the proposed steganographic system is also presented (it is equal to
accyIEEE1616).
5.5 Protecting the secret message
In this work, ECIES is used to protect the secret message before embedding it.
ECIES uses public key cryptography to derive two keys that will be used for sym-
metric encryption and message authentication. As it is based on elliptic curves, it
usually requires a lower computational effort compared to other traditional encryp-
tion schemes. Several data are used as input of the key derivation process. Besides
the ECIES public parameters (which should be previously known by all parties),
the sender vehicle requires to have its private key, the public key of the receiver
RSU, and a salt value. On the other hand, the receiver RSU requires to have the
public key of the sending vehicle, its private key and the salt value. In order to
guarantee that these data is available to the interested parties, several decisions and
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assumptions have been taken, as explained next.
In the proposed system, it is assumed that the public key of the RSU is made
available to vehicles by means of the periodical WAVE Service Announcements sent
by the RSUs [61]. On the other hand, we assume that each beacon is signed by the
vehicle (to avoid the threat of data forgery, as explained in IEEE 1609.2) and that
the signature includes the vehicle’s public key certificate. Regarding the salt, the
beacon ID (BID) of the first beacon used to embed the secret message has been
selected.
Once the secret key has been derived, the reporting message is symmetrically
encrypted. As ECIES enables using a stream cipher combined with the aforemen-
tioned key derivation function, the XOR (or-exclusive) operation has been selected.
The resulting encrypted message has the same bit length than the secret message,
that is, 56 bits. Additionally, as established by ECIES standard, a message authen-
tication code of 160 bits2 is appended to the encrypted message. Therefore, the
final message to be embedded within the cover has a total length of 216 bits (see
Figure 5.3).
Magic 
Header 
Misbehaving 
Action 
Offender 
Identifier 
56 bits 
Message Authenticacion Code (MAC) 
216 bits 
160 bits 
Encrypted Message 
16 bits 4 bits 32 bits 
Message 
Type 
4 bits 
Figure 5.3: Structure of the reporting message to embed into beacon messages
As the length of the protected message exceeds the capacity of a beacon message,
more than one beacon is needed to embed it. The total amount of required beacons
is nbmsg = 216 bits/msg ÷ 24 bits/beacon = 9 beacons/msg.
It should be noted that the reduced length of the reporting message makes that
2160 bits is the output length of the MAC1 function that may be selected for ECIES according
to the IEEE 1363 [62].
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even if the witnessed offence is repeated over time, it would not be more efficient to
send an offence reconfirmation message (i.e. expressing “I have witnessed again the
same offence that I have already reported”) instead of repeating the whole reporting
message again.
5.6 Embedding function
In this Section, the operation concerning the insertion of secret data within the
cover message is described. One of the key aspects of the proposed mechanism is
that it must counter (as much as possible) the channel unreliability. Section 5.6.1
analyses the alternatives to promote the message reception, whereas Section 5.6.2
describes the internals of the whole embedding procedure.
5.6.1 Alternatives to promote the message reception
In order to ensure that the message is received over an unreliable channel, several
alternative mechanisms may be used. All of them are based on the assumption that
the more times a message is sent, the higher the probability of reception is.
The simplest decision is to repeat the message a given amount of times ([63],
Chapter 1). In the analysed application, it means that the whole set of fragments
should be repeated one or more times. The simple message repetition scheme has
a low efficiency, in that it requires to linearly multiply the amount of network
resources as much as the amount of repetitions.
In order to promote a correct reception of a message through a noisy channel
while providing a reasonable efficiency, there is a set of correction codes that may
be applied. In this field, Low-Density Parity Check (LDPC) ([63], Chapter 47)
and repeat-accumulate codes ([63], Chapter 49) have been intensively studied. In
a nutshell, these techniques enable recovering some parts of the received message
because several dependences are established between the values of different parts.
In this way, if one part is not successfully received, it can be predicted by solving
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the corresponding dependences. It should be noted that if the value of the involved
parts is not successfully received, a belief propagation process has to be executed.
The efficiency of this kind of codes (especially LDPC) has turn them to be very
useful for practical systems, such as digital television broadcasting.
Even if the efficiency of this kind of mechanisms outperforms the basic repeti-
tion scheme in terms of required network resources, for the sake of simplicity the
latter will be selected in this thesis. Given that the ECIES algorithm is the public
key encryption scheme selected in IEEE 1609.2 standard, and given that it provides
not only confidentiality but also integrity (in that a Message Authentication Code
is calculated, so transmission errors may be detected), introducing an additional
computational workload could put the feasibility at risk. Nevertheless, the devel-
opment of an efficient code correction technique suitable for this environment is left
to future work.
5.6.2 Procedure
The embedding function protects first the secret message as described in Section
5.5. This operation is specified in Algorithm 1. Afterwards, the secret is split
and the resulting fragments are embedded on nbmsg beacon messages. Embedding
consists on replacing the least significant bits of the sensorial data elements with
those of the protected secret message (see Algorithm 2). A graphical representation
of the process is shown in Figure 5.4.
In order to minimize the introduced error, an embedding interval K has been
defined. Bits of the protected secret message may only be embedded in beacons
whose beacon ID BID is multiple of K.
Additionally, each secret message is sent R times to reduce the possibility of not
receiving a reporting message due to communication errors. As the beacon ID BID
of the first beacon in which the secret message is embedded is used as salt in the
key derivation process, different keys are created for each message repetition.
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It should be noted that the procedure described so far does not take into account
whether a given repetition has been successfully received or not, before sending the
following repetition. In other words, there is no acknowledgement mechanism which
makes the sender aware of the reception and avoids further repetitions. Even if
such mechanism would have a positive impact on the overall efficiency, it should be
recalled that such acknowledgement must not be perceived by the reported vehicle.
Given that RSUs do not issue beacons by themselves, the definition of a suitable
RSU-originating cover message to convey this acknowledgment is left to future work.
Data: PKRcv, public key of the receiver; PrivKSnd, private key of the sender;
M1...M16, the magic header content; BID, beacon identifier; R1...R32,
misbehaving vehicle identifier; A1...A4, perceived misbehaving action
1 begin
2 Set MagicHeader ← M1...M16
3 Set MessageType ← 0001
4 Set MisbehAction ← A1...A4
5 Set MessagePayload ← R1...R32
6 # Secret keys derivation according to ECIES
7 Set SecretKey1 ← KDF1(Hash=SHA-256, PrivKSnd, SVD(PKRcv), BID)
8 Set SecretKey2 ← KDF2(Hash=SHA-256, PrivKSnd, SVD(PKRcv), BID)
9 # Secret message encryption
10 Set EncryptedMagicHeader ← MagicHeader ⊕ SecretKey2 (bits 1...16)
11 Set EncryptedMessageType ← MessageType ⊕ SecretKey2 (bits 17...20)
12 Set EncryptedMisbehAction ← MisbehAction ⊕ SecretKey2 (bits 21...24)
13 Set EncryptedMessagePayload ← MessagePayload ⊕ SecretKey2 (bits
25...57)
14 Set EncryptedMessage ← EncryptedMagicHeader ∥
EncryptedMessageType ∥ EncryptedMisbehAction ∥
EncryptedMessagePayload
15 # MAC1 calculation according to ECIES
16 Set MessageAuthenticationCode ← HMAC(Hash=SHA-1, SecretKey1,
EncryptedMessage)
17 Set MessageToEmbed ← EncryptedMessage ∥
MessageAuthenticationCode
Algorithm 1: Secret message preparation algorithm
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Data: MessageToEmbed; MessageToEmbedLength, 216; K, embedding
interval; BID, beacon identifier.
1 begin
2 Set CurrentBit ← 0
3 Set CurrentK ← 1
4 Set BeaconToEmbed ← BID
5 # The following operations will be repeated R times
6 while CurrentBit less than MessageToEmbedLength do
7 # After each embedding operation, it is checked (but omitted, for
clarity) whether there are remaining bits to embed
8 Set BeaconToEmbed.Latitude ← BID.Latitude (bits 1...23) ∥
MessageToEmbed (bits CurrentBit...CurrentBit+9)
9 Set CurrentBit ← CurrentBit+9
10 Set BeaconToEmbed.Longitude ← BID.Longitude (bits 1...23)∥MessageToEmbed (bits CurrentBit...CurrentBit+9)
11 Set CurrentBit ← CurrentBit+9
12 Set BeaconToEmbed.Speed ← BID.Speed (bits 1...11)∥MessageToEmbed (bits CurrentBit...CurrentBit+5)
13 Set CurrentBit ← CurrentBit+5
14 Set BID.AccelSet4Way ← BID.AccelSet4Way (bits 1...55)∥MessageToEmbed (bits CurrentBit...CurrentBit+1)
15 Set CurrentBit ← CurrentBit+1
16 if CurrentBit less than MessageToEmbedLength then
17 Set BeaconToEmbed ← BID+CurrentK⋅K
18 CurrentK ← CurrentK + 1
Algorithm 2: Secret message splitting and embedding
5.7 Revealing function
The revealing function detects and decrypts embedded data within beacon, even in
the case of fragmentation (see Figure 5.5 and Algorithms 3 and 4). The receiver
does not know in advance if a reporting message is embedded in a cover. Thus,
it must proceed as if any cover, among those eligible to contain embedded data
(i.e. considering K), could contain the beginning of the secret. This is done by
appending the extracted bits to a bitstream and by using a decryption window
that moves along. If any of the beacons containing a message fragment is lost, the
receiver will restart the whole revealing function.
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Data: PKRcv, public key of the receiver; PrivKRcv, private key of the
receiver; PKSnd, public key of the sender; BID, beacon identifier;
M1...M16, the magic header content
1 begin
2 Set EncryptedMagicHeader ← BID.Latitude (bits 24...32) ∥
BID.Longitude (bits 24...30)
3 # Secret keys derivation according to ECIES
4 Set SecretKey1 ← KDF1(Hash=SHA-256, PKSnd, SVD(PrivKRcv), BID)
5 Set SecretKey2 ← KDF2(Hash=SHA-256, PKSnd, SVD(PrivKRcv), BID)
6 Set MagicHeader ← EncryptedMagicHeader ⊕ SecretKey2 (bits 1...16)
7 if MagicHeader = M1...M16 then
8 # Proceed to Embedded Message Extraction (Algorithm 4)
Algorithm 3: Embedded Message Detection Algorithm
Data: SecretKey1, MAC key; SecretKey2, decryption key; K, embedding
interval; BID, beacon identifier; M1...M16, the magic header content
1 begin
2 Set EncryptedMessageType ← BID.Longitude (bits 31...32) ∥BID.Speed
(bits 12...13)
3 Set MessageType ← EncryptedMessageType ⊕ SecretKey2 (bits 17...20)
4 if MessageType = ‘0001’ then
5 Set EncryptedMessagePayload ← BID.Speed (bits 14...16) ∥
BID.AccelSet4Way (bit 56) ∥ BID+K .Latitude (bits 24...32) ∥
BID+K .Longitude (bits 24...32) ∥ BID+K .Speed (bits 12...16) ∥
BID+K .AccelSet4Way (bit 56) ∥ BID+2K .Latitude (bits 24...31)
6 Set ReceivedMessageAuthenticationCode ← BID+2K .Latitude (bit 32)∥ BID+2K .Longitude (bits 24...32) ∥ BID+2K .Speed (bits 12...16) ∥
BID+2K .AccelSet4Way (bit 56) ∥ . . . ∥ BID+8K .Latitude (bits 24...32)∥ BID+8K .Longitude (bits 24...32) ∥ BID+8K .Speed (bits 12...16) ∥
BID+8K .AccelSet4Way (bit 56)
7 # If any of the required fragments is lost, the process returns to the
embedded message detection (Algorithm 3)
8 # Check MAC
9 Set MessageAuthenticationCode ← HMAC(Hash=SHA-1,
SecretKey1, EncryptedMessagePayload)
10 if MessageAuthenticationCode = ReceivedMessageAuthenticationCode
then
11 Set MessagePayload ← EncryptedMessagePayload ⊕ SecretKey2
(bits 21...56)
Algorithm 4: Revealing Algorithm
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5.8 Summary of the chapter
In this Section, a mechanism that enables any vehicle to report the misbehavior
produced by other vehicles is presented. In order to promote that the report passes
unnoticed to other vehicles (and, specially, to the reported one), steganographic
techniques have been adapted to this specific context.
Chapter 6
Vehicular-enhanced electronic
notification protocol
The electronic notification is a process that enables the fast delivery of a given offi-
cial information to its intended receiver. However, current notification mechanisms
cause offenders to be aware of the punishment long after the offence. Because of
that, the Spanish Law 30/92 enables using “new mechanisms based on the upcom-
ing data transmission technologies that speed up the process while respecting the
underlying data authenticity requirements” 1. In this way, notifications may be
performed in other places different from the receiver’s home [35].
Even if the electronic notification could be performed (in absence of delays) in
the order of seconds or minutes, the current goal of the Spanish Traffic Authority
is to reduce this gap from 45 days to 12 [11]. At the light of these figures, there is
room for improvement as the goal should be put on making the notification to be
delivered as soon as possible, even within the same trip in which the offence was
committed.
Apart from the previous fact, current mechanisms enable that the offender ig-
nores the notification, i.e. she does not accept or reject it. As a consequence, the
offender has the practical chance of not being aware of the notification. Such deci-
sion may be taken to increase the probability of failure in the process, typically by
1Translated from the Spanish, “Medios de notificacio´n distintos a los tradicionales que, sin
merma de las necesarias garant´ıas de autenticidad, permitan su agilizacio´n mediante el empleo de
las nuevas te´cnicas de transmisio´n de informacio´n, supera´ndose la limitacio´n de la exclusividad del
domicilio como lugar de notificaciones”.
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exceeding the maximum time interval to perform each legal step.
It is expected that the fast notification delivery and the avoidance of the chance
for the offender of being unaware of its content will contribute on increasing the
educational effect of the punishment. As a consequence, road traffic safety will be
improved. One alternative is to deliver the notification to the mobile phone of the
offender. However, the use of such devices while driving is forbidden in several
European countries (such as Spain) in order to increase the road traffic safety.
Thus, there is a need to find a trade-off solution that ensures the fast delivery of
the notification while avoiding distractions to the offending driver.
To contribute on this issue, this Chapter describes the proposed electronic no-
tification protocol that enables delivering the offence notification directly to the
vehicle. The use of vehicular embedded systems to receive this information seems
to be suitable – such devices are at the core of ITS applications, trying to assist the
driver in her task. However, for the particular case of road traffic offence notifica-
tions, it is necessary to ensure that the legitimate receiver (the offending driver) had
available and further accessed to the notification content. Therefore, the concept
of non-repudiation is at the core of the proposed mechanism.
This Chapter is structured as follows. A proposal overview is presented in
Section 6.1. The considered model is described in Section 6.2, along with the specific
security requirements (derived from the legal provisions) that must be taken into
account when designing an electronic notification system. Section 6.3 introduces
the architecture derived from the previous model. Finally, the proposed protocol is
presented in Section 6.4.
6.1 Proposal overview
The proposed protocol enables sending the offence notification to the offending
driver through her vehicle. It is executed once the offence has been detected and
the notification has already been prepared.
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To perform this notification, the vehicular communication channel is used first.
Thus, the notification is sent through RSUs. In order to decide which RSUs must
send such message, it is assumed that it is possible to estimate the set of potential
positions in which the vehicle may be at the notification moment.
For this notification mechanism to be valid, it is necessary to make it compliant
with legal regulations. As there is no explicit regulation for such a mechanism, a set
of requirements are derived from those imposed to the existing mechanisms. Among
these requirements, it is necessary to attest the reception of the notification message
as well as the moment in which it is accessed. In this way, neither of these actions
may be repudiated. In order to build these attestations, the vehicular devices
issue and send the corresponding evidences of availability and access. It should
be noted that the second evidence is built on behalf of the intended notification
receiver. This action has to be authorized by the notification receiver beforehand.
For this purpose, the use of a password is required. From the conceptual point
of view, this action enables the vehicle as a suitable place to receive notifications.
Nevertheless, this action may only be performed by one person by vehicle. More
precisely, as it is not assumed that when the offence is detected, the current driver is
identified, the notification will be referred to the designated-as-offender. Therefore,
this mechanism is suitable for offences committed by such person.
Due to the unreliability of the vehicular channel, it may happen that any of the
transmitted data gets lost. In order to countermeasure this fact, each message is
repeated several times. For consistency with contribution C2, such a simple repeti-
tion scheme has been preferred against other approaches based on error correction
codes (recall Section 5.6.1). Despite such repetition, some executions may still fail.
For these situations, the use of a resilient channel is adopted between the vehicle
and the notifying entity.
100 Chapter 6. Vehicular-enhanced electronic notification protocol
Witness data retrieval
Enforcement process management
Offender communication management
Evidence 
Analyser 
(EA)
Initial Fine 
Issuer (IFI)
CounterEvidence 
Analyser (CEA)
Intermediate 
Fine Issuer 
(IntFI)
Process 
Analyser 
(PA)
Final Fine 
Issuer 
(FFI)
Al egation 
Analyzer 
(AA)
Process starting Preliminary investigation Process reso ution
Appeal 
Analyser 
(ApA)
Appealling
Appeal 
Result 
Issuer (ARI)
Evidence Collector (EC) Notifier (N)
Designated-as-offender Contact 
Point (DCP)
Current 
Driver
Vehicle owner / 
Usual driver
Human witness
Automatic 
sensor dev ce
In tial
Evidence Initial Fine
Intermediate 
Fine
Allegation
Appeal
Appeal result
 
Aux l ary 
enforce s
Admin st ative 
Authority (star ing)
Administrative 
Author ty (resolut on 
and appea ling)
Administrative 
Authority (pre iminary 
investigat on)
Pol ce of icer
Allegation
Designated as
offender 
Personal Data
Manager 
(DPDM)
Vehicle Data
Manager 
(VDM)
Process Data 
Manager 
(PDM)
Da a Requester (DR)
Data 
request Data 
request
Data management
O fence-related stakeholders Witness stakeholders
Process management stakeholders
L able 
Driver  
Analyser 
(LDA)
Al egat on 
(Driver 
Identif cation)
Surrounding 
ITS-enabled veh cle 
Offending 
ITS-enabled vehicle 
Coun er-
evidence
Final Fine
Figure 6.1: Parts of the entities model of the enforcement process related to the
proposed notification mechanism
6.2 Model
In this Section, the considered model is presented. For this purpose, the entities
at stake as well as the different ways in which they may interact are introduced in
Section 6.2.1. Afterwards, the security requirements derived from the legal provi-
sions are presented in Section 6.2.2. The implications of the determination of the
responsible person in the notification process are discussed in Section 6.2.3. Finally,
the working assumptions are presented in Section 6.2.4.
6.2.1 Participant entities
The parts of the entities model (proposed in Chapter 4) related to the mechanism
presented herein are highlighted in Figure 6.1. Thus, there is an entity that creates
the message to notify (one of the fine issuers or the Appeal Result Issuer) which del-
egates on another entity (the Notifier) to deliver it to the offender. In the proposed
mechanism, the offender is reached through the human-machine interface from her
ITS-enabled vehicle.
As the model should serve as a guide to understand the world, and the restric-
tions that should be taken into account to propose a solution, it is necessary to
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Figure 6.2: Model of current electronic notification mechanisms
use the most specific model that is possible. Thus, a refined version of the afore-
mentioned model will be built, based on the underlying notification model that is
followed by current mechanisms.
The legal framework for the electronic notification (Royal Decree 1671/2009,
recall Section 3.2.1) establishes four mechanisms and their particular requirements.
Except from the last one (which is subject to its own regulation), it is possible to
identify a common underlying model for the three first types (see Figure 6.2). The
DEV, as a specific type of authorized address, is also covered by this model.
Once the message is created by its issuer (Initial/Intermediate/Final Fine Issuer
or Appeal Result Issuer, collectively called Message Issuer (MI) from now on), it
is made available through a delivery server (Notification Provider, NP). In order
to advert the offender of the existence of such notification, an informative message
may be sent to her personal cellular phone or traditional e-mail address (in general
terms, Notification Advertisement System, NAdS). Both NP and NAdS are different
parts of the Notifier (N) identified in the model proposed in Chapter 4. Once this
informative message is read by the user (Notification Receiver, NR), or upon her
personal will, the offender may access to the delivery server to fetch the notification.
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The process finishes with the notification transfer to the offender.
The communication between these entities is produced in two different environ-
ments. The connection between the issuers and NP is done in the context of the
Traffic Authority infrastructure. On the other hand, NP, NR and NAdS are con-
nected through mobile (i.e. cellular-based or Internet) communication technologies.
Based on this notification-specific model, two refinements will be made over it
to better fit to the technical context considered in this thesis. Figure 6.3 shows the
definitive model after the mentioned modifications. First, the Notification Adver-
tisement System (NAdS) has been removed, as it is intended to provide the receiver
with an informative message regarding the notification existence. This message
contributes to make the offender be aware of the notification, thus giving her an
appropriate amount of time to take a decision on the notification. As the decision
has to be taken as soon as possible in the proposed context, this message is not
necessary anymore.
The second refinement is related to the Notification Receiving System (NRS),
which is included to alleviate the interaction required by NR. As NR is indeed the
actual offender while he/she is driving, its active participation in the protocol should
be minimized. In a broad sense, the NRS acts on behalf of the NR for the task of
receiving the notification. This idea gathers the interceptor concept proposed by
Robinson [64].
It must be noted that, from a conceptual point of view, the NRS should be
considered to be a part of the Notifier from the model proposed in Chapter 4. In
other words, it is one of the components in charge of delivering the message between
the issuer and the receiver, so it should be taken as part of the Notifier with respect
to the legal provisions. In other words, both NP and NRS are notification entities
(see Figure 6.3) and they must both comply with the corresponding regulation.
In this situation, the specific model defined so far is not different to the general
enforcement model (recall Figure 6.1), but instead it gives a complementary vision
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Figure 6.3: Model considered for the vehicular-enhanced notification model
of the same system. NRS deserves special attention, as it is part of the Notifier but
it is between the Notification Provider and the Notification Receiver. It may be seen
that there are is one equivalent entity in the general model – the Offending ITS-
enabled vehicle. The way in which the vehicle may practically become the NRS will
be explained in Section 6.3. Therefore, given that both models are complementary,
only the specific model will be taken into consideration in the following.
Identified interaction models
In order to access to the notification, there is a request-response exchange between
NR and N. Based on the described legal notification mechanisms, there are two
models to perform such interaction – push and pull. In the push model, N sends
the notification and, afterwards, NR sends the receipt that attests its access to the
content. In the pull one, NR checks periodically if there exists some pending noti-
fication. The push model is followed by the e-mail address, whereas the authorized
address and the access to the notifier site follow the pull one.
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6.2.2 Security requirements derived from the legal framework
Taking into account the general legal framework and the specific issues presented
in Section 3.2.1, it is possible to derive a set of requirements that may be fulfilled
by the proposed mechanism. Table 6.1 summarizes such requirements, which are
referred to as Reqi. In this Table, the notified message is noted as M .
Requirement Description Legal source
Req1 Non-repudiation of receipt: NP
must be aware of the moment in
which NRS has received M.
Art. 77.2 Law 18/2009
Req2 Non-repudiation of delivery: N
must be aware of the moment in
which NR accessed to M.
Art. 77.2 Law 18/2009
(Art 7.2 Order PRE-
878-2010)
Req3 Authenticated access control to
NRS: Only NR must be able to
use (i.e. access, enable as notifi-
cation place) NRS.
Art. 35.2 R.D.
1671/2009 (Art. 38.1
RD 1671-2009)
Req4 Availability of the notification
system: Both NP and NRS must
be permanently available to man-
age M.
Art. 9 Order PRE-878-
2010 (Art. 38.1 RD
1671-2009)
Req5 Physical access control: Both NP
and NRS must have physical ac-
cess control mechanisms.
Art. 8 Order PRE-878-
2010
Req6 Synchronization: NP and NRS
must be synchronized.
Art 7 Order PRE-878-
2010
Req7 Message authentication: NR
must be able to verify that M was
created by MI.
Art 5 Order PRE-878-
2010
Req8 Confidentiality of M: M must
only be available for MI, NRS
and NR.
Art. 6 Order PRE-878-
2010
Req9 Integrity of M: It must be pos-
sible to determine whether the
message M received by NR is the
same as the one issued by MI.
Art 5 Order PRE-878-
2010
Table 6.1: Summary of requirements for the vehicular-enhanced notification proto-
col
The set of requirements Req1–Req6 are referred to the notification system,
whereas Req7–Req9 are related to the notified message M .
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The non-repudiation of receipt (Req1), as well as the non-repudiation of delivery
(Req2) are directly derived from Law 18/2009. In both cases, there is a need to
have a temporal attestation – in the first case, of the moment in which M was
received, and in the second one, of the moment of access to M ’s content. Such
need imposes that there is a global synchronization between all elements of the
notification system (Req 6). One important issue is that the attestation must
reflect that NR accessed to the content. Such need is the basis for Req3, where
authenticated access control is required over NRS – the part of the notification
system related to NR. This protection is completed with physical measures (Req5)
that may contribute to ensure the permanent availability (Req4).
Concerning the data security, NR must be able to determine if the received
notification is authentic. Thus, it must be possible to verify that it was issued by the
legitimate entity (Req7) and that it has not been modified since its creation (Req9).
Furthermore, it is necessary to avoid third parties to have access to such notification
(Req8). According to Order PRE-878-2010, if NP is an external service provider,
it should not be able to access to the notification. For the sake of generality, this
requirement has been adopted for the proposed mechanism.
6.2.3 Implications of the personal responsibility in the notification
process
According to Law 18/2009 [6], the responsible person of a given offence is the one
that actually committed it. However, there are several situations that require a
special procedure. In case of minors (i.e. persons under the legal age for driving)
that are caught when driving, tutors and parents will be also responsible. Con-
cerning motorbikes and any other transport that requires the use of helmets, the
driver will be responsible in case that passengers are not wearing them. In those
traffic offences in which the car was not stopped, the person identified by the vehi-
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cle owner2 as the usual driver will be responsible, except if she nominates another
person or the car had been stolen. If there is no usual driver defined, then the
vehicle holder may nominate other person as the driver in the moment of the of-
fence. The vehicle holder will be always responsible for those offences related to
the vehicle documentation or maintenance status. Parking offences will be assigned
to the vehicle holder (or its short-term tenant, if it exists), except if a usual driver
exists or another person is nominated.
The aforementioned considerations are related to the responsible person for an
offence, and thus they indicate who must receive the notification. Due to the legal
nature of this process, it is necessary to send this notification in such a way that
its intended receiver is able to gather it. Once the offender has been identified,
the notification may be sent. If this person has a suitable place in which he/she is
able to get such message3 to receive such message, it must be sent to this place [6].
Taking into account the considered model (Figure 6.3), NRS is intended to be the
aforementioned suitable place. For this purpose, NR must enable NRS as such a
place at the beginning of the trip.
6.2.4 Working assumptions
There are six working assumptions in the considered model. Three are related to
the vehicular devices, two to the background environment, and one affects to RSUs.
Concerning the vehicular devices, the first assumption is that its HSM has MI’s
public key certificate preloaded, as well as that from its corresponding issuer. In
this way, it is able to verify MI digital signatures. Secondly, the HSM obtains the
public key certificate of the RSU at stake through the WAVE Service Announcement
message [8]. It is useful to send encrypted messages to the RSU whenever required.
Thirdly, the vehicular devices has to perform a set of unavoidable operations at
2According to the legislation, the figure of the vehicle holder is equivalent to the long-term
tenant. For the sake of brevity, in this discussion only the term vehicle holder will be employed.
3Law 18/2009 refers to this point as “lugar cierto de notificaciones”, where all traffic-related
administrative bodies may send the different messages [6].
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the moment in which the engine is started up. Particularly, in case that there are
previous notifications, they will be presented at this moment.
Regarding the background environment, it is assumed that it is possible to de-
termine the set of potential locations in which a vehicle may be after a given time
after the offence has been detected. In this way, it is possible to deliver the noti-
fication message only to the potential locations, thus reducing the impact of this
operation. On the other hand, the message issuer knows, at the beginning of the
notification process, the pseudonym of the offending vehicle. More specifically, it
is assumed that it knows the pseudonym in use at the moment of the notification,
apart from the pseudonym at the moment of the offence, which is also assumed to
be known. In order to fulfil this assumption, three alternatives may be taken. First,
it may be assumed that the pseudonym has not changed between both moments.
However, it reduces the applicability of the proposal to such situations, which re-
quire a significant processing speed by the Authority. Second, vehicles may be able
to receive packets to one of its n recent pseudonyms. Furthermore, in the interval
between the offence and the notification, less than n pseudonyms have been used.
Such decision is convenient to avoid routing problems [65]. Third, the short-lived
pseudonyms may have a validity period (e.g. only valid for Feb, 3rd, 2011, from
19:00 to 20:00). For the purpose of this notification protocol, the second alternative
is chosen although the third one is also suitable.
Finally, RSUs are able to contact the certification authority to know the status
of a given certificate. On the other hand, such authority offers a service to determine
whether two pseudonyms belong to the same entity, without revealing the associated
real identity.
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6.3 Architecture
Based on the model presented in Section 6.2, the architecture considered in this work
is shown in Figure 6.4. There are two environments considered in this architecture,
namely the back-end environment, and the in-vehicle one. Each one is introduced
below.
6.3.1 Back-end environment
There are four entities in the back-end environment, namely the Message Issuer
(MI), the Notification Manager (NMan) the Dispute Resolution Authority (DRA)
and the Notification Sender (NS). The latter will be presented in Section 6.3.3 as
it is not purely from this environment, but it is shared with the vehicular one.
Concerning the remaining ones, MI is the entity that creates the message (i.e. the
notification), and sends it to NMan for delivery. It is trusted to create notifica-
tions of offences that have been detected by the Traffic Authority, ensuring the
confidentiality of the data at stake.
The NMan is in charge of contacting the appropriate Notification Senders (i.e.
RSUs) to make the notification arrive to the vehicle. For this purpose, it estimates
the set of potential positions of the offending vehicle based on its location when the
offence was committed and the time gap between the offence and the notification.
Concerning the DRA, it is in charge of performing the notification if it has not
been successfully done through RSUs. The name is inspired on the conceptual task
– it enables determining whether the failure of the notification through the vehicular
channel was due to the channel itself or a malfunction of the vehicular devices.
6.3.2 In-vehicle environment
The in-vehicle environment contains the NRS, which is internally structured as pro-
posed in the OVERSEE project (see Section 2.2.4). Particularly, four components
will be at stake, namely the Secure Application Environment (SAE), the Hardware
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Security Module (HSM), the On-Board Unit (OBU) and the Human-Machine Inter-
face (HMI). The SAE contains the application code, which is in this case in charge
of the processing activities of the vehicle in the notification process. The HSM per-
forms the cryptographic operations, whereas the OBU transmits the information
to and from the vehicle. The HMI enables the linkage between the NRS with the
Notification Receiver (NR), which is the intended recipient of the notification at
stake.
Given that not all NRS components are trusted (particularly, the OBU and the
HMI are not protected), the whole NRS component may not be fully trusted for
receiving the notification and sending the corresponding evidences when required.
Enabling NRS to receive notifications for NR
One of the needs imposed by the legislation is that NRS must be a suitable place
for NR to receive notifications (recall Section 6.2.3). In other words, from NRS’
viewpoint, it is necessary to ensure that NR acknowledges that it is such a suitable
place for this purpose. In order to solve this issue, one approach is to require an
electronic credential to be inserted at the beginning of the trip. Such credential may
be a physical one (such as the national identity card or the electronic driving license)
or a logical one (a password). It should be noted that such usage has two different
implications from the theoretical point of view. First, NRS is able to authenticate
NR. Second, this action of inserting a credential may be seen as an authorization
from NR, thus enabling NRS as a possible place to receive notifications.
There are two considerations in order to decide between physical or logical
credentials. Concerning the robustness, a physical credential is more convenient as
it usually requires not only the physical token (e.g. a card) but also some private
information, which is indeed a logical credential. However, concerning the short-
term applicability, a logical credential is more suitable in that it does not require
installing additional hardware. In order to ensure the practical viability of the
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proposal in the short term, the use of a logical credential is selected.
Using a password has a negative impact on the utility of the proposed mech-
anism. Thus, if the HSM has to determine whether the introduced password is
correct, there is a need to install such password in the device prior to this process.
As a result, only one person per car will be able to perform this authentication. This
person will be the designated-as-offender (i.e. vehicle holder or its usual driver).
This restriction could be relaxed in such a way that more than one password could
be pre-loaded, each one associated with one of the frequent drivers of the car. How-
ever, in any case this decision requires that such pre-loading operation is performed
beforehand.
It should be noted that this action is not transferred to the infrastructure. In
this way, the chance of tracking (i.e. determining the path followed by a given
person) as a consequence of this action is countered.
6.3.3 Connection between environments
There are two different types of connection between the aforementioned environ-
ments, each one having different communication features. The first one (called
mobility context) is used while the vehicle is on the road, whereas the second one
(static context) is used when the vehicle is stopped for some time, such as the home
garage.
In the mobility context, the communication is established between RSUs (Road-
Side Units) and the vehicular OBUs already introduced in the in-vehicle environ-
ment. RSUs are static nodes that are placed aside the roads. They are managed by
the Authority, and thus they are assumed to reliably perform their communication
tasks. RSUs are intended to offer a set of services to passing by vehicles. For this
purpose, they are connected to backbone servers that act as service providers.
The communication channel in the mobility context is based on a wireless short-
range technology called DSRC (Dedicated Short-Range Communications) which has
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a nominal range of 1 km. Due to the very nature of the wireless medium, the channel
is inherently unreliable (i.e. packets may be lost). Thus, timeliness may only be
achieved by means of deadlines, but this mechanism is not able to ensure that the
fairness property is fulfilled in unreliable channels [66].
With respect to the static context, the communication takes place between the
vehicular OBU and DRA. This connection may be wireless (e.g. through the at-
home Wi-Fi network) or even wired (e.g. for electric vehicles during the recharge
process). In any case, this context is physically bounded, which is an inherent pro-
tective measure. Therefore, such connection is considered as resilient (i.e. packets
will arrive to its destination after a finite, but unknown, amount of time).
6.3.4 Selection of the interaction model
Once the implementation of each of the considered entities is defined, it is possible
to determine which interaction model is more suitable among those identified in
Section 6.2.1.
The push model imposes that NS (i.e. the RSU) proactively sends the noti-
fication to NRS (i.e. the in-vehicle computation device). For this purpose, it is
necessary to know the location of such vehicle. It should be noted that the offence
place was already known – once the offence was detected at the beginning of the
enforcement process, its place was recorded within the initial evidence (recall Sec-
tion 4.4). Based on this information, it is possible to estimate the set of potential
locations in which the vehicle may be, considering the time interval between the
offence and the notification. Thus, there is no need to track the vehicle movement,
which would threat the driver privacy.
On the other hand, the pull model requires that the vehicle periodically re-
quests for new notifications to the RSU. It must be noted that this would cause
non-offending vehicles to perform such unnecessary requests. As the vehicular net-
work has to deal with safety-related ITS applications, saving bandwidth should be
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put as a critical design goal. Furthermore, this periodic action would require an
authentication against RSUs, which could enable tracking. For these reasons, the
interaction model selected for the unreliable channel is the push one.
Concerning the resilient channel between NRS and DRA, the selected interaction
model is the pull one. In this case, the natural interaction is that at the beginning
of the periodic connection, NRS authenticates itself against DRA. As a result,
the DRA knows when NRS is available, and then it may proceed to send all the
information related to NRS. It should be noted that this connection could be re-
used with other entities of the Traffic Authority to solve other periodic processes,
such as credential renewal, tax revisions, etc.
6.3.5 Threat model
In this Section, the different threats related to each element in the architecture are
described. It must be noted that four elements (Message Issuer, Dispute Resolution
Authority, RSUs and the back-end communication channel) are assumed to be
trusted for the purpose of this mechanism4. Therefore, there are no threats related
to these elements. The following subsections describe the corresponding threats for
the remaining elements.
Compromise of VANET communication channel
The VANET communication channel may be eavesdropped by any other entity in
range. Moreover, new messages may be injected in the conversation and existing
ones may be altered.
The channel may be filled with (potentially useless) messages. However, we
assume that Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks have been already addressed (for ex-
ample, using the LEAVE protocol [67]).
4This assumption does not mean that such entities are fully free of threats. However, in case
that they exist, they do not interfere with the mechanism presented herein.
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It must be noted that an intrinsic threat is posed by the channel unreliability,
which may cause any sent data to be lost.
Compromise of HMI devices
OVERSEE does not offer any kind of security service to protect against alteration
of the HMI devices or their connection networks. Thus, they rely on their own
physical countermeasures.
For the context of this contribution, the threat of compromise of HMI devices
is not considered. This threat may be caused by a malicious manipulation or by an
accidental malfunctioning operation. The relevance of this threat in this context
is that the HMI may report that the notification was accessed by the driver, but
actually it did not occur. Even if this threat is feasible, its solution will require the
development of software-hardware mechanisms that ensure its proper operation.
The design of such mechanisms is out of the scope of this contribution.
Compromise of OBUs
There are two main threats related to the OBU and its connection network – its
complete blockage and its selective manipulation. For the context of this contribu-
tion, both threats must be assumed as possible.
Regarding the first threat, it has been extensively studied in the e-toll field. A
case study may be the Toll Collect system which is currently running in Germany.
In order to detect this threat, control bridges are placed along the road. Each
vehicle is scanned, and it is determined whether or not it is subject to toll payment.
If it is the case, the bridge communicates (through DSRC) to the OBU to determine
whether the vehicle is participating in the automatic toll collection system and if the
OBU is properly switched on. If a vehicle subject to toll is not emitting an infrared
signal, it has either logged on manually or is in violation. To clarify this, the number
plate of each vehicle is photographed with an infrared camera and compared with
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the logged on number plate at Toll Collect headquarters. If it is discovered that the
vehicle is not manually logged on, the information is forwarded to BAG authorities
and an administrative fine is issued [68].
With respect to the second threat, it implies that the attacker is able to control
the OBU at her own will, intervening this component in a different way depending
on the data at stake. Thus, it may avoid sending some message or sending an
altered version. Moreover, it may avoid sending data outside the vehicle or just
sending some modified information.
6.4 Protocol definition
The notification at stake is sent by the Message Issuer (MI) to the Notification
Receiver (NR). However, none of these entities will have a direct role within the
non-repudiation interaction. On the one hand, the MI is assumed to be trusted to
create the notification itself, and its communication with the Notification Sender
(NS) through the Notification Manager (NMan) is reliable. Therefore, there is
no need to implement a non-repudiation protocol between these entities. On the
other side, by design of the model, the NR delegates into the Notification Receiving
System (NRS) for receiving data. As in the previous case, there are not non-
repudiation issues between these entities.
Taking into account the previous considerations, the only step in the whole
notification transfer process that may be challenged is the communication between
NS and NRS. Such protocol is designed in this Section.
6.4.1 Data structures
Apart from the notification itself, whose transference is the main goal of this pro-
tocol, there are two additional data structures, namely the evidence of availability
and the evidence of access to the content. Such two structures are derived from
the non-repudiation requirements introduced in Section 6.2.2. Tables 6.2, 6.3, and
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6.4 show the contents of the notification, the evidence of availability and of access,
respectively.
Data group Element Size
(bytes)
Offender
Vehicle Identifier 4
Offender name 30
Offender identifier 4
Offence and punishment
Description 30
Date 4
Place 10
Time 2
Issuer name 20
Offended rule 10
Punishment 4
Demerit points 1
Witness Device identifier 4
Future actions Legal terms, time interval, ex-
planation on future actions
100
Signature
Signature value 56
Public key certificate 125
Total Size 404
Table 6.2: Contents of the Notification message
The notification contents follow the legal provisions on this regard (see Section
3.2.2). Only two refinements are made over such contents – the postal address is
removed (as it is the own vehicle the place of notification) and the digital signature
of the issuing Authority is added to ensure the data origin and integrity. Even if
the public key certificate of MI is pre-loaded in vehicles, it is also included in the
notification to simplify its updating.
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Data group Element Size
(bytes)
Message Digest value 32
Availability time Time mark 4
Signature
Signature value 56
Public key certificate 125
Total Size 217
Table 6.3: Contents of the Evidence of availability message
Data group Element Size
(bytes)
Message Digest value 32
Access description
Time mark 4
Decision 1
Signature
Signature value 56
Public key certificate 125
Total Size 218
Table 6.4: Contents of the Evidence of access message
The evidence of availability (referred to as EoA) is created by the HSM acting
on its own behalf. It contains (1) the hash of the received notification and (2)
the moment in which it was received. The digital signature of the HSM (using the
current pseudonym) over the previous two fields is also contained herein, along with
its public key certificate. The evidence of access (referred to as EoAcc) is created
by the HSM acting on behalf of the notification receiver. Additionally to the fields
introduced in EoA, it includes the decision (i.e. accept or reject) that has been
taken concerning the notification. Such field is also taken into account when the
digital signature is calculated. Such digital signatures are created using the keys
associated with the pseudonym that appears in the notification. The sizes of public
key certificates and digital signatures are taken from the IEEE 1609.2 standard [8].
6.4.2 Notation
This Section describes the notation in use in the protocol specification. Concerning
the data structures, they will be noted as Notif for the notification, EoA for the
evidence of availability and EoAcc for the evidence of access. With respect to the
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cryptographic operations, public key encryption (EX(t)(M)) and its corresponding
decryption (E−1X(t)(M)), as well as digital signatures (SX(t)(M)) and their verifica-
tions (S−1X(t)(M)) are in use. In these cases, X(t) refers to the pseudonym of entity
X at time t, which has a public-private keypair used for cryptographic operations.
For example, in the encryption process the public key will be used whereas the
private one is employed in the decryption operation.
6.4.3 Protocol specification
The protocol consists of three main steps – sending (1) the notification to the
vehicle, (2) the evidence of availability from the vehicle once the message has been
successfully received and (3) the evidence of access from the vehicle once the driver
has accessed to its contents. However, both the vehicular network failure and the
OBU compromise may become an obstacle to the regular protocol development and
thus they must be properly managed.
Algorithm 5 describes the data exchange between the different entities. The
process starts (step 0) with NR enabling NRS to be the place in which notifications
addressed to her may be received. For this purpose, a password is introduced into
the NRS’s HSM.
Once the offence is detected, MI prepares the notification and sends it to the
NMan, along with its hash, the pseudonym in use of the HSM (at the time of the
offence), and the time of the offence toffence (step 1a). Once NMan has estimated
the set of potential positions of the vehicle, it sends the notification to the corre-
sponding Notification Senders (i.e. RSUs)5 . They will try to send this message
to the OBU, although at most only one will be able to achieve it (step 1b). It
should be noted that also the public key certificate and the signature value are
sent encrypted. The confidentiality of the public key certificate ensures that other
vehicles will not be able to guess the nature of the message (as the amount of types
5For the sake of clarity, in this Section the terms RSU and Notification Sender will be used
interchangeably.
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of messages that such entity may send to vehicles is really reduced).
The OBU transfers this message through the SAE to the HSM, which decrypts
the message using the private key associated to the pseudonym in use, and verifies
the notification signature using the public key certificate of MI (step 2a). If such
verification is successful, the evidence of availability is prepared and sent to the
RSU that sent the notification6 (step 2b). For this purpose, a hash function is
applied over the notification and a time mark is obtained from the HSM internal
time source. All these data are signed using the private key associated with the
pseudonym in use. Such signature is verified by the RSU (step 2c).
The notification message is then presented to the driver by means of the Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) (step 3a). The driver may take a decision on the notifi-
cation, which will be employed to prepare the evidence of access (step 3b). Such
decision may be explicit (i.e. an action of accepting or rejecting the message in an
idle driving time) or implicit (i.e. a pre-defined action established by the driver, for
example by means of policies). Such evidence is sent to the aforementioned RSU
(step 3c), which again verifies the signature (step 3d). Furthermore, it also deter-
mines whether the received evidences are semantically correct. Thus, the digest
values must be the same as that received in step 1b and the respective time marks
must be coherent (i.e. the evidence of availability must be prior to the evidence of
access, and both dated before the current time).
The previous data transmissions with RSUs are developed through the vehic-
ular communication. For this purpose, each of the steps is repeated a number α
of times to counter the eventual data loss caused by the unreliability of this chan-
nel7. Section 8.3.1 analyzes possible values for such parameter. An optimization of
this mechanism is to avoid sending α retransmissions, by incorporating an acknowl-
edgement mechanism. In this way, once the message is received, the remaining
6The special situation in which the NRS is not enabled as a suitable place to receive notifications
is discussed at the end of this Section.
7Such repetition is transparent to the driver. Thus, re-sending the evidence of access does not
require taking a decision for each repetition.
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repetitions would be avoided. Nevertheless, the reduced size of messages (which
involves a short transmission time) along with the fact that repetitions may be sent
without delays (if enabled by the network usage), make that a regular acknowledge-
ment message be impractical – it could be sent once all retransmissions have been
already sent.
Both the evidence of availability and of access are expected to be sent to any of
the involved RSUs (more specifically, to the RSU from which the vehicle received
the notification message) after a realistic amount of time. As an example, it is not
reasonable to wait one hour to receive these evidences, as the vehicular mobility
imposes that after such an interval the vehicle will be surely out of the RSUs range.
Thus, after a reasonable interval (see Section 8.3.1 for an illustration of the size of
this interval), all RSUs contacted in step 1b send the results on their verification of
the evidences (both the signature verification and semantic checks). Those RSUs
that have not received any message simply send a false value.
After receiving these values from all RSUs, the NMan establishes if the process
has been successfully finished. Thus, if both evidences have been verified by one
RSU, the notification is adequately performed. If it is not the case, then NMan
contacts DRA (step 3f), sending both the notification, the pseudonym in use by the
HSM and the time toffence (already received by NMan in step 1a).
The process followed by DRA (Algorithm 6) starts after a mutual authentication
between HSM and DRA. It should be noted that the HSM never reveals its real
identity to DRA, but instead it uses one pseudonym to authenticate. DRA contacts
the certification authority to determine if the presented pseudonym is related to the
one sent by the NMan. If it is the case, then the process starts (step 1 in Algorithm
6) by sending the notification message as well as the time of the notification toffence.
Such time mark is necessary to enable HSM retrieving the pseudonym that was
in use at the time of the offence. Using such pseudonym (more specifically, its
associated public key), it is possible for HSM to decrypt the notification. Moreover,
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1 begin
2 (0) NR → HMI → SAE → HSM : password (HSM)
3 # Once the offence has been detected and processed
4 (1a) MI → NMan → RSU-set : Ehsm(Toffence) (Notif), hsm(Toffence),
toffence, tnotif , Hash(Notif)
5 # Message (1b) is re-sent α times by each RSU in RSU-set
6 (1b) RSU → OBU → SAE → HSM : Ehsm(Toffence) (Notif)
7 (2a) HSM → SAE: notifAuth = S−1MI(E−1hsm(Toffence)(Notif))
8 if notifAuth == true then
9 # Upon request from SAE, the HSM creates the evidence of
availability
10 (2b) HSM → SAE → OBU → RSU : ERSU (EoA)
11 (2c) RSU : evidAuth = S−1hsm(Toffence)(E−1RSU (EoA))
12 (3a) SAE → HMI → NR : notification data
13 # Once the offender has accessed to the notification content
14 (3b) NR → HMI → SAE → HSM: Decision
15 (3c) HSM → SAE → OBU → RSU : ERSU (EoAcc)
16 (3d) RSU : evidAvailAuth = S−1hsm(Toffence)(E−1RSU (EoAcc))
17 # RSU establishes the value evidCoherence by comparing both
evidences each other, as well as the hash value contained in them with
the value Hash(Notif) received in step 1b
18 # Message (3e) is sent by each RSU in RSU-set
19 (3e) RSU → NMan : evidAuth, evidAvailAuth
20 if (evidAuth == false OR evidAvailAuth == false OR evidCoherence ==
false) for all RSUs in RSU-set then
21 (3f) NMan → DRA : Ehsm(Toffence) (Notif), hsm(Toffence),
toffence, Hash(Notif)
22 # Start the notification process through the DRA (Algorithm 6)
Algorithm 5: Notification process over the vehicular channel
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1 begin
2 # This process starts after a successful mutual authentication between
HSM and DRA
3 (1) DRA → OBU → SAE → HSM : Ehsm(Toffence) (Notif), toffence
4 (2a) HSM : notifAuth = S−1MI(E−1hsm(Toffence)(Notif))
5 # Upon request from SAE, the HSM creates the evidence of availability
6 (2b) HSM → SAE → OBU → DRA : EDRA (EoA)
7 (2c) DRA : evidAuth = S−1hsm(Tnotif−dra)(E−1DRA(EoA))
8 if evidAuth == false then
9 Repeat the process from the beginning. If the result is the same,
DRA takes evidence on this situation and contacts the Traffic
Authority to call the vehicle for revision of its devices
10 The notification should be performed using the
non-vehicular-enhanced mechanisms
11 if notifAuth == true then
12 (3a) SAE → HMI → NR : notification data
13 # Once the offender has accessed to the notification content
14 (3b) NR → HMI → SAE → HSM: Decision
15 (3c) HSM → SAE → OBU → DRA : EDRA(EoAcc)
16 (3d) DRA : evidAvailAuth = S−1hsm(Toffence)(E−1DRA(EoAcc))
17 # DRA establishes the value evidCoherence by comparing both
evidences each other, as well as the hash value contained in them with
the value Hash(Notif) received at the end of Algorithm 5
18 if evidAvailAuth == false OR evidCoherence == false then
19 # The vehicular-enhanced electronic notification is not successfully
completed
20 Repeat the process from the beginning. If the result is the same,
DRA takes evidence on this situation and contacts the Traffic
Authority to call the vehicle for revision of its devices
21 The notification should be performed using the
non-vehicular-enhanced mechanisms
Algorithm 6: Notification process performed by DRA after a failure of the ve-
hicular channel
using MI’s public key, it verifies the notification signature (step 2a). The following
steps (2b to 3d) are the same as those described in Algorithm 5. The only difference
is that even if the notification signature was not successfully verified, the evidence
of availability is prepared and sent to DRA as a means to inform this entity of
the situation. Only if the signature is verified the notification is presented to the
notification receiver.
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If DRA detects that either the signature of any of the evidences is not correct, it
may repeat the process from the beginning. As the time available for this resilient
connection is several orders greater than the time to perform this exchange, it is
possible to perform this repetition (as opposed to what happened in the vehicular
environment). If the result is the same, then it is assumed that the in-vehicle
platform is not working properly. In such a case, the notification protocol is failed
and it should be performed using other traditional mechanisms. Furthermore, DRA
calls for maintenance to the affected vehicle.
One important difference is that the time required to access to the notification
may be greater than that in the vehicular connection. As an example, consider
that the resilient connection is established in the parking of the offender’s home.
It may happen that the notification is received once after the offender has left the
car. In such a situation, the notification will be accessed the next time the offender
introduces the password. Particularly, in order to prevent the driver ignore the no-
tification, in case that no decision is taken on this issue, the SAE determines that it
has been rejected and creates (autonomously) the evidence of access including such
decision. Even in this situation, it may happen that the offender never introduces
again the password. It may happen, for example, if the vehicle is sold. In such
scenario, the reason for the protocol not finishing successfully is not related to the
malfunctioning of the in-vehicle devices or the passive behavior from the notifica-
tion receiver – the only reason is that the vehicle is not a suitable notification place
anymore. To prevent DRA reaching a deadlock, a timer must be set. The defini-
tion of the waiting time highly depends on the usage patterns of the vehicle and the
frequency of the resilient channel. Thus, for a channel that is usually established at
a daily basis, waiting more than two days does not seem to be reasonable. A policy
to determine such interval is left to future work. It should be noted that this timer
has a different purpose than the 10-days timer established by current legislation.
If the action that enables the NRS as a suitable notification place (i.e. inserting a
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password, in the proposed protocol) is set as a prerequisite for the vehicle ignition,
then the passive behavior (which was the goal of the 10-days timer) is countered
– the next time the offender tries to use the vehicle, she will be forced to take a
decision (or the vehicle will autonomously take it on her behalf). The timer defined
in this protocol is intended to prevent unnecessary waiting times derived for special
situations such as the one described above.
Handling NRSs not enabled to receive notifications for NR
The proposed protocol is based on the fact that at its very beginning (step 0), NR
introduces the password that enables NRS as a suitable place to receive notifications.
However, it may happen that the vehicle is driven by a person different from the
one that has the password pre-loaded in the vehicle. In this case, the vehicle is not
a suitable place for receiving notifications. To reflect this fact, the HSM inserts a
void time mark in the evidence of availability (step 2b of Algorithm 5). This issue is
recognized by the RSU, which communicates this fact to the NMan. Based on this
information, the NMan determines that it is not possible to perform a vehicular-
enhanced notification protocol and it proceeds with one of the existing notification
mechanisms.
6.5 Summary of the chapter
In this chapter, a novel electronic notification protocol has been presented. Such
protocol is based on the upcoming communication capabilities of vehicles. In this
way, the notification may be sent directly to the offending vehicle, thus reducing
the time gap between the offence and its punishment. Moreover, in case that
the notification is not successfully done, the interacting parties take notice of this
situation in order to proceed with other existing notification mechanisms.
Chapter 7
EVIGEN: A protocol for
vehicular cooperative EVIdence
GENeration
In order to ensure that a punishment is fair, it is necessary to provide the offender
with enough elements to defend herself. Nevertheless, for the road traffic enforce-
ment process there is currently no practical mechanism to create these defensive
elements that help the driver on attesting its driving behavior or the surrounding
circumstances. The low amount of counterevidences presented by offenders, even if
around the 36 % of drivers find this punishment system to be unfair, may be seen
as an indicator of the lack of a real means for building these supporting elements.
To contribute on this issue, in this Chapter a mechanism to cooperatively create
vehicular evidences about the recent driving behavior is presented. This mechanism
is applied after the offence notification is received in the computational device of
the offending vehicle (as detailed in Chapter 6). Particularly, only the scenario in
which the notification is sent to the vehicle through the VANET is considered. The
scope of this protocol covers not only the evidence creation but also its verification.
Nevertheless, the trustworthiness evaluation of the data provided by such surround-
ing vehicles is out of the scope. The threat of collusion among vehicles (to give a
collective false vision of a given situation) is also out of the scope.
Section 7.1 gives an overview of the proposal. Afterwards, the model and ar-
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Figure 7.1: Proposal scope within the enforcement process and timeline. Covered
steps have been marked in white.
chitecture are presented in Section 7.2 and Section 7.3, respectively. Finally, the
protocol is described in Section 7.4.
7.1 Proposal overview
The proposed protocol enables the cooperative creation of evidences that may help
on supporting a given claim. In this work, it will be applied to help a driver on
defending herself against an unfair punishment. Thus, the protocol is executed after
an offence notification is received and its resulting evidence (called counterevidence
in the proposed enforcement model, see Chapter 4) will be sent to the Authority
for evaluation (see Figure 7.1).
Before the purported offence is detected, vehicles are being driven, exchanging
status data through VANET beacons, i.e. messages containing (among other data)
the position and speed of the sender vehicle and which are sent to all one-hop
communication neighbours. Once an offence is detected, a fine notification is sent
to the offending driver through the computational device of the vehicle. This device
analyses the fairness of the received notification. For this purpose, it compares the
offence description with its recent behavior, based on the information provided by
in-vehicle sensors. If such device finds that the punishment is not fair, it asks
surrounding vehicles (witnesses) for supporting data that may help on decreasing
the fine. Particularly, the one-hop neighbours when the offence was purportedly
committed are surveyed. Each of these vehicles may send an estimation (called
y y y y y y 
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testimony) of the previous behavior of the offender. On the other hand, the vehicle
requesting testimonies will send its claimed value for the behavior-related variable,
along with the list of witnesses that should be sending their testimonies to support
the claim. Using such list and the corresponding testimonies, the evidence is built
and sent to the appropriate entity in the Authority domain for evaluation.
As vehicles are connected through a wireless network, data may get lost in the
communication channel. To deal with this issue, two exception handling proce-
dures are proposed, one for the offender vehicle and the other for witnesses. These
protocols are executed over a resilient network, such as an at-home connection.
As a difference with contributions C2 and C3, this protocol does not contain any
strategy of repeating several times each of the exchanged messages to counter the
vehicular network unreliability. This decision aims to avoid the waste of resources
for a mechanism which is only fruitful for one person – the offender. In contribution
C2, reporting misbehaving vehicles is of the interest of the whole set of drivers, as
it contributes on removing them from the roads. On the other hand, contribution
C3 is focused on delivering the notification, thus increasing the global speed of the
process, which is beneficial for the sustainability of the road traffic administration
body.
7.2 Model
This Section describes the considered model for this contribution. Section 7.2.1
introduces the participant entities. Section 7.2.2 describes the requirements that
the mechanism has to fulfil. Finally, Section 7.2.3 describes the working assumptions
that are taken into account.
7.2.1 Participant entities
The parts of the enforcement process related to this mechanism are highlighted
in Figure 7.2. Thus, the Offending ITS-enabled vehicle will perform two different
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Element Symbol Content / Description
Participant entities
OBUi On Board Unit i.
R, R(t) Requester, using pseudonym R(t) on time t.
Wi, Wi(t) Witness i, using pseudonym Wi(t) in time t.
EM Evidence Manager.
HSMR, HSMWi Hardware Security Module of R and Wi, respectively.
SAER, SAEWi Sec. App. Environment of R and Wi, respectively.
Adj Adjudicator.
CA Certification Authority.
Crypto. operations
SX(t)(M) Signature over ‘M’ using entity X private key at time
’t’. It denotes the message ‘M’ and its signature value.
S−1X(t)(M) Signature verification over the signed message ‘M’ us-
ing entity X public key at time ’t’. It represents the
result (true or false) of this operation
EX(t)(M) Message ‘M’ encrypted with entity X public key at
time ’t’.
EX(t)−1(M) Decryption of message ‘M’ using entity X’s private key
at time ’t’.
Data elements
CertE(t) Public key certificate of entity E at time t
toff , treq, ttest, tevid Time mark of the offence, of the request, of the tes-
timony and of the evidence. Figure 7.1 graphically
represents such moments.
offence-id Offence identifier given by the road traffic authority.
Data structures
BeaconR(t) SR(t)(R(t), speed, position, t)
ReqR(Treq) (part1, part2) where part1 = SR(Treq)(R(toff ), toff ),
and part2 = SR(Toff)(offence-id, type), being type =
position or speed
TestimWi(Ttest) SWi(Ttest) (Wi(ttest), offence-id, R(toff ), [position or
speed], ttest)
EvidHdrR(Tevid) SR(Tevid) (R(tevid), offence-id, claimedValue, toff ,
BeaconW1(Toff), CertW1(Toff),...BeaconWn(Toff),
CertWn(Toff), tevHdr)
EvidEM SEM (EvidHdrR(Tevid) (offence-id), SupportingTestim,
tevid) where
SupportingTestim ={ TestimW1(Ttest), ... ,
TestimWn(Ttest) }
Auxiliary functions
contains(data,min,max) Determines if data ∈ [min,max]. Returns true if this
condition holds.
lookupBehRecord(KnowWi(t1)(t1),
R(t2), t2, type)
Searches whether Wi knows the behavior-related vari-
able according to type of vehicle R(t2) in t2. Returns
such value, or null if it does not exist.
lookupCert(KnowE1(t1), E2, t2) Searches within KnowE1(t1) if CertE2(t2) was known.
It returns such certificate, if existed.
findNeighbours(E, t) Returns neighbourSet, the set of vehicles that were
known to entity E at time t. It also outputs the bea-
cons (beaconSet) that showed the existence of such
knowledge relationship, and the corresponding public
key certificates (certSet)
storeTestimony(E,TestimE1(E2,
offence-id), CertE1(ttestim))
Stores the testimony in KnowE(tstore), being tstore the
moment in which the function is invoked and ttestim
the time of the testimony.
retrieveTestimony(KnowE1(t), E2,
offence-id, t)
Searches within the knowledge set of entity E1 the
testimony of entity E2 referred to offence offence-id
in time t. It returns such testimony (along with the
corresponding public key certificate), if existed.
checkPseudonymsEntity(E(t1),E(t2)) Returns true if pseudonyms E(t1) and E(t2) belong to
the same entity E.
Table 7.1: Notation summary
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Figure 7.2: Parts of the entities model of the enforcement process related to the
cooperative evidence generation mechanism
actions. First, it will send to the Authority (especifically, the CounterEvidence
Analyzer, CEA) its claim on its past behavior. For this purpose, the Designated-
as-Offender Contact Point (DCP) will be used as the intermediary of this commu-
nication. In this way, the Offending vehicle does not have to care the specific CEA
that has to be contacted, which may depend on the internal organization of the
enforcement infrastructure.
The second action is to obtain the information (called testimonies) from sur-
rounding vehicles. From the logical point of view, this interaction involves that at a
certain point in time it is necessary to extract from such vehicles some information.
This data is requested directly from the Offending ITS-enabled vehicle to the Sur-
rounding ITS-enabled vehicles. The latter sends the data to the CEA through the
Data Requester (DR), which is the entity in charge of retrieving data from witness
stakeholders.
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Identified interaction models
There are three ways in which the identified entities may interact to perform the
counterevidence generation process. They will be referred to as the centralized
approach, the decentralized and the combined ones. In the first case, the Offending
ITS-enabled vehicle relies on DR (which is seen as a single, central entity) to ask the
Surrounding vehicles on behalf of the Offending one, to retrieve their information
and to create the counterevidence. In the decentralized approach, it is the Offending
ITS-enabled vehicle which asks for the Surrounding vehicle data, retrieves it and
builds the counterevidence. In the combined one, it is the Offending vehicle who
requests for testimonies, while DR collects them. The Offending vehicle then sends a
summary of its expectations on the future counterevidence. Based on this summary,
the CEA (which receives such summary along with the data retrieved by DR)
compiles the counterevidence and proceeds with its verification and evaluation.
From the enforcement model point of view, the three identified interaction mod-
els are suitable. Even if any of them matches exactly the data flows of the enforce-
ment model, all of them respect the definition of the entities and the logical division
of their responsibilities. Thus, in all cases DR is focused on retrieving data from
witness stakeholders, DCP is the entity that receives data from the offence-related
stakeholder (the Offending vehicle, in this case) and CEA focuses on analysing the
counterevidence, obtaining data from DR when necessary to perform this evalua-
tion.
7.2.2 Requirements
There are four requirements that must be achieved by the devised solution. Each
one is introduced below.
Correctness. The protocol must enable the creation of a behavior-describing
evidence ev for a Requester vehicle (R). Such evidence must contain one or more
testimonies from surrounding Witness vehicles (Wi). The protocol must enable the
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Adjudicator Adj to validate the aforementioned evidence. For this purpose, the
following five conditions must hold:
Condition 1 (supported evidence). ev has to contain at least one testimony
referred to the offence identifier offence-id to which the evidence is related.
Condition 2 (value consistency). Let testimV alue be the percep-
tion of the behavior-related variable included in a testimony appearing in
ev. Given that claimedV alue is R’s claim on that variable, the oper-
ation contains(testimV alue, claimedV alue − confidThreshold, claimedV alue +
confidThreshold) must return true for a predefined parameter confidThreshold.
Such parameter represents the maximum allowed deviation that a testimony may
have in order to determine that it supports a given claimedV alue. At least one
testimony must support such value.
Condition 3 (time consistency). All testimonies contained in ev must contain a
time mark ttest such that toff < ttest < tevid, being toff the time of the offence and
tevid the time when the evidence is issued.
Condition 4 (identity consistency). Every testimony appearing in ev must be
signed by a different entity. Moreover, there must not be a testimony created by
the entity that issues the evidence header of ev.
Condition 5 (witness identity coherence) Every beacon contained in ev’s evi-
dence header must be signed by an entity that has also issued one of the testimonies
appearing in ev.
Confidentiality. Testimonies and evidences should only be available for EM
and Adj, apart from their issuers.
Authentic requests. Only authentic requests should be processed by the
receiving vehicles. A request is said to be authentic if, on the one hand, it is related
to a genuine previous offence notification and, on the other, it has not been modified
since it was created.
Authentic testimonies. False testimonies should be identified as such by
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the receiving entity. A testimony is considered to be false if the contained data is
not reasonable (e.g. a vehicle may not be driven at 600 kph), if its sender is not
properly identified or if it is not possible to attest that it was present (i.e. near the
Requester) at the time of the facts.
7.2.3 Working assumptions
The solution devised herein is suitable to work in scenarios where the following
six conditions hold. First, a secure boot-up process exists through which the CA
installs all cryptography-related materials into the R and Wi’s HSM. Apart from
the aforementioned pseudonyms, the material contains the public-private keypairs
along with the corresponding public key certificates (CertE(t)). Similarly, SAE
applications are installed by the appropriate entity (e.g. manufacturer, road traffic
agency, etc.).
The second assumption is that a Secure Location Verification (SLV) service is
being executed by vehicles, to determine which vehicles are really in its vicinity
[69, 70]. This avoids a vehicle falsely claiming to be somewhere, which is useful for
both the Offending vehicle and the Surrounding ones. In this way, the Offending
vehicle knows which vehicles are really on its vicinity and the Surrounding ones will
have an accurate location for the Offending vehicle. For this purpose, vehicles verify
the position of neighbours that are directly reachable by measuring the received
signal strength. For those that are not reachable (for example, because of obstacles),
a cooperative data exchange is performed with direct neighbours in order to discover
the location of a third vehicle through triangulation.
The third assumption is related with message routing. Particularly, there exist
a routing mechanism that enables sending messages from one vehicle to another.
One example is the modified version of the Ad-Hoc On-demand Distance Vector
(AODV), in which routes are only built for a predefined zone of relevance [71].
For the context of this work, such zone may be defined according to the maximum
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distance that may exist between a vehicle and its intended witnesses1. Additionally,
a mechanism against routing misbehavior is assumed (e.g. incentive-based approach
[72] or watchdog surveillance [73]).
The fourth assumption is that vehicles store the behavior-related data from all
the received beacons. Such data will be removed once the next connection to the EM
through the resilient channel is finished. Furthermore, it is assumed that vehicles
store during a period p the information provided by in-vehicle sensors and the full
set of received beacons. Such period p is assumed to be greater or equal than the
time between the offence and its notification. The amount of storage required to
fulfil this assumption is shown in Section 8.4.2.
The last two assumptions are related to beacons. On the one hand, it is assumed
that all beacons are signed by their issuers. On the other hand, once a vehicle
receives a beacon from another one, the latter will also be receiving the beacons
from the former. In this way, once vehicle A receives a beacon from vehicle B,
both are sure that the other one may act as its witness. Although the wireless
nature of the vehicular network does not formally guarantee this situation, there
are two factors that contribute on this issue. First, beacons are exchanged at a very
high rate (one each 100 ms.). Second, data losses in this network do not happen
in bursts, but they are independent one to each other [74]. Thus, in practice it is
expected that even if A receives a beacon from B but B misses the beacon from
A at the same time, the next beacon from A (which is only 100 ms. later) will be
successfully received by B.
7.3 Architecture
This Section introduces the architecture derived from the model presented in Section
7.2. The considered architecture is depicted in Figure 7.3, which shows the entities
from the model described in Chapter 4 (marked with a broken line) and their
1Such distance is related to the parameter tgap that will be analyzed in Section 8.4
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Figure 7.3: Architecture for the evidence generation protocol
technical realization. The participant entities are grouped according to the network
environment they belong to, either the background or the vehicular one. Section
7.3.1 describe the background environment, whereas Section 7.3.2. Section 7.3.3
describes how both environments are connected. Section 7.3.4 focuses on the trust
of entities and communication channels. The threat model is presented in Section
7.3.5. Finally, the selection of the interaction model among those presented in
Section 7.2.1 is described in Section 7.3.6.
7.3.1 Background environment
There are three entities in the background environment, namely the Certifica-
tion Authority (CA), the Adjudicator (Adj) and the Evidence Manager (EM). CA
manages (i.e. issues, transfers and revokes) pseudonymous public key certificates
(CertE(t)) that bind a cryptographic key with a pseudonym assigned to the vehicle.
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Thus, CA is the top entity within a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and it is the
only entity that is able to relate a pseudonym with a real identity [54]. Adj decides
about the imposed fine taking into account the evidence proposed by the offender.
Such evidence is created by EM2, using the information received from the entities
in the vehicular environment. Concerning the evidence verification and adjudica-
tion conducted by the Adjudicator, both tasks are properly within the scope of the
CEA. At the light of their respective descriptions, both Adj and EM collectively
form the task developed by the CounterEvidence Analyzer in the model proposed
in Chapter 4. All entities that form the background environment are static, and so
they are placed in one or more traditional computation nodes.
7.3.2 Vehicular environment
With respect to the vehicular environment, Requester and Witness are connected
through a Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET). For this purpose, they contain an
On-Board Unit (OBU) which provides several communication interfaces (e.g. IEEE
802.11p, GPRS, etc.), as proposed in the CVIS project [75].
Apart from the OBU, there are three additional in-vehicle devices, which are
organized considering the OVERSEE architecture [24]. In this way, there exists a
Secure Application Environment (SAE) where applications reside. From the SAE
viewpoint, the proposed protocol is an application itself.
Each vehicle is also equipped with sensors, which give information related to
the vehicle current status (position, speed) and to its surroundings. All these data
will be stored in a data set (KnowE(t)), which contains the information known
by vehicle E at time t. This set is also present in the entities in the background
environment to store the data received from others.
The OVERSEE architecture also considers the existence of a Hardware Security
Module (HSM). Regarding this contribution, such device provides with a reliable
time source and stores the cryptographic material related to vehicular credentials.
2Other alternatives are analysed in Section 7.3.6.
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Particularly, it stores a set of short-lived pseudonyms that will be given to each
vehicle to protect their privacy. They are noted as R(t) (Requester pseudonyms)
and Wi(t) (Witness pseudonyms), and may be used only in time t. To avoid routing
problems due to the pseudonym change, each OBU will be able to receive packets
that are sent to one of its previous but recent pseudonyms [65].
7.3.3 Connection between environments
The connection between both the background and the vehicular environment may be
performed through Road Side Units (RSUs)3, which are static nodes placed aside the
roads that participate in the VANET. Thus, the RSU task involves receiving some
data from the offending vehicle (as it is done, in the enforcement model proposed
in Chapter 4, by the Designated-as-offender Contact Point, DCP) and from witness
vehicles (as it is done in the enforcement model by the Data Requester, DR).
All RSUs are connected to EM. Apart from this connection, there exists a
resilient channel between the vehicular entities and the EM, which ensures that
packets eventually arrive. One typical environment for such a channel is a location-
restricted connection like an at-home network. This channel is built periodically,
for example at a daily basis. The Network Access Point (NetAP) is the entity that
enables such communication between OBUs and EM.
7.3.4 Trust model
Trust considerations are divided into those affecting entities and those for commu-
nication networks. Regarding entities, Adj is honest-but-curious, which means that
it will never misbehave but it may try to deduct as much information as possible
regarding the offender. On the other hand, both the CA and the EM are trusted.
In the first case, it means that it will responsibly manage the vehicular credentials
and that it will never disclose to unauthorized entities the identity related to a given
3Although other settings could be possible (e.g. using cellular connections), the use of RSU has
been chosen for consistency with the rest of this thesis’ contributions
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pseudonym. With respect to the EM, it will never disclose any received information
to unauthorized parties and it will never create false information, forge or manip-
ulate any existing one. Furthermore, they will unavoidably follow the proposed
protocol.
With respect to the vehicular environment, there are two fully trusted enti-
ties (HSM and SAE) and two unreliable ones (in-vehicle sensors and OBU). In
the last case, it is assumed that both may be maliciously altered, thus leading to
false sensorial information (in-vehicle sensors), a communication blockage or data
manipulation (OBU).
Communication networks present different trust profiles. The network in the
background environment is assumed to be resilient (i.e. packets eventually arrive).
However, it does not prevent from manipulation, injection or eavesdropping attacks.
On the other hand, the in-vehicle network between OBU, HSM and SAE is managed
by the OVERSEE architecture, thus guaranteeing that only authorized parties may
access and no data alteration is possible. The connection with sensors is assumed to
be resilient but unreliable (i.e. there is no guarantee on the data authenticity). The
same profile is shared by the resilient connection between vehicles and EM. Finally,
the regular communication between vehicles, and from these to the background
environment, is not resilient nor reliable.
7.3.5 Threat model
Threats on correctness. There are two threats on this issue. First, every message
sent through an unreliable network (as it is the case of the vehicular one) may be
altered or lost. Second, the aforementioned messages may be never created, even if
mandated by the protocol. One example of this is that OBUs may be compromised
in such a way that they refuse to participate in the protocol.
Threats on confidentiality. The eavesdropping threat may happen in the
vehicular environment (as usual in shared medium networks such as VANETs) as
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well as in the background network (due to its unreliability).
Threats on authentic requests. A rational attacker may ask for testimonies
referred to other vehicle as a means of obtaining some information about its past
behavior.
Threats on authentic testimonies. A false testimony is not beneficial for
a well-behaving vehicle, as it may lead to legal consequences. However, a rational
attacker may be interested in creating testimonies without being in the surroundings
of the offender, if a reward is given by the offender. Apart from this threat, a
malfunctioning sensor may originate inaccurate testimonies.
7.3.6 Selection of the interaction model
Taking into account the interaction models identified in Section 7.2.1, in this Section
they are comparative analysed. Furthermore, the most suitable one is selected.
Without entering into the details of the exchanged messages for each partic-
ular setting, some conclusions may be reached from the general features of each
approach. Such features are the system scalability, its auditability and its effective-
ness (see Table 7.2).
Regarding the system scalability, it must be noted that the decentralized choice
is more scalable than the remaining approaches, as the workload from EM is re-
duced. Even considering that EM’s computational power greatly overcomes that
offered by vehicles, the amount of offences that may be detected (at a nation-wide
scale) at the same time suggests that EM may become a bottleneck. However, the
feasibility of this approach should be analysed, as several real-time ITS services will
be running at the same time over the (constrained) vehicular computational device.
On the other hand, the combined approach seems to appropriately balance the re-
quirements from both parts. However, experimental evaluations with real vehicular
hardware will be interesting to assess this issue.
The system auditability measures whether it is possible to reliably determine
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the operations that have been performed to achieve a result. In this context this
is a critical feature, as there could be consequences after the execution of this
mechanism, e.g. call for maintenance due to the lack of response by a witness. In
this regard, the decentralized approach is less suitable than the remaining options.
As all the inter-vehicle communications are performed over an unreliable channel,
it would be impossible to determine whether the absence of a testimony (needed by
a certain R) is due to the loss of the request, of the testimony or the uncooperative
behaviour from Wi [66]. However, a lazy R could claim that it sent a request but
did not receive a testimony, thus forcing EM to collect it. In this way, R could
save resources, but it could never be determined whether its claim was trustworthy.
The centralized variant is similar to the combined approach in this issue, as in both
cases EM (which is trusted) takes part in the process, using the resilient channel.
The system effectiveness measures the capacity of the system to create evi-
dences based on testimonies. The decentralized approach is again inappropriate for
this context. To understand this issue, it is important to note that a testimony
that is not beneficial for R could cause it to take reprisals against Wi. Moreover,
it is reasonable to assume that if R would know the value of the testimonies, it
will remove the ones that are not favourable to it to avoid wasting resources by
creating evidences that are against its interests. In this way, a Wi holding a non-
profitable value for R would never answer in the decentralized choice. Therefore,
such approach would prevent these testimonies to be managed. On the contrary,
the system effectiveness offered by the centralized version and the combined one is
similar, as both enable a private communication between the EM and every Wi.
Thus, these unfavourable testimonies could be freely sent to EM. They could be
used to enable the Authority to complement its proof against the offender. For this
reason, we consider that the effectiveness of the combined approach (and, similarly,
of the centralized version) is better than the decentralized one.
At the light of these considerations, the combined approach is the most suitable
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Centralized Decentralized Combined (selected)
System scalability – ++ +
System auditability ++ – ++
System effectiveness + – – +
Table 7.2: Analysis of approaches for the testimony collection and evidence gener-
ation. The rating for each feature ranges from ++ (totally fulfilled) to – – (poorly
fulfilled)
one as it addresses successfully all the analysed features. For this reason, it will be
selected for the development of this contribution.
7.4 Protocol specification
The proposed protocol is composed by three parts, namely the testimony collection,
the evidence generation and the evidence verification. Furthermore, there are two
exceptional situations that must be properly handled, one concerning the offender
and the other related to witnesses. The following subsections describe, first, the data
structures (Section 7.4.1) and cryptographic operations at stake (Section 7.4.2) and,
afterwards, each of the aforementioned process parts and the exceptional processes.
7.4.1 Data structures
There are five data structures in this work, namely beacon, testimony, request, evi-
dence header and evidence. Beacons (noted as BeaconS(t)) contain the description
of several behavior-describing variables (such as heading, acceleration, etc.) of the
sender vehicle S at time t. In this work, they contain at least the speed and po-
sition, and are digitally signed to avoid manipulation. The corresponding public
key certificates are sent along beacons to enable their verification. A testimony
TestimE1 allows one vehicle E1 to describe one of these variables related to another
vehicle E2 at a given time ttest. The testimony is to be used in the context of an
offence notification identified by offence-id. To ensure the data origin, it is digitally
signed by its issuer.
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In order to retrieve a testimony, the Requester sends a request ReqR(Treq), which
contains the moment to which the testimony should be referred (toff ), the sender’s
identity on that moment (pseudonym R(toff )), the offence identifier offence-id and
the behavior-describing variable that should be witnessed (i.e. position or speed).
In order to prevent a third party to impersonate the Requester, the request is
divided into two parts, each one signed under a different identity. Thus, the first
part (called part 1 ) contains R(toff ) and toff and is signed using the private key
related to pseudonym R(treq), which is the sender’s identity when the request is
created. In this way, both identities get linked. The second part (part 2 ) contains
offence-id and the type of testimony requested, and it is signed under R(toff ). In
this way, only the vehicle that actually holds both private keys is able to build this
message.
Finally, the most complex data structure is the evidence (Evid). It is formed
by an evidence header, a set of supporting testimonies and the time tevid. The
header EvidHdrR(Tevid) describes the identity of the Requester in the moment of
the evidence (R(tevid)) and contains: (1) its claim on its past behavior (called
claimedValue), (2) the identification of the offence offence-id, (3) the beacons that
show that witnesses were in the Requester’s surroundings at toff (plus their cor-
responding public key certificates), and (4) the time marks toff and tevHdr. The
corresponding public key certificates are also introduced to enable the verification
of such beacons. The evidence header is signed by the Requester to ensure the
data origin authentication. On the other hand, the whole evidence is signed by
the Evidence Manager to ensure that only evidences controlled by this entity are
considered by the Adjudicator.
7.4.2 Cryptographic operations and auxiliary functions
In the context of this process, public key cryptography is considered. Particularly,
to protect the confidentiality of messages, public key encryption (EX(t)(M)) and
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its corresponding decryption (E−1X(t)(M)) will be applied. On the other hand, to
ensure their integrity and data origin authentication, digital signatures (SX(t)(M))
and their verifications (S−1X(t)(M)) are in use.
Apart from cryptographic operations, entities are able to execute seven opera-
tions related to the management of the knowledge set KnowE(t) and the processing
of incoming messages. Within the knowledge set, vehicles may look for behaviour-
related data from other vehicles through the lookupBehRecord function. They may
also search the public key certificate of other entity using the lookupCert function.
To find suitable witnesses for a given vehicle, it may execute the findNeighbours
operation. This operation relies on the Secure Location Verification service. For
each one, it returns the beacon that shows that it was near that vehicle, along with
the public key certificate for verifying it. Once a testimony is created, the receiving
entity can store it in its knowledge set using the storeTestimony operation, and it
may be retrieved later on using retrieveTestimony. In order to ensure if a claim is
supported by a set of testimonies, contains enables to find whether a given value
is within an interval (for speeds) or region (for positions).
As opposed to the previous operations, which may be executed by all entities,
there is an operation (checkPseudonymsEntity) that is only available for the CA.
Such operation enables to determine whether two different pseudonyms belong to
the same entity.
7.4.3 Testimony collection
Once a vehicle has received a fine notification, its SAE determines whether it is
suitable to ask for evidences to challenge the fine. In such a case, the testimony
collection process is started (see Algorithm 7). For this purpose, SAE extracts the
relevant information from the offence notification to build the request, namely the
offence identifier and the time of the offence. Furthermore, it determines which
behavior-related variable should be witnessed, and sends all these data to the HSM
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to build the request (Algorithm 7, lines 2,3). In order to determine the vehicles that
are candidate to be witnesses, the function findNeighbours is used to establish
which vehicles were around the Requester in the moment of the offence (toff ) (line
4). For each of these vehicles, the request is sent (line 6). Apart from being signed
(as explained in Section 7.4.1), the request is encrypted as it contains a private
statement – the Requester, which is currently using pseudonym R(treq), was using
pseudonym R(toff ) at the time of the offence. For the same reason, the public key
certificate CertR(toff ) is also encrypted. It must be noted that the Requester is
able to encrypt data for witnesses as it stores, for some time interval, their public
key certificates (recall Section 7.2.3).
Once a Witness Wi receives and decrypts the testimony request, it verifies the
signature (line 7). Such verification includes checking the status of the requester
certificates, which is important to avoid creating testimonies for a vehicle which
is in an irregular situation. If such verification is correct, it searches within its
knowledge any data that is relevant to R in toff (line 9). If it exists, a testimony
is prepared and sent encrypted to EM (lines 11-13). The encryption is necessary
to avoid third parties to be aware of the witnessed value. Significantly, R should
not realize of this value to avoid retaliation against Wi in case that the testimony
is against R’s interests. However, the public key certificate necessary to verify the
signature is not encrypted, as it only contains public information. All these data
are stored by EM (line 14) and will be used to create the evidence afterwards.
7.4.4 Evidence generation
When R (specifically, its SAE) estimates that all witnesses have had enough time to
send their testimonies, it starts the creation of the evidence header (Algorithm 8).
For this purpose, it sends to HSMR the offence identifier, the time of the offence, the
set of designated witnesses (including the beacons and the corresponding public key
certificates) and its estimation (claimedValue) on the behavior-describing variable
144
Chapter 7. EVIGEN: A protocol for vehicular cooperative EVIdence
GENeration
Data: offence-id, the offence identifier; type, the type of evidence that
should be created based on the type of offence purportedly
committed; toff , time of the offence; treq, time in which the request is
prepared; ttest the time in which the testimony is created;
1 begin
2 SAER → HSMR : offence-id, type, toff
3 HSMR → SAER : ReqR(Treq)
4 SAER : {neighbourSet, beaconSet, certSet} = findNeighbours(R,toff )
5 forall the Wi ∈ neighbourSet do
6 SAER → OBUR → OBUWi → SAEWi → HSMWi :
EWi(Toff)(ReqR(Treq), CertR(toff )), CertR(treq)
7 HSMWi : { part1, part2 } = E−1Wi(Toff)(ReqR(Treq), CertR(toff ))
8 if S−1R(Treq)(part1) = true & S−1R(Toff)(part2)=true then
9 HSMWi → SAEWi : RequestedFact =
lookupBehRecord(KnowWi(toff ), R(toff ),toff , type)
10 if RequestedFact is not null then
11 SAEWi → HSMWi : RequestedFact, EM
12 HSMWi : lookupCert(KnowWi(ttest), EM, ttest)
13 HSMWi → OBUWi → RSU → EM: EEM (TestimWi(Ttest)),
CertWi(ttest)
14 EM : storeTestimony(EM, E−1EM (TestimWi(Ttest)),
CertWi(ttest))
Algorithm 7: Testimony collection
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(line 2). Such header is then sent to EM through one RSU (line 3) encrypted to
prevent other vehicles to learn the status data of witnesses. Again, the public key
certificate is not encrypted as it is not confidential. EM then decrypts and verifies
the evidence header signature. If it is not correctly signed, the evidence header
is discarded. Otherwise, EM acknowledges such header (lines 4-7). It must be
noted that if the acknowledgement is not received within a reasonable time interval
(considering the EM processing speed and the transmission delays), R starts the
corresponding Exception Handling procedure (see Section 7.4.6). This situation
may happen because one of four reasons: the evidence header was lost, it was not
correctly signed, the acknowledgement was lost or not correctly signed.
If the evidence header was correctly received and verified, EM compiles the
evidence incorporating the corresponding testimonies based on the witness list pro-
vided in such evidence header (lines 9-14). If any of them has not been received,
the Testimony Exception Handling procedure is marked to be started once the wit-
ness connects using the reliable channel (see Section 7.4.6). Once all the available
testimonies have been collected, the evidence is finished. EM transfers it to Adj
(line 15), which will verify it as a prerequisite to the adjudication process.
Taking into account the described procedure, the need for R to wait an interval
to promote all witnesses to have sent their testimonies is based on how exceptions
are managed. Particularly, the absence of one Testimony causes the initiation of the
Testimony Exception Handling. As this process requires the reliable channel, it in-
troduces a non-negligible delay in the whole evidence generation process. Thus, the
waiting time for R tries to maximize the chance for testimonies to have been sent
to EM whenever they are required, avoiding the use of the exception handling pro-
cedure. The estimation of this waiting time should be based on the computational
capabilities of vehicles and the inherent transmission delays for the testimony.
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Data: offence-id, toff , beaconSet, neighbourSet, certSet, from Algorithm 7;
claimedValue, SAE estimation on the behavior-describing variable;
1 begin
2 SAER → HSMR : offence-id, claimedValue, toff , beaconSet, certSet
3 HSMR → SAER → OBUR → RSU → EM : EEM (EvidHdrR(Tevid)),
CertR(tevid)
4 EM : decryptedHeader = E−1EM (EvidHdrR(Tevid))
5 EM : result = S−1R(Tevid)(decryptedHeader)
6 if result = true then
7 EM → RSU → OBUR → SAER → HSMR : SEM (ACKevHdr,
offence-id)
8 # If the acknowledgement is not received, or not successfully verified,
the evidence header exception handling is invoked (Algorithm 11)
9 EM : SupportingTestim = null
10 # neighbourSet is composed by the identifiers of senders of beacons
in beaconSet
11 forall the Wi ∈ neighbourSet do
12 EM : CurrentTestimony = retrieveTestimony(KnowEM (tevid), Wi,
offence-id, toff )
13 if CurrentTestimony = null then
14 EM : call Testimony exception handling algorithm (Algorithm
10) and store the result in CurrentTestimony
15 EM : SupportingTestim = SupportingTestim ∪ CurrentTestimony
16 EM → Adj : EAdj(SEM (EvidEM ))
Algorithm 8: Evidence generation
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Dealing with witnesses that have invalid certificates
Under some circumstances, vehicles may have their certificates invalid. This may
happen, for example, if a vehicle has misbehaved, or if it has not accomplished the
underlying administrative processes (e.g. yearly inspections, tax renewal, etc.).
In this context, the testimony provided by a vehicle in this irregular situation is
not valid, as it will not be correctly signed. From the requester point of view, there
are two potential approaches that may be used to deal with these vehicles – the a
priori approach and the a posteriori one. In the a priori approach, the requester has
already verified the incoming beacons, and therefore it determines that the sender is
not a suitable testimony. Therefore, it does not issue a request for this vehicle and,
consequently, it does not take part in this process. In the a posteriori approach,
the requester first sends the request to that vehicle and, afterwards, it verifies the
beacons that showed that the witness was in the requester’s surroundings. In case
that it finds that the certificate status was invalid, then the witness is not included
in the witness list within the evidence header. According to the evidence generation
process, at the end the testimony potentially provided by such a vehicle would not
be considered.
From the sake of efficiency, the a priori approach is more interesting, as it avoids
creating and sending an unnecessary request. Nevertheless, it must be noted that
it requires that the verification is performed beforehand. As in both cases the
testimonies from vehicles holding an invalid certificate will not be considered, the
decision depends on the availability of resources to perform such computation at
the required time.
7.4.5 Evidence verification
The evidence verification process (Algorithm 9) is executed mainly by Adj and starts
by verifying the signatures on the evidence and on each of the beacons contained in
the evidence header (lines 2-7). It should be noted that the signature on the evidence
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header was already verified by EM during the evidence generation. If any of these
verifications fail, the whole evidence is discarded, as it is conceptually invalid. This
also applies in case that it is one beacon which is not successfully verified. It should
be noted that the vehicle should have already verified such beacon, so an invalid
signature indicates that the vehicular devices are not operating regularly.
In case that all the aforementioned verifications are successful, the checks on the
content may start. First, it is evaluated if the verification is performed in a moment
later than that in which the evidence was created (line 8). In such a case, each of
the testimonies is analysed. If its signature is verified (line 11), then several checks
are applied over the contents of the evidence – coherence of times, of identities
and of the behavior-describing values. Thus, the testimony must be created at a
reasonable time (i.e. after the fine notification but before the evidence time) (line
12). It should be noted that there is no need to verify if the testimony is issued by
one of the witnesses designated by R, as EM only considers witnesses included in
neighbourSet in the evidence generation. However, all participants (i.e. R and all
Wis) must be different among them. To this regard, Adj contacts the CA in order
to ensure that the different pseudonyms are not related to the same entity (lines
13-17). In case that an identity fraud is detected, the verification process is aborted
and the CA is contacted to reveal the identity of the involved entity. Similarly, Adj
takes the same decision if R is not related to the offence identified by offence− id4.
If all the previous inspections are successful, it is evaluated whether the wit-
nessed value supports R’s claim, i.e. belongs to a confidence interval around
claimedV alue, using a predefined confidence parameter confid − threshold (lines
18-20). If it is the case, the index that counts the amount of supporting testimonies
(supportIndex) is incremented.
The process is repeated for all the beacons that were contained in the evidence
header. The result of this process is twofold. First, the boolean value verified
4It should be noted that issuing a request, validly signed, related to an offence in which the
requester is not involved, is an irrational behavior which does not report any valuable benefit.
7.4. Protocol specification 149
which indicates if the evidence header signature was successfully verified. Second,
the final result of supportIndex shows the degree of support that the requester
claim has. Such value may be useful for a posterior adjudication process. It should
be noted that if there is no supporting testimony, the evidence is considered as not
semantically valid. This fact is reflected by putting verified to false (lines 20-22).
7.4.6 Exception handling
There are two exceptional situations, caused by the data loss in the communication
channel. The first one is the absence of an expected testimony, which may happen
if the witness did not receive the request, the testimony itself was lost or even the
purported witness did not know the requesting vehicle. The second one is the lack of
acknowledgement for the evidence header, which makes the Requester be unaware
of the successful starting of the evidence generation by the EM. This may be caused
because either the evidence header or its acknowledgement were lost in transmission.
Each situation must be managed using a different exception procedure. In order to
avoid the uncertainty caused by the channel unreliability, these exception handling
mechanisms are run over the resilient channel between the vehicular entities and
EM.
Testimony exception handling
Once the resilient channel is established, there exist a mutual authentication pro-
cess between EM and the connected vehicle. As this process is executed at time
texc, the vehicle will be using the pseudonym Wi(texc). After this authentica-
tion, EM determines whether the connected vehicle was supposed to give one tes-
timony that has not been received yet. For this purpose, it uses the function
checkPseudonymsEntity from the CA, considering the list of all witnesses that
have a pending testimony to send. If it is the case, the testimony exception handling
is invoked (Algorithm 10). EM asks for a testimony by sending the offence-related
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Data: EvidEM , the evidence at stake; tverif time in which the evidence is
verified; confid-threshold, the maximum allowed deviation over the
claimed value in order to consider that it is supported by another
claim; tevid, the time when the evidence is created; testimonyValue,
the value reported by the witness
Result: verified: true if the evidence is correct, false otherwise;
supportIndex: amount of testimonies supporting the claim
1 begin
2 Adj : resultEvid = S−1EM (EvidEM )
3 Adj : resultBeacon = true
4 forall the BeaconWi(Toff) in EvidHdrR(Tevid) do
5 Adj : resultBeacon = S−1Wi(Toff)(BeaconWi(Toff))
6 if resultBeacon = false then
7 break
8 if resultEvid = true & resultBeacon = true & tverif > tevid then
9 Adj : verified = true
10 forall the TestimWi(Ttest) in SupportingTestim in EvidEM do
11 Adj : resultTestim = S−1Wi(Ttest)(TestimWi(Ttest))
12 if resultTestim = true & tevid > ttest > toff then
13 Adj → CA : Wi(ttest) [from the certificate], R(toff ) [from the
testimony]
14 CA → Adj : cheatingReq =
checkPseudonymsEntity(Wi(ttest),R(toff ))
15 # Checking that all witnesses are different one to each other,
and that the R is related to the offence at stake, is omitted for
brevity
16 if cheatingReq = false then
17 Adj: supportEvaluation = contains(testimonyValue,
claimedV alue − confid − threshold/2,
claimedV alue + confid − threshold/2)
18 if supportEvaluation = true then
19 Adj : supportIndex = supportIndex+1
20 else # Detected identity fraud, abort process and proceed
with identity reveal
21 if supportIndex = 0 then
22 verified = false
23 else verified ← false ; supportIndex ← 0
24 return verified, supportIndex
Algorithm 9: Evidence verification
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data: which offence is related (offence-id), who was involved (R(toff )) and when
it happened (toff ). Moreover, it also sends the beacon that shows that the asked
vehicle may potentially act as a witness of the offence (line 2). The whole message is
encrypted to prevent eavesdropping, except the public key certificate of EM which is
not private. It should be noted that the data sent by EM reveals Wi’s past location
(contained in the beacon) and such data should be kept private. Wi then decrypts
and verifies the enquiry (line 3-4) and proceeds to prepare the testimony. The first
action is to determine if the purported witness has any relevant data to build the
testimony (line 5). In such a case, it is built and sent encrypted to EM (lines 6-8).
The testimony should be kept private to avoid R be aware of its contents. It must
be noted that the probability of R being aware of this transmission is extremely low
– it should be in the coverage area of the place where Wi establishes this resilient
channel with EM. However, the potential undesired consequences of not encrypting
such information are bigger than the cost of the encryption operation.
In case that the witness does not have the information to build the testimony,
the vehicle answers indicating this issue (lines 15-17). This is a signed message
which contains an indication of this issue (fnot−ready) and the offence identifier. It
is not encrypted as none of these data are private by themselves.
Based on the answer, EM takes different actions. If the testimony is received and
correctly verified, then it is transferred to the evidence generation process to insert
it into the ongoing evidence (lines 8-15). On the other hand, if the signature on the
vehicle claim for not being a witness is also correct, EM continues with the evidence
generation omitting this vehicle as a witness (lines 19-20). However, the Authority
may implement a mechanism to avoid a malicious use of such action, which should
be exceptional – it has been assumed that beacons are mutually exchanged. Finally,
if the signature is not correct or there is no answer from the vehicle, then the vehicle
is called for maintenance to verify the vehicular devices (lines 11, 19).
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Data: EvidHdrR(Treq), the evidence header; texc current time, CertWi(ttest)
the certificate of the witness
1 begin
2 EM → NetAP → OBUWi → SAEWi → HSMWi : enquiry =
EWi(Texc)(SEM (BeaconWi(tbeacon), R(toff ), toff , offence-id, type),
CertEM (texc)
3 HSMWi → SAEWi : result = S−1EM (E−1Wi(Texc)(enquiry))
4 if result = true then
5 HSMWi → SAEWi : RequestedFact =
lookupBehRecord(KnowWi(toff ), R(toff ),toff , type)
6 if RequestedFact is not null then
7 SAEWi → HSMWi : RequestedFact, CertEM (texc))
8 HSMWi → OBUWi → NetAP → EM: EEM (TestimWi(Ttest)),
CertWi(ttest)
9 EM: result = S−1Wi(Ttest)(E−1EM (TestimWi(Ttest)))
10 if result = false then
11 EM : Call vehicle for maintenance
12 else
13 EM : Continue with Evidence Generation (Algorithm 8) using
this testimony
14 else
15 SAEWi → HSMWi : fnot−ready, CertEM (texc))
16 HSMWi → OBUWi → NetAP → EM : claimNotReady =
SWi(Texc)(fnot−ready, offence-id)
17 EM : result = S−1Wi(Texc)(claimNotReady)
18 if result = false then
19 EM : Call vehicle for maintenance
20 else
21 EM : Continue with Evidence Generation (Algorithm 8)
omitting this testimony
Algorithm 10: Testimony Exception handling
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Evidence header exception handling
This process is activated if SAER does not receive the acknowledgement for the
evidence header (Algorithm 11). As opposed to the transference of testimonies,
the evidence header requires an acknowledgement to enable R be aware of the
starting of the evidence generation process. In this process, R sends the evidence
header (line 2), which was already created and encrypted for EM in the evidence
generation part. If the signature on the evidence header is not successfully verified,
the vehicle is called for maintenance as a preventive measure (lines 3-7). Otherwise,
an acknowledgement is issued in the same way as it was done in the evidence
generation (line 8). As the acknowledgement is signed to ensure its integrity and
data authentication, it may happen that the signature verification (lines 12-13) fails.
In such a case, this process is restarted. In this way, this process only finishes when
the acknowledgement is successfully received by R.
Data: EEM (EvidHdrR(Tevid)), encrypted evidence header already created in
the evidence generation process
1 begin
2 SAER → OBUR → NetAP → EM : EEM (EvidHdrR(Tevid)), CertR(tevid)
3 EM : decryptedHeader = E−1EM (EvidHdrR(Tevid))
4 EM : result = S−1R(Tevid)(decryptedHeader)
5 if result = false then
6 EM : Call for maintenance
7 else
8 EM → NetAP → OBUR → SAER → HSMR: acknowledgement =
SEM (ACKevHdr, offence-id)
9 if EvidHdrR(Tevid) had not been previously received then
10 EM : Proceed with the Evidence generation process (Algorithm
8), from line 9
11 HSMR → SAER : result-ack = S−1EM (acknowledgement)
12 if result-ack = false then
13 SAER : restart evidence header exception handling process
Algorithm 11: Evidence header exception handling
It should be noted that this process may be run by R simply because the ac-
knowledgement, but not the evidence header itself, was lost. In such a case, EM
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would have already performed the steps of the Evidence generation algorithm that
are beyond the acknowledgement. Otherwise (lines 9-11) it is necessary for EM to
proceed with such steps.
7.5 Summary of the chapter
In this Section a protocol for creating evidences about a vehicle’s recent behavior
has been presented. Data employed for creating such evidence is obtained from the
neighbouring vehicles, which act as witnesses. In this way, an enriched description of
the situation is achieved, thus simplifying the future decision process (e.g. liability
attribution in accidents, adequate punishment for an offence). The corresponding
verification process for the aforementioned evidence has also been described.
Part IV
Evaluation and Conclusions

Chapter 8
Evaluation
This Section describes the evaluation of the contributions proposed in this thesis.
Thus, the enhanced model and its realization using ITS technologies is analysed in
Section 8.1. The evaluation of the steganographic mechanism to send reports of
misbehaving vehicles is shown in Section 8.2. The vehicular-enhanced notification
protocol is analysed in Section 8.3. The mechanism for cooperative evidence gen-
eration is evaluated in Section 8.4. Finally, the novelty of the four contributions as
compared to previous related works is discussed in Section 8.5.
8.1 Evaluation of the proposed enhanced enforcement
model and its realization by ITS
The model proposed in this work must be suitable to represent automated enforce-
ment systems. Although such a completely automated system does not exist, there
are partially automated ones which should be represented as well by this model. In
this Section this property is validated against two significant enforcement systems,
the Spanish ESTRADA and the French CSA (Section 8.1.1). Additionally, the pro-
posed application of ITS technologies in this context may produce improvements
but it may also have some drawbacks. Such discussion is presented in Section 8.1.2.
8.1.1 Suitability evaluation against current systems
In order to determine the suitability of the proposed model to current systems,
the entities identified in the model have been matched with the different functional
158 Chapter 8. Evaluation
parts of each system The results of such matching are summarized on Table 8.1.
The granularity (i.e. level of specificity) of the matching is related to that of the
functional description. Thus, the ESTRADA description enables specifying which
module of the whole system is in charge of a set of operations. On the contrary,
the CSA description only establishes which operations are carried in the national
processing centre (referred to as CACIR, Centre Automatise´ de Constatation des
Infractions Routie`res) and those that are performed by other entities.
In general words, it may be seen that almost all functionalities of both systems
have been clearly identified in the proposed model (see Table 8.1). There are two
exceptions on this issue. The first one affects to the task performed by the Data
requester entity, which was not explicitly detailed in any of the studied systems.
The second one is related to the appealing phase, which is out of the scope of CSA.
As a result, the suitability of these parts of the proposed model are not completely
contrasted.
Validation against the Spanish ESTRADA
Regarding the ESTRADA, the Evidence collector is performed in two different
entities of the Spanish traffic agency (called DGT) that are related to the radar
and surveillance cameras management. On the other hand, the Notifier operations
are performed by regular mail (managed by the Spanish postal company) or by
electronic one (managed by the electronic notification module of the DGT’s Data
Processing Centre (DPC)). The Designated-as-offender contact point is performed
in the module M2 of the ESTRADA processing centre.
With respect to the process management entities, they are placed in different
modules of the ESTRADA centre except from the different fine issuance entities
(Initial, Intermediate and Final fine issuers), which are placed in the Enforcement
process module of the DGT’s DPC.
The data management entities are placed in different modules. The Designated-
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Model entity CSA ESTRADA
Evidence collector Pictures received and decoded in the Na-
tional Processing Centre (CACIR)
Radar management system and Picture
server of the Spanish Traffic Authority
Data requester Not explicitly detailed Not explicitly detailed
Notifier Regular mail sent by the national postal
system (La poste)
Regular (certified) mail; Electronic mail
(Electronic notification module in the
Data Processing Centre of the Spanish
Traffic Authority)
Designated-as-
offender contact
point
Regular mail to National Processing Cen-
tre
ESTRADA M2 module (Paper-based doc-
umentation received and classified)
Evidence Ana-
lyzer
Offender data retrieved by the National
Processing Centre
ESTRADA M1 module (Owner data re-
trieval)
Initial Fine Issuer Automated process under the supervision
of the Public Prosecutor Officer
Enforcement process module in the Data
Processing Centre of the Spanish Traffic
Authority
Liable Driver An-
alyzer
Analyzed by the National Processing Cen-
tre
ESTRADA M3 module (Citizen-given
data processing)
CounterEvidence
Analyzer, Allega-
tion analyzer
The Public prosecutor analyzes the ma-
terial provided by the Designated-as-
offender
ESTRADA M3 module (Citizen-given
data processing), although the processing
of counterevidences is not explicited
Intermediate Fine
Issuer
The Public prosecutor creates this fine Enforcement process module in the Data
Processing Centre of the Spanish Traffic
Authority
Process Analyzer The case is heard by a Police court
in case that the previous allega-
tion/counterevidence has not suspended
the fine
ESTRADA M3 module (Citizen-given
data processing)
Final Fine Issuer The Police court issues this final fine Enforcement process module in the Data
Processing Centre of the Spanish Traffic
Authority
Appeal Analyzer Out of the scope of CSA ESTRADA M3 module (Citizen-given
data processing) and Appeal and allega-
tion system in the Data Processing Centre
of the Spanish Traffic Authority
Appeal Result Is-
suer
Out of the scope of CSA Appeal and allegation system in the Data
Processing Centre of the Spanish Traffic
Authority
Designated-as-
offender personal
data manager
National driving license database; EU-
CARIS
Spanish driver and offenders register; EU-
CARIS
Vehicle data man-
ager
National license plate database; EU-
CARIS
Spanish vehicle register; EUCARIS
Process data
manager
Held within the National Processing Cen-
tre
ESTRADA M2 module (Envelope re-
moval, classification, digitalization, stor-
age)
Table 8.1: Model suitability validation against ESTRADA and CSA
as-offender personal data manager is performed by the Spanish driver and offender
register, whereas the Vehicle data manager is at the national vehicle register, both
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placed in the aforementioned DPC. In both cases, they may also be realized by the
EUropean CAR and driver Information System (EUCARIS). Regarding the process
data management, it is jointly addressed by the module M2 of the ESTRADA
centre, along with the Document manager of the DPC.
Validation against the French CSA
In this system, the evidence collection and analysis are performed by the National
Processing Centre (called CACIR). On the other hand, the communication to and
from the offender is performed exclusively by regular post, managed by the national
French postal company. The initial fine issuance is also addressed by the CACIR,
although it is supervised by the Public prosecutor officer.
Beyond the starting phase, the remaining enforcement process is conducted
manually. Particularly, the preliminary investigation is performed by the Public
prosecutor, whereas the Process resolution is done by a police court.
Regarding the data management, both the Designated-as-offender and the Ve-
hicle data management are performed in national databases. The use of EUCARIS
has also been established as well. Finally, the Process data management entity is
performed in the CACIR processing centre.
8.1.2 Analysis of the improvements and drawbacks of integrating
ITS technologies in enforcement
This Section describes the improvements and drawbacks of integrating ITS-related
technologies to contribute on solving the current problems of enforcement systems
(recall Section 4.7). Tables 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 summarize the comparison between
current practices and the envisioned ITS-enhanced ones. Such Tables also detail
the entities in the model that are affected by each approach.
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Use of ITS technologies on offender identification
As opposed to cameras, ITS techniques allow the driver to be identified in a shorter
time. With cameras it is the vehicle owner who identifies the real offender, and
this action may take several days. Instead, ITS techniques require a few seconds
or minutes depending on the availability of resources. This improvement is smaller
if this identification is performed by police patrols, as it only requires the time to
physically check the credentials and fill up a form. Concerning the incurred costs,
deploying and maintaining the ITS infrastructure (e.g. set of Road-Side Units)
requires a significant investment, which is assumed to be higher than current costs.
However, extensive cost-benefit analysis have concluded the long-term suitability of
ITS developments [76].
A key factor in this comparison is the global effectiveness of each approach, that
is, the amount of detected offences in which the offender is reliably identified. Such
effectiveness is potentially low for cameras due to identification errors or frauds.
Police patrols are moderately effective, because even if they reliably identify the
offender, they can only operate at specific places and times. ITS-based solutions
enable a continuous reliable authentication of offenders wherever they are installed.
Although there exists the chance for the driver to steal other person’s credential,
biometric approaches may contribute on this issue. Therefore, this approach is
highly effective if deployed at a wide scale.
Use of ITS technologies to reduce notification delays
Thanks to ITS technologies, the driver may be aware of the punishment during the
same trip in which the offence was committed. On this regard, they outperform
traditional surveillance cameras and are similar to police enforcement. It must
be noted that ITS technologies may only contribute on reducing two of the three
delay factors (tsend.notif and tdelay.access) to the order of minutes
1. To achieve the
1These values are analysed in Section 8.3.1.
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improvement it is also necessary to reach a negligible tprep.notif , which requires an
adequate background processing infrastructure.
The improvement on the overall speed has also an impact on the cost analysis.
Thus, even if the cost of the ITS infrastructure is again significant, the process
duration is reduced and therefore the cost of the bureaucracy is decreased. On
the other hand, this novel notification method is more reliable than the postal
one, where outdated information may cause the notification loss. Therefore, it is
considered as reliable as current electronic or manual alternatives.
Use of ITS technologies to build a more complete offence description
The costs of the ITS-based improvements are again greatly higher than those re-
quired for the operation of current systems. However, they enable having data
currently not available, which is a significant benefit. Moreover, such data can be
available a few seconds after the offence, at any place where two or more vehicles
coincide. This may also help victims of offenders to rapidly report them. This fact
opens the door for a continuous road monitoring (as opposed to current spot-based
surveillance) which promotes a permanent compliance with traffic rules. However,
the same reason dictates that ITS techniques must integrate privacy protection
mechanisms [54][56].
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8.2 Evaluation of the mechanism to report misbehaving
vehicles
The use of steganography to covertly report misbehaving vehicles as proposed in
this work involves modifying the original data elements to embed information. If
it is done over a safety-related data element (as it is the case of most sensor mea-
surements), it is necessary to analyse the introduced error. In this Section, the
ratio of altered bits is analysed (Section 8.2.1). The robustness of the system is
analysed given certain configuration (parameters K and R) in Section 8.2.2. The
computational and operational feasibility of the system are discussed in Sections
8.2.3 and 8.2.4 respectively. Finally, the achievement of the imposed requirements
is analysed in Section 8.2.5.
8.2.1 Ratio of altered bits
By design, the maximum error introduced in each sensorial data element di is, at
most, its accuracy accydi (see Table 5.1). From our point of view, this error is
acceptable, especially considering that its effects on the road safety are minimized
thanks to the embedding interval K.
In order to measure the introduced alteration, a Ratio of Altered Bits (RAB) is
calculated against the total number of bits that carry sensorial information. Note,
however, that this ratio does not specify the overall error introduced by our system,
as different measurements are modified. The maximum number of bits altered in
each beacon is given by its capacity, which is calculated in Table 5.1 and equals 24
bits. On the other hand, the total number of bits that carry sensorial information
in a beacon is 224. As the proposed scheme establishes an embedding interval
parameter K, the ratio of altered bits RAB is given by Equation 8.1.
RAB (Ratio of Altered Bits) = ∑ni=0 capacitydi(bits)
K ⋅∑ni=0 lengthdi(bits) = 24K ⋅ 224 (8.1)
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Therefore, when K = 1, the RAB is 10.71%. Increasing the value of K reduces the
RAB. That is, for K = 2, RAB = 5.36%; for K = 3, RAB = 3,57%; for K = 4,
RAB = 2.68%; and for K = 8, RAB = 1.34%.
8.2.2 Robustness of the system
The communication reliability of DSRC affects the robustness of the proposed sys-
tem, as there exists a non negligible probability of losing a packet that has been
sent through the VANET. In this Section, the conditions (minimum number of rep-
etitions Rmin) under which the system is robust (to a certain probability pthreshold)
are studied.
Let pbeacon and pmsg be the probability of successful reception of a beacon and
an embedded message, respectively. If the reception of each beacon is considered
an independent event, pmsg can be calculated as a function of nbmsg and pbeacon as
follows:
pmsg = (pbeacon)nbmsg (8.2)
The success probability psuccess is defined as the probability of that at least one
of the R repetitions has successfully reached the receiver. Thus, psuccess can be
calculated using the aforementioned pmsg:
psuccess = 1 − (1 − pmsg)R (8.3)
To ensure the system robustness, psuccess > pthreshold must hold under all configu-
rations of the system. Such condition imposes the minimum number of repetitions
Rmin(pthreshold), which is graphically shown in Figure 8.1. For this calculation,
pbeacon is assumed to be 0.58, which is the value estimated in [74] for the packet
delivery ratio in VANETs for packets sent from a distance of 400 meters (vehicle-
to-vehicle). Note that Figure 8.1 shows not only Rmin for nbmsg = 9 (the case of the
proposed system) but also for nbmsg = 11 and nbmsg = 7, so the effects of increasing
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Figure 8.1: Analysis of the minimum repetition rate Rmin once a threshold proba-
bility pthreshold is selected. It is assumed that pbeacon = 0.58. In the proposed system
nbmsg = 9.
or decreasing the number of fragments nbmsg are illustrated.
8.2.3 Computational feasibility
In this Section it is analyzed if all participants in the system are computationally
capable of sending and receiving hidden messages. The time required by the sender
and receiver is reflected in Equations 8.4 and 8.5, respectively. It must be noted
that they reflect the cost considering the whole set of R repetitions (although it is
highly improbable that the RSUs will successfully receive all of them).
TSND = Tprepare +R ⋅ Tembedding = Tprepare +R ⋅ (Tprotect + Tsubstitute) =
= Tprepare +R ⋅ (TECIES−keys + TECIES−encrypt + TECIES−MAC +
+ nbmsg ⋅ Tsubstitute−beacon) (8.4)
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TRCV = R ⋅ (Tdetect + (nbmsg − 1) ⋅ Tfinish−revealing) =
= R ⋅ (nbmsg ⋅ Textract−beacon + TECIES−keys + TECIES−encrypt−1 +
+ TECIES−MAC−1 + Treassemble) (8.5)
For each report, the sender first prepares the secret message (Tprepare(56 bits)).
Afterwards, for each repetition R, he derives the keys (TECIES−keys), protects the
secret message (TECIES−encrypt(56 bits) and TECIES−MAC(56 bits)) and embeds
the fragments in each of the nbmsg beacons that follow (Tsubstitute−beacon(216 bits)).
With respect to the receiver, the first part of its effort (Tdetect) is devoted to
decide whether there is an embedded secret or not in a given beacon. This opera-
tion may be further divided into the time to extract the bits (Textract(24 bits)), the
time to derive the keys (TECIES−keys) and the time to decrypt the extracted bits
(TECIES−decrypt−1(24 bits)). It is important to note that this effort will likely hap-
pen for every received VANET message whose identifier complies with the defined
embedding interval K, until the existence of a secret message is confirmed.
Once the RSU detects that it is receiving an embedded message from cer-
tain vehicle (Tdetect), its revealing must be finished (Tfinish−revealing). There will
be nbmsg − 1 more fragments to process, involving the time to extract the bits
(Textract−beacon(192 bits)), the time to decrypt them (TECIES−encrypt−1(32 bits))
and to verify the MAC value on the whole set of bits (TECIES−MAC−1(56 bits)). Fi-
nally, the secret message must be reassembled (Treassemble) in order to be analysed.
Note also that, although Equation 8.5 reflects the total computational time devoted
to process the R message repetitions, more than one RSU could be involved in the
process if a hand-over occurs in between.
From the sender point of view, once the first message repetition is prepared
and protected (TR0prepare+TR0protect), in order to guarantee the system’s computational
feasibility, the embedding of a message in the next nbmsg beacons (T
Ri
substitute) and
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the protection of the next one (TRi+1protect) should be done in less time than that used
to send those nbmsg beacons (Tnbmsg beacons):
Tsubstitute + Tprotect ≤ Tnbmsg beacons (8.6)
In this way, while a previously protected message repetition Ri is being sent, the
next message repetition Ri+1 can be protected (it will be sent in the next set of nbmsg
beacons). Otherwise, the subsequent repetitions should be put in a (potentially
growing) queue. In order to estimate the sender cost, it is assumed that the most
computationally significant operations are the cryptographic ones, as the remaining
operations are simple manipulations of messages; therefore, Tsubstitute ≈ 0.
To illustrate this cost, performance figures of CycurV2X (a commercial OBU2),
provided by its manufacturer, show that the ECIES operation for 16 bytes is ad-
dressed in 27.938 ms. Although the message to protect in this work is shorter
(7 bytes), we assume this performance value in our calculations, i.e., Tprotect =
27.938 ms. Recalling from Section 5.5, in our proposal nbmsg = 9. Therefore, as
there is a period Tbeacon = 100 ms between beacons, in the worst case scenario (i.e.,
K = 1) each secret message repetition takes Tnbmsg beacons = nbmsg ⋅Tbeacon = 900 ms
to be completely sent.
However, as in the proposed system it is assumed that secure beaconing is used
(as a means to provide the RSUs with the public key of the reporting vehicle), the
temporal overhead introduced by signature generation over sent beacons, TSG, and
signature verification of received beacons, TSV , must be also considered. Perfor-
mance figures for embedded platforms taken from [77] state that TSG = 16.856 ms
and TSV = 45.381 ms. In a Tnbmsg beacons period, the sender will have also to spend
a time nbmsg ⋅ (TSG + δ ⋅TSV ), being δ the mean number of incoming secure beacons
(i.e., signed) within a beacon period Tbeacon. With these figures, it is obvious that a
vehicle can hardly verify more than one incoming signed beacon from neighbouring
2https://www.escrypt.com/products/cycurv2x/details/
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vehicles. To overcome this limitation, we assume that the periodic or context-
adaptative verification strategies proposed in [78] are applied. Therefore, δ can be
adjusted to assure that the vehicle copes with the overhead introduced by secure
beaconing and leaves some time to embed the next message repetition:
Tprotect + nbmsg ⋅ (TSG + δ ⋅ TSV ) ≤ Tnbmsg beacons (8.7)
where δ is the adjusted mean number of incoming secure beacons that will be
actually verified within a Tbeacon period. Note, however, that the mean overhead
introduced by the proposed steganographic system in a Tbeacon period is Tprotect ÷
nbmsg = 3.104 ms, which is substantially less than the overhead introduced by the
secure beaconing. These assumptions make the system feasible for the sender in
the worst case of the embedding interval parameter K, and as a consequence, no
restrictions for this parameter exist and all its possible values could be employed.
In our scenario the entities receiving messages from all passing by vehicles will
be a RSU or a set of RSUs. To assure the computational feasibility, it must be
possible for a RSU to determine for the beacons sent by all passing by vehicles
whether they contain an embedded message or not before the next set of beacons
arrive. Considering the na¨ıve case of only one passing by vehicle, the condition
Tdetect < Tbeacon must be hold, and the overhead introduced by secure beaconing
should be also taken into account. Otherwise, it could lead to a growing queue
of beacons to process. For the purpose of this work, we assume that the RSUs
have enough computational capacity to make the previous condition hold. It must
be noted that the ECIES time for 16 bytes is 21.26 ms in the aforementioned
commercial OBU. However, the RSU’s computational capacity is expected to be
significantly greater than that of embedded vehicles and, moreover, the amount
of data to process (i.e. the encrypted magic header) is smaller than the 16 bytes
considered in such performance figure.
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8.2.4 Operational feasibility
As in the proposed system it is assumed that the reporting vehicle sends the required
amount of beacons while being in the range of a set of RSUs, it must be possible
to send all these beacons during the time that the vehicle stays within the RSUs’
range. That depends mainly on the vehicle’s speed. This Section analyses the
condition that must be satisfied to guarantee the system’s feasibility regarding this
issue. Moreover, the suitability of different system’s configurations (parameters K
and R) for different types of roads according to the vehicle’s speed and the distance
traveled is also analysed.
Assuming that a specific steganographic system is selected by choosing certain
values of K and R, the required total number of beacons used to transmit a report
is N = R ⋅nbmsg ⋅K. On the other hand, as beacons rate is br (beacon/s) = 1/Tbeacon,
the number of beacons MRSU that a vehicle can actually transmit to one RSU will
depend on the communication range r between both and the relative speed v of one
respect to the other: MRSU = (r ⋅br)/v (with v in m/s and r in m). If a set of ρ RSUs
are considered, the number of beacons M increases accordingly: M = ρ ⋅MRSU .
To guarantee the system’s operational feasibility, M must necessarily be greater
than N . By design, r = 1000 m, br = 10 beacon/s and nbmsg = 9. Therefore, the
operational feasibility comes determined by:
R ⋅K ⋅ v ≤ ρ ⋅ r ⋅ br
nbmsg
= ρ ⋅ 1111,1111 (8.8)
We analyse the system’s operational feasibility in nine scenarios specified by
the vehicle’s speed and the distance traveled (Figure 8.2). Considered speeds are
those common in highways (120 km/h), secondary roads (80 km/h) and urban
environments (40 km/h). It should be noted that speeds that are over the speed
limit are not considered in this analysis because it is not reasonable for an offending
vehicle to report others. Concerning the distance traveled, in highways vehicles are
8.2. Evaluation of the mechanism to report misbehaving vehicles 173
assumed to have mean trip lengths of 60 km, 30 km and 1 km; in secondary roads,
analysed mean trip lengths are 20 km, 10 km and 1 km; finally, for urban roads;
5 km, 2 km and 1 km are considered. It has been assumed that RSUs are placed
every kilometre, so the number of traveled kilometers is equal to ρ. Figure 8.2
shows the probability of success psuccess in such scenarios as a function of RAB.
Note that we have avoided using exactly some of the traveled distance values (30 km
and 10 km) to increase the figure’s readability.
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Figure 8.2: Success probability in several scenarios defined by the vehicle’s speed
and distance traveled
From our point of view, the system is considered to be feasible if psuccess ≥ 0.75.
Thus, the system is not feasible if only one RSU is available (distance traveled or
ρ = 1) for any speed value and K. If more than one RSU is considered, there is
at least one feasible setting in each scenario. Generally speaking, psuccess lowers
as K raises, because a higher embedding interval gives less chances to embed data
for the same amount of time. Therefore, with speeds of 120 km/h, if traveled
distance equals 60 km the system is feasible even if K = 8 (RAB = 1.34%). If
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traveled distance equals 30 km with a speed of 120 km/h, the maximum value of
K is 5, so the minimum RAB will be 2.14%. Note that the system performance
is equal in this last case to the scenario where the speed is 80 km/h and traveled
distance equals 20 km. in the scenario where vehicles travel at 80 km/h a distance
of 10 km, the maximum value of K is 2 (RAB = 5.36%). This performance is
again similar to the scenario where speed equals 40 km/h and distance 5 km, while
when distance equals 2 km only one configuration presents an acceptable success
probability: K = 1 (RAB = 10.71%).
It should be noted that in the previous calculations it has been assumed that
all fragments of a given repetition are received by the intended RSU. This fact
implies that there are not fragments that are not useful – it must be recalled that
all fragments of a given repetition are encrypted for a given RSU, so they could
not be decrypted by another one. This assumption is in line with the working
assumption presented in the model (recall Section 5.2.3).
8.2.5 Requirements analysis
In this Section, it is evaluated the achievement of the requirements imposed in
Section 5.2.2. It should be noted that the requirement of computational feasibility
for both the sender and the receiver has already been analysed in Section 8.2.3.
Similarly, the resistance against data losses has been studied in Section 8.2.2.
Concerning the embedded message integrity, it must be noted that it has been
assumed that the cover message (beacon) is digitally signed. Furthermore, the se-
cret message structure already contains a message authentication code that enables
detecting manipulations over the embedded data. Therefore, any variation on the
message will be detected by the receiver. As the cover message in the proposed
mechanism are beacons, and given that such messages are not routed, it is not
possible for third parties to perform intentionally this threat.
The following subsections focus on the other two requirements, undetectability
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and maximum capacity, which require an in-depth discussion.
Undetectability
In the context of the studied domain, the detection of steganography may be inter-
esting for some of the VANET participants. As VANET messages are transmitted
through a shared channel, unintended recipients (particularly, the reported driver)
are able to eavesdrop its content, potentially allowing them to discover the covert
channel. Given that the secret message is encrypted before embedding, unautho-
rized receivers will not be able to access its content. However, it can allow them
to detect the use of steganography by discovering statistic anomalies in the distri-
bution of the least significant bits of the data elements involved in covert channel
communications [79]. This technique is widely used to attack Least Significant Bit
(LSB) steganography in images [80]. It has been assumed that sensor inaccuracies
are random and according to the sensor accuracy and resolution (recall Section 5.1).
Therefore, the resolution and accuracy of beacon fields data have been used to mea-
sure the amount of data that is possible to embed without disturbing the sensor
measures outside the allowed boundaries. Nevertheless, a practical evaluation with
real sensors on a real scenario should be performed. Therefore, it is not possible to
ensure that errors produced by sensor measures are truly random. This fact could
be used to ease the covert message detection.
There are two factors that make such attack difficult. On one hand, the proposed
steganographic system is parametrized in such a way that only a portion of messages
may include secret information. In this way, statistical anomalies will be masked
by the natural properties of messages with no embedded information. On the other
hand, it must be noted that vehicles use temporary identifiers (pseudonyms) to avoid
the chance of tracking [54]. As a consequence, it makes difficult (specially in dense
roads) to discover all messages generated from the same vehicle. Both factors reduce
dramatically the amount of information available to an attacker. Additionally, to
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reduce the amount of statistical changes introduced to sensor measurements, it
would be possible to reduce the amount of least significant cover bits used to embed
data.
Apart from the previous considerations, it should be noted that the detection
of the embedded data by a timing attack may not be performed in this scenario.
Thus, current standards impose that the beacon message be sent every 100 ms.
In this situation, it is not possible to determine whether a given beacon contains
embedded data or not, as this operation does not affect to the moment in which it
has to be sent.
Maximum capacity
The proposed mechanism is designed in such a way that it uses the maximum
capacity that is enabled by the current precision and accuracy. Therefore, as using
a greater capacity would affect the reliability of the sensorial data at stake, it is not
possible to use a greater capacity on each beacon. Despite this fact, the embedding
interval K impacts negatively on the global capacity of the system, as only one out
of K beacons is enabled to contain embedded data. However, thanks to this interval
the undetectability is improved. At the light of this facts, it may be concluded that
the system offers the maximum capacity while remaining practical and reasonably
undetectable.
It must be noted that there are two ways to reduce the covert channel capacity
as it is currently defined. First, if the technology developments increase the accu-
racy of sensors, it is expected that the underlying standards may evolve in the same
direction, thus reducing the measure uncertainty which is used to embed data. The
threat of this initiative into the proposed scheme is thus dependent on the techno-
logical evolution and its standardisation. Second, a malicious vehicle may overload
the VANET with messages, in order to avoid other vehicles to use the network. The
impact of this alternative is relatively low, as several research contributions (such
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Figure 8.3: Temporal evolution of the considered process
as the LEAVE protocol [67]) have already focused on this issue.
8.3 Evaluation of the notification protocol
In this Section, the proposed vehicular-enhanced notification protocol is evaluated.
First (Section 8.3.1), the practical applicability of the proposed mechanism is anal-
ysed, considering a realistic vehicular scenario.
From the Authority viewpoint, the process efficacy is expressed in terms of the
total time taken (i.e. the lower such time is, the greater the efficacy the process
has). Such time (texecution) will be the sum of the time taken by the Authority to
prepare the notification (tprocAuto) and the time taken by the proposed mechanism
to send it (tprotocol) (Figure 8.3).
Thus, this analysis aims to characterize tprotocol in order to show how it may
contribute to the aforementioned goal. Section 8.3.1 analyzes tprotocol but to a
limited scope: only the vehicular network scenario is considered – the interaction
with DRA is out of the scope, as there may exist an intrinsic delay. Such delay is
the time taken to arrive to the place in which the reliable channel is established
(e.g. parking lot), which is not foreseeable (i.e. it may range from a few minutes to
a couple of hours or days).
The last part of Section 8.3.1 aims to determine whether the use of RSUs is
suitable for this protocol. It should be noted that all messages (notification and
evidences of availability and access) should be exchanged with the same RSU, as it
~.======.~======~.==============~.=========v 
I I 
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is the Notification Sender. Otherwise, the proposed approach would only be suit-
able for scenarios in which RSUs where interconnected, or in which the Notifier
where accessed through other communication media (e.g. GSM channel). Accord-
ing to Figure 8.3, most components of tprotocol are related to data processing or
transmission. However, there is one component, tdelay.access, which is the time un-
til the driver accesses to the notification. This action must happen when it does
not disturb the driver, which may happen immediately (e.g. if driving in sparse
traffic conditions in a calmed environment) or after some time (e.g. if driving in
rush hours). Therefore, it is required to know the maximum value of tdelay.access
that ensures that the protocol may be fully executed in this scenario. Such issue is
studied in Section 8.3.1.
Finally, Section 8.3.2 analyses the achievement of the security requirements
derived from the legal framework.
8.3.1 Performance evaluation
The time to execute the whole protocol (tprotocol) is composed by seven factors
(Figure 8.3). Two are related to the notification (step 1 of the protocol) – the
time to send it (tsend.notif ), and the time required by the vehicle to process it
(tprocV ehNotif ). Other two are related to the evidence of availability, the second
step of the protocol (tprocV ehEoA to prepare it and tsend.EoA to send it). There
is a delay time tdelay.access, which is the time taken by the driver to access to the
notification. Finally, there are two factors related to the evidence of access (step 3 of
the protocol), tprocV ehEoAcc for its preparation and tsend.EoAcc for its transmission.
Based on its definition, the proposed protocol is only successful when all mes-
sages have been exchanged. However, in the vehicular context the sending unit (i.e.
the OBU) may be compromised in such a way that it does not send back the evi-
dences. The impact of the compromise of OBUs over the performance is analysed
in the following subsection of this Section.
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Despite the threat of OBU compromise, it should be noted that such misbehavior
will be easily identifiable through the use of the resilient channel. Thus, even if it
is a realizable threat, it is assumed that its real presence will be very low. Thus,
for the remaining performance calculations, it will be assumed that OBUs are not
compromised.
In order to measure the performance of the protocol, the time taken will be mea-
sured. Speaking generally, the time to send a message is determined by the time
taken for the transmission, along with that required to manage the retransmissions
to contribute on countering the channel unreliability. On the other hand, the pro-
cessing time of the in-vehicle device is determined by its computational resources.
The time to send the studied messages is analyzed in the second subsection of this
Section. Afterwards, the processing time of the in-vehicle device is studied in the
last subsection.
Impact of the degree of OBUs compromise over the performance
The value psucc.notif is the probability of a given execution of the protocol to be
successfully finished over the vehicular network. In the proposed protocol, such
success is achieved when both the notification and the respective evidences of avail-
ability and access are successfully received. The event of receiving each message is
subject to its own probability, namely prcv.notif , prcv.eoa and prcv.eoacc. However,
in the case of evidences, it may also happen that they are not sent, as a result of
being compromised. Thus, pnot.comprom is the probability for an OBU of not being
compromised. It is assumed that in case of compromise, neither of the required
evidences (i.e. availability and access) is sent by the OBU. Based on this four prob-
abilities, and given that all events are independent each other, psucc.notif may be
written as follows (Equation 8.9).
psucc.notif = prcv.notif ⋅ prcv.eoa ⋅ prcv.eoacc ⋅ pnot.comprom (8.9)
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In this analysis, it will be assumed that the transmission probabilities are equal
for all messages (commonly referred to as prcv.msg), thus leading to Equation 8.10.
psucc.notif = p3rcv.msg ⋅ pnot.comprom (8.10)
Taking into account that prcv.msg ≤ 1 by definition, the previous Equation may
be rewritten as follows (Equation 8.11):
prcv.msg = 3√psucc.notif /pnot.comprom ≤ 1 (8.11)
According to the previous expression, it may be seen that it only holds if psucc.notif≤ pnot.comprom. This condition has a direct interpretation in this context – the de-
gree of unreliability of OBUs will determine the maximum amount of success that
the proposed protocol will have over any not-resilient channel. Considering that
25% of OBUs are compromised (i.e. pnot.comprom = 0.75), this means that over 100
executions of this protocol, 25 of them will not be successful, as compromised OBUs
will never send back the corresponding evidences. With respect to the remaining
75, their success will be conditioned by the reliability of the channel. Thus, if the
protocol is executed over a reliable channel, all of them will be successful. On the
contrary, if the channel does not ensure that packets are successfully delivered (as
it is the case of the wireless vehicular network), the amount of successful executions
may be low due to the data loss in the communication channel. In order to counter
the unreliability of the vehicular communication channel, both the notification and
the evidences will be retransmitted several times. The analysis of this retransmis-
sion strategy and its impact over the transmission time is presented in the following
subsection.
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Analysis of tsend.notif , tsend.EoA and tsend.EoAcc
In this Section, the values of tsend.notif , tsend.EoA and tsend.EoAcc are analysed under
the assumption that OBUs are not compromised. In order to counter the unreliabil-
ity of the vehicular communication channel, all messages are re-sent a number α of
times. Such parameter is established based on the probability of success psucc.notif
– the bigger the number of retransmissions, the bigger the probability of a message
to arrive to its destination (except in the case that the probability of sending a
single message is null).
Prcv.msg is, in the presence of retransmissions, the probability that at least one
retransmission arrives. According to [74], the probability of receiving a message
that has been repeated α times is related to the probability psucc.rep of successfully
receiving each repetition. Such relationship is given by the following expression
(Equation 8.12).
prcv.msg = 1 − (1 − psucc.rep)α (8.12)
Combining this expression with the one provided for prcv.msg (Equation 8.11), under
the assumption of pnot.comprom = 1, enables finding a relationship between the
amount of retransmissions and the probability of success based on the probability
of receiving each repetition:
α = ⌈log(1 − 3√psucc.notif)/log(1 − psucc.rep)⌉ (8.13)
According to [74], psucc.rep = 0.58 for a vehicle-to-vehicle communication sepa-
rated by 400 meters. Using such parameter, the evolution of the required amount
of retransmissions based on a predefined probability of success can be studied (Fig-
ure 8.4). Thus, for a psucc.notif = 0.99, every message must be re-sent 6,57 times
(more precisely, 7 times, as the number of repetitions must be natural), whereas for
psucc.notif = 0.75 this number is decreased to 2,75 times (i.e. 3 repetitions).
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Figure 8.4: Evolution of the amount of retransmissions based on the success prob-
ability
Based on the amount of retransmissions, it is possible to determine the total
time required to send each of the considered messages. Such time is the sum of the
times required for each retransmission, thus leading to the following expressions:
tsend.notif = α ⋅ ttransm.notif ,
tsend.EoA = α ⋅ ttransm.EoA
tsend.EoAcc = α ⋅ ttransm.EoAcc
The transmission time for each message (ttransm.notif , ttransm.EoA and
ttransm.EoAcc) is determined by two factors – the time for the sender to transmit the
message (transmission delay) and the time to propagate it in the network (propaga-
tion delay). In this context, the propagation delay is negligible, as it is calculated
as d/s where d is the distance from sender to receiver (up to 1 kilometre due to
DSRC maximum range [81]) and s is the speed of light (in any wireless scenario).
Thus, such delay is 1(km)/300000(km/s) ≈ 0.
Concerning the transmission delay, it is determined by the message size and the
channel bandwidth. Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 describe the sizes for each message (404,
217 and 218 bytes, respectively). On the other hand, the channel bandwidth for a
DSRC channel is 6 Mbps [81]. Using both data, the time required to perform the
retransmissions (for each value of psucc.notif ) is shown on Figure 8.5. Thus, for a
psucc.notif = 0.99,
tsend.notif = 7 ⋅ 404 (bytes) / 750000 (bytes/sec) = 0.004 seconds,
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Figure 8.5: Transmission times for the considered messages based on the probability
of success
tsend.EoA = 7 ⋅ 217 (bytes) / 750000 (bytes/sec) = 0.002 seconds, and
tsend.EoAcc = 7 ⋅ 218 (bytes) / 750000 (bytes/sec) = 0.002 seconds.
Analysis of tprocV ehNotif , tprocV ehEoA and tprocV ehEoAcc
Cryptographic operations are the most significant processing tasks for the vehicular
device. Other basic tasks (e.g. message queueing, discarding repeated messages,
change of context to work on other ITS services, etc.) are assumed to have a
negligible cost with respect to these operations. Particularly, the vehicular device
has to decrypt the notification message and verify its signature. Concerning the
evidences of availability and access, it has to sign and encrypt them.
In order to illustrate the time taken by the aforementioned operations, the
performance offered by a commercial vehicular device (CycurV2X) is considered.
Such device encrypts 16 bytes in 27.938 ms (21.26 ms. required for decryption).
Digital signature for such data is done in 7.156 ms. whereas the verification requires
27.114 ms. This last figure does not include the time (referred to as σv) to verify the
public key certificate status. Nevertheless, in the following calculations it will be
assumed that the Message Issuer certificate is already verified (i.e. σv = 0) before
the vehicular device starts functioning. It is a reasonable assumption since this is
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a well-known entity.
As the data at stake in this protocol is significantly bigger than that considered
by the previous performance figures, it is necessary to adapt them for the current
message length. Such adaptation depends on the very nature of the algorithm. For
encryption, the ECIES algorithm is based on a stream cipher that uses a symmetric
key. Such key is encrypted using public key cryptography. Thus, the most signif-
icant operation is the public key encryption, and it is assumed that the cost of
the stream cipher is linearly proportional to the message length. Concerning the
signature, ECDSA encrypts asymmetrically the result of a hash function over the
considered message. As the result of such function is always of the same length,
having a greater message only imposes a greater cost over the hash function. As
the hash function usually divides the message in blocks of the same amount of
bytes, the difference in performance will be based on the difference between the
amount of blocks. For the following calculations, the SHA-256 hash function will
be considered. Such function uses a block size of 64 bytes.
Taking into account the previous considerations, processing the notification mes-
sage takes
tprocV ehNotif = tdecrypt.notif + tverif.notif = 21,26 (ms / block of 16 bytes) ⋅
ratiodecrypt + 27,114 (ms / block of hash function) ⋅ ratioverif , where
ratiodecrypt = ⌈ 404 bytes (notif) / 16 bytes (reference implementation) ⌉ = 26
blocks of 16 bytes
ratioverif = ⌈ 223 bytes to verify (notif) / 64 bytes per block of hash function ⌉
= 4 blocks of hash function.
In the previous calculations, the amount of bytes to decrypt is the whole noti-
fication message (i.e. 404 bytes), whereas the data to verify are 223. In the first
case, the whole notification message, including the public key certificate and the
signature, are encrypted. These data are not part of the data to verify. Using the
obtained values tprocV ehNotif may be calculated as follows:
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tprocV ehNotif = tdecrypt.notif + tverif.notif = 21.26 ⋅ 26 + 27.114 ⋅ 4 = 661.2 ms
= 0.661 s.
In an analogous way, for the evidence of availability,
tprocV ehEoA = tsignEoA + tencryptEoA = 7.156 (ms / block of hash function) ⋅
ratiosign + 27.938 (ms / block of 16 bytes) ⋅ ratioencrypt, where,
ratiosign = ⌈ 36 bytes to sign (evid. of availability) / 64 bytes per block of hash
function ⌉ = 1 blocks of 64 bytes
ratioencrypt = ⌈ 217 bytes (notification) / 16 bytes (reference implementation) ⌉
= 14 blocks of 16 bytes
Using these values, the time to process the evidence of availability can be cal-
culated,
tprocV ehEoA = 7.156 ⋅ 1 + 27.938 ⋅ 14 = 398.288 ms = 0.398 s.
For the sake of brevity, it may be seen that tprocV ehEoAcc ≈ tprocV ehEoA, as both
evidences have a very similar size (only one byte of difference) and the crypto-
graphic operations are the same. Using these values of tprocV ehNotif , tprocV ehEoA
and tprocV ehEoAcc it is possible to calculate the total time that the vehicular device
takes for processing these messages:
tprocV ehicle = tprocV ehNotif + tprocV ehEoA + tprocV ehEoAcc = 0.661 + 0.398 +
0.398 = 1.457 s.
Analysis of tdelay.access. Discussion on its impact over the suitability of
RSU-based communications for this protocol
The time tdelay.access that a driver may need to access to the notification is affected
by the driving situation. However, such value is critical to ensure that the whole
protocol may be executed using a single RSU – if the vehicle at stake gets out of
range of the RSU3 when all messages have not been exchanged, then the protocol
3In this evaluation, only direct communication between vehicle and RSU is considered. The use
of routing strategies that could increase the reachability of the vehicle are not considered, as this
issue is a matter of open research and thus the results could be conditioned by the routing strategy
selected.
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will need the resilient channel to be finished. As the use of such channel introduces
a delay in the process (the time required to arrive to where the channel is available),
it is advisable to minimize as much as possible the need of such alternative.
In order to ensure that all messages are exchanged while the vehicle is in RSU’s
range, it is necessary to determine how long the vehicle is within this area. Thus,
considering a maximum speed of 120 km/h, and given that the range is 1 kilometre
[81], the vehicle is 1 (km) / 120 (km/h) = 0.0083 h = 30.0 seconds in range. Taking
into account this value,
tprotocol = tsend.notif + tprocV ehNotif + tprocV ehEoA + tsend.eoa + tdelay.access +
tprocV ehEoAcc + tsend.EoAcc ≤ 30.0
According to the previous expression, and taking into account the values for
computation and transmission for messages previously calculated in this Section,
tdelay.access must fulfil the following condition in order to ensure the suitability of
RSUs in this scenario:
tdelay.access ≤ 30.0 - 0.004 (tsend.notif ) - 0.661 (tprocV ehNotif ) - 0.398 (tprocV ehEoA)
- 0.002 (tsend.eoa) - 0.398 (tprocV ehEoAcc) - 0.002 (tsend.EoAcc) = 28.535 seconds.
At the light of this value, the driver has around 28 seconds to access to the
notification. It should be noted that in case of speeding offences, the vehicle may
be driven at a higher speed, say 199 km/h in a highway4. Using this value, the
vehicle would be 1 (km) / 199 (km/h) = 0.005 h = 18.09 seconds in range, which
leads to a delay for accessing of
tdelay.access ≤ 18.09 - 0.004 (tsend.notif ) - 0.661 (tprocV ehNotif ) - 0.398 (tprocV ehEoA)
- 0.002 (tsend.eoa) - 0.398 (tprocV ehEoAcc) - 0.002 (tsend.EoAcc) = 16.625 seconds.
An extended analysis should be conducted to ensure which driving conditions
might allow this delay on the driver. In any case, it should be noted that such time
is increased with the reduction of the driving speed. In fact, such value could be
used by the Authority to estimate whether it will be feasible for the driver to take
4Even if the speed could be higher, according to the Spanish legal framework driving at 200
km/h in a highway is considered a crime, and it is thus processed using the criminal law. Such
process is out of the scope of this thesis.
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this decision based on the current traffic status data, obtained for example through
the use of other ITS-related applications such as floating car data [82]. Based on
such estimation, other communication channels (e.g. GSM connection) could be
selected.
8.3.2 Security requirements analysis
Table 8.5 summarizes the achievement of the imposed requirements. At the end
of the notification process, there are three possible final status – the notification
has been delivered through the vehicular communication, or through the reliable
channel by means of the DRA, or it has not been delivered. In all situations, either
NMan or the DRA have enough elements to attest the situation. In the first case,
NMan has the evidence of availability which is signed by NRS. If such evidence
was not successfully verified or simply not received, the resilient channel (with the
DRA) is employed. This entity may either (1) have such evidence correctly verified
or (2) do not have any valid data. In this second scenario, DRA is entitled to
attest the situation because (1) it is a trusted entity and (2) the underlying channel
was resilient to send the information. Thus, although the protocol may finish with
NR having the notification while NMan / DRA do not have a valid evidence of
availability, these entities are able to detect the situation, to take the appropriate
corrective actions (i.e. call for maintenance) and to proceed with other notification
mechanism. Based on these facts, requirement Req1 is fulfilled.
A similar situation happens with the attestation of access (Req2). However, in
this case only two situations are possible – if NMan or DRA do not receive the
corresponding evidence in a predefined interval, the legislation establishes that the
notification has been successfully performed. Thus, either an evidence of access (i.e.
evidence of non-repudiation of delivery) is explicitly received or, in its absence, a
default evidence (of implicit rejection) may be created.
Concerning the NRS authenticated access control (Req3), it is ensured by the
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need for a password (recall step (0)) to enable the NRS as a suitable notification
place. The underlying security of the in-vehicle devices (particularly, its HSM)
ensures that such activation is only performed by introducing this password. It must
be noted that the proposed mechanism only ensures that somebody that knows the
password accesses to the notification. Additional authentication mechanisms (such
as biometry-based approaches) should be introduced here to ensure that such person
is indeed the driver. Such issue is identified as a future research work.
The availability of the notification system (Req4) may not be ensured without a
practical analysis in a real device. Even if the Notifier is assumed to be available (as
RSUs have enough computational resources, by assumption), neither the communi-
cation channel or the NRS are assumed to be available. The performance analysis
of Section 8.3.1 is intended to illustrate this issue. Similarly, from the theretical
point of view it is not possible to ensure the physical access control requirement
(Req5). Even if the in-vehicle devices are protected to some extent (as they are in-
stalled inside the vehicle), RSUs are publicly accessible and thus they require some
additional protective mechanisms.
Concerning the synchronization of the notification system (Req6), both NP and
NRS have their reliable time sources. NP may have access to it (e.g. the time
server from the Spanish Real Observatorio de la Armada) through the network
infrastructure, whereas the in-vehicle platform may use the one of the HSM.
The authentication of the notification (Req7) is ensured thanks to the MI’s
electronic signature. Such mechanism also enables to verify the message integrity
(Req9). On the other hand, the message confidentiality (Req8) is ensured thanks
to the use of the public key encryption. It must be noted that NP is not able to
access to the notification as the encryption is performed directly by MI in step (1).
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Requirement Fulfilment status
Req1 (Non-repudiation of receipt) Achieved
Req2 (Non-repudiation of delivery) Achieved
Req3 (Authenticated access control
to NRS)
Achieved
Req4 (Availability of the notifica-
tion system)
Unclear (implementa-
tion required)
Req5 (Physical access control) Unclear (implementa-
tion required)
Req6 (Synchronization) Achieved
Req7 (Message authentication) Achieved
Req8 (Confidentiality of the notifi-
cation)
Achieved
Req9 (Integrity of the notification) Achieved
Table 8.5: Summary of the fulfilment of the requirements imposed over the proposed
notification protocol
8.4 Evaluation of EVIGEN
In this Section, the proposed mechanism is assessed using three ways. First, in
Section 8.4.1 it is analysed whether it conforms to the evidence management cycle
defined in Section 3.3.2. Second, a performance evaluation is shown in Section 8.4.2.
Finally, the fulfilment of the imposed requirements is analysed in Section 8.4.3.
8.4.1 Conformance to the evidence management cycle
The evidence management cycle is composed by six consecutive steps that, in gen-
eral words, are mostly addressed by the proposed protocol.
Concerning the design of the evidence, it is fulfilled by the description of the
contents of the evidence and also of its header and the testimonies contained in
it. The creation of the evidence is also described in the protocol, detailing the
specific process that the Evidence Manager should follow. As a difference to the
traditional management cycle, there is no need to perform a real collection step, as
the entity that generates the evidence is the same that has to perform the following
step – the evidence analysis. Particularly, it has been defined as part of the creation
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process, that at least one testimony should be supporting the requester claim. Such
procedure (which avoids the creation of non-relevant evidences) is the essence of
the evidence analysis step.
Once it has been created, the evidence is presented to the adjudicator (evidence
report and presentation step). This entity is in charge of performing the evaluation
of the evidence, which is partially addressed in the proposed contribution through
the evidence verification procedure. The future decision process on the relevance of
the evidence for the enforcement action is out of the scope of this contribution.
8.4.2 Performance evaluation
In this Section, the performance of the proposed approach is evaluated. Due to
the unreliability of the vehicular network, the high mobility of vehicles and their
limited computational resources, the more challenging environment is the vehicu-
lar one. Therefore, this analysis will focus on how the protocol performs in such
environment. Particularly, two indicators will be considered, namely (1) the com-
putational and storage cost for vehicles and the impact in the vehicular network
(analysed in the three first subsections of this Section) and (2) the amount of ev-
idences, and testimonies per evidence, that may be achieved in a road scenario
(analysed in the last subsection of this Section). For the second indicator, it must
be noted that the time interval between the offence and the notification may have
a critical impact over the protocol effectiveness – it may cause witnesses to be non
reachable for R, due to their high mobility.
Vehicular computational and network cost
In order to give a lower bound for this cost, this analysis only considers ideal con-
ditions, that is, there are not external computational workloads derived from other
ITS simultaneous applications, which could cause delays to the protocol at stake.
Particularly, the cost of performing and verifying the signatures over beacons will
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not be considered. Furthermore, for these calculations it should be recalled that the
proposed protocol, as a difference with contributions C2 and C3, does not contain
any strategy of repeating several times each of the exchanged messages to counter
the vehicular network unreliability (recall Section 7.1).
Prior to estimate the costs, it is necessary to define the computational and
network available resources. Concerning the computational platform, a commercial
vehicular HSM (CycurV2X5) is considered. Although there are delays introduced by
the OBU’s and SAE’s processing, as well as the in-vehicle communication network,
it is estimated that the most costly operations are related to cryptographic calcu-
lations. Thus, only such operations will be considered in this analysis. According
to figures provided by its manufacturer, CycurV2X performs ECIES encryption of
16 bytes in 27.938 milliseconds (21.26 ms. for decryption). Regarding the ECDSA
signature operation, it is performed in 7.156 ms. (27.114 ms. for its verification,
plus a time of σv to verify the public key certificate status). Both ECIES and
ECDSA are selected for compliance to the current standard in security of vehicular
networks (IEEE 1609.2, [8]).
Related to the network resources, a typical inter-vehicle DSRC (Dedicated Short
Range Communications) network is considered. Such network has a bandwidth of
6 Mbps [81]. Even if a different network technology will be used for the resilient
network (to execute the exception handling processes), the same bandwidth will be
assumed.
Taking into account these figures, Table 8.6 details the cryptographic operations
for each algorithm and summarizes their processing costs. Note that the provided
performance data are referred to 16 bytes, but the data structures have a different
size. Thus, it is necessary to extrapolate these values for each size, which depends
on the cryptographic algorithm design. In the case of ECIES encryption, it is an
hybrid encryption scheme – it uses the public key to create a ciphering sequence,
which is the input key for a stream cipher. Such type of encryption does not divide
5https://www.escrypt.com/products/cycurv2x/details/, accessed in January 2012.
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Algorithm Cryptographic operations Vehicular pro-
cess. time (ms)
Testim. Collec-
tion (REQ)
2 sign. (req.) + nw ⋅ encrypt (req.) 14.31 + nw ⋅
670.51
Testim. Collec-
tion (WIT)
1 decrypt (req.) + 2 sign. verif.
(req.) + 1 sign. (testim.) + 1 en-
cryption (testim.)
708.1 + 2 ⋅ σv
Evid. Generation
(REQ)
1 sign. (evid. header) + 1 en-
crypt (evid. header) + 1 sign. verif.
(evid. header ack)
341.59 + σv
Evid. Verification None (performed by Adj) 0
Testimony Excep.
Handling
1 decrypt (testim. enquiry) + 1 sign
verif. (testim. enquiry) + 1 encrypt
(testim.) + 1 sign. (testim.)
216.21 + σv
Evidence Header
Excep. Handling
1 sign. (evid. header) + 1 en-
crypt (evid. header) + 1 sign. verif.
(evid. header ack)
341.59 + σv
Table 8.6: Summary of processing times for each algorithm. nw is the number of
participant witnesses. σv is the time to verify a public key certificate
the message in blocks, so it is reasonable to estimate that there will be a linear
relationship between the message size and the encryption time. On the other hand,
ECDSA signature is based on hash functions. According to IEEE 1609.2, such
function has to be SHA-224 or SHA-256 ([8]). As it uses a message block size of 64
bytes, which is greater than the messages to sign by the vehicle (see Table 8.7), we
will consider that the signature time is the same in all cases.
The operations for R concerning the testimony collection take a variable time,
as it depends on the amount of witnesses nw – the request is encrypted individually
for each Wi. Concerning the witness, it must be noted that Algorithms 8 and 10
(recall Section 7.4) have different workloads, even if their purpose is the same (i.e.
to prepare the testimony). In Algorithm 8, there is a need to encrypt not only
the request, but also the public key certificate of R(toff ) for privacy purposes, as
explained in Section 7.4.4. The witness has to decrypt these data and, moreover,
the request includes two signatures to be verified. Both issues are different to
Algorithm 10, where the message is smaller and the public key certificate is not
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encrypted as the EM does not need to protect its privacy. Regarding Algorithm 9,
there is no computation workload on the vehicle as it is fully performed by Adj.
Finally, the workload for the requester in the evidence generation is related to the
evidence header. Thus, it has to prepare (i.e. sign and encrypt) this data structure
and to verify the corresponding acknowledgement by its receiver. This workload is
the same as in the Evidence Header Exception Handling procedure (Algorithm 11).
Regarding the transmission costs, there are two relevant factors – the propaga-
tion delay and the network transmission one. The propagation delay (Tpropagation
= distance / wave propagation speed) is assumed to be negligible. In particular,
for wireless environments the wave propagation speed is the speed of light (300.000
kms / s), whereas the distance between sender and receiver is in the order of a few
kilometres. In fact, even if the communication range of DSRC is one kilometre,
there may be a multi-hop communication between both communicants. Thus, for
a distance = 10 kms. , Tpropagation = 3,33 * 10
−5 seconds ≈ 0.
To calculate the network transmission delay, it is necessary to determine each
message’s size. For this purpose, Table 8.7 shows the size for each data element.
Based on these data, Table 8.8 summarizes the data sent on each algorithm, along
with its transmission time. Thus, all transmission times are lower than a millisec-
ond, except from Algorithm 8, which depends on the amount of witnesses nw. It
should be noted that the absence of retransmissions makes this time significantly
shorter than the transmission time of the notification protocol (recall Section 8.3.1).
Using the previous values, it is possible to determine the total time taken since
the first request is prepared and until the evidence is ready to be created. For such
calculation, the worst case will be assumed, that is, all operations are performed
sequentially. It happens when the evidence header is sent after the testimony, so
there are no parallel operations. There are four cases: when there is no exception,
when there is a testimony exception, an evidence header exception or both of them.
Equation 8.14 shows the expression for all cases, considering a single witness.
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Data element Size (bytes)
Public key certificate 125 ([78])
Digital signature 56 ([78])
Vehicle identifier 4 ([59])
Behavior-related variable esti-
mation
10 (position: lati-
tude, longitude and
elevation), 2 (speed)
([59])
Time mark 2 ([59])
Offence identifier 4 (estimated by us)
Acknowledgement 4 (estimated by us)
Table 8.7: Size of data elements
Algorithm Sent data Transmission
time (ms)
Testim. Collec-
tion (REQ)
nw ⋅ (Request + 2 certificate) 0.47 ⋅ nw
Testim. Collec-
tion (WIT)
Request + 2 certificate + testimony +
certificate
0.73
Evid. Generation
(REQ)
Evidence header + certificate + ac-
knowledgement + offence identifier
0.52
Evid. Verification None (internal process of Adj) 0
Testimony Excep.
Handling
Beacon + offence identifier + vehicle
identifier + time mark + certificate +
testimony + certificate
0.53
Evidence Header
Excep. Handling
Evidence header + certificate + ac-
knowledgement + offence identifier
0.52
Table 8.8: Summary of transmission cost per algorithm
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Tevid−gen = Trequest + Ttestimony + Tevid−header + Texceptions (8.14)
Trequest (see Equation 8.15) is the time taken for a request to be created
(Tcrypto−request−requester), sent to a witness (Tsend−request) and processed by this
entity (Tcrypto−request−witness).
Trequest = Tcrypto−request−requester + Tsend−request + Tcrypto−request−witness (8.15)
On the other hand, Ttestimony (see Equation 8.16) is the time taken by
the witness to prepare the testimony (Tcrypto−testimony) and to send it to EM
(Tsend−testimony). Similarly, Tevid−header (Equation 8.17) is the time taken by the
requester to create (Tcrypto−evidHeader) and to send (Tsend−evidHeader) the evidence
header.
Ttestimony = Tcrypto−testimony + Tsend−testimony (8.16)
Tevid−header = Tcrypto−evidHeader + Tsend−evidHeader (8.17)
Finally, Texceptions (see Equation 8.18) is the time taken to proceed with the
exception handling procedures. Particularly, Testablish−resilient−channel represents
the time until the resilient channel is available for the vehicle. Tsend−enquiry +
Tcrypto−enquiry represents the time to send and to process the request for testi-
monies (in the Testimony Exception Handling procedure). On the other hand,
ExceptionTestim and ExceptionEvHeader are boolean values that have value 1
when it is necessary to execute the Testimony Exception Handling procedure and
the Evidence Header Exception Handling one, respectively. The remaining compo-
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nents of Equation 8.18 are already defined in the previous equations.
Texceptions = ExceptionTestim ⋅ (Testablish−resilient−channel + Tsend−enquiry +
+ Tcrypto−enquiry + Tcrypto−testimony + Tsend−testimony) +ExceptionEvHeader ⋅
⋅ (Testablish−resilient−channel + Tsend−evidHeader) (8.18)
In case that an exception happens, it is necessary to wait for the resilient channel
to be available. As it typically means the time to arrive to the physical place
where such channel exists, there is no reasonable estimation for this value (i.e.
Testablish−resilient−channel). For this reason, in this analysis only the case with no
exceptions will be considered. In such a case, the former expression is simplified as
follows:
Tevid−gen = Trequest + Ttestimony + Tevid−header =
= Tsend−request + (Tcrypto−request−requester + Tcrypto−request−witness +
+ Tcrypto−testimony) + Tsend−testimony + Tcrypto−evidHeader + Tsend−evidHeader =
= Tcrypto(Testim.Collection(REQ)) + Ttrans(Testim.Collection(REQ)) +
+ Tcrypto(Testim.Collection(WIT )) + Tcrypto(Evid.Generation(REQ)) +
+ Ttrans(Evid.Generation(REQ)) + Tsend−testimony =
= (14.31 + 1 ⋅ 670.51) + 0.47 + (708.1 + 2 ⋅ σv) + (341.59) + 0.52 + 0.26 =
= 1735.76 + 2 ⋅ σvms. (8.19)
In the previous expression, Ttrans(x) refers to the transmission time shown in Ta-
ble 8.8 for Algorithm x, whereas Tcrypto(x) represents its cryptographic processing
as shown in Table 8.6. Moreover, time Tsend−testimony has been calculated by sim-
ply isolating the transmission costs of the testimony from Ttrans(Testim. Collection
(WIT)). Noted that the previous calculations have considered that the testimony is
8.4. Evaluation of EVIGEN 197
referred to the position (which is slightly bigger than that referred to the speed). At
the light of this result, it may be seen that this execution, under ideal conditions,
takes around 1.8 seconds to be performed, plus two times σv, required to verify
public key certificates. It should be noted that the time to verify the certificate
status in the signature verification of the evidence header acknowledgement has not
been considered. This decision is taken because the message issuer is the Evidence
Manager, which is a well-known entity from the background environment. There-
fore, it is assumed that its certificate is already verified at the beginning of this
process.
Vehicular storage needs for the witness
In general words, the witness is forced to (1) perform a connection to EM using
the resilient channel at a periodic basis (typically, daily) and (2) if necessary, give
the pending testimonies using that connection (being called for maintenance if it
is not performed). For this purpose, vehicles have to store the behavior-related
data contained in the incoming beacons. This need implies that vehicles have to be
equipped with a storage unit. The size of such device will affect to the suitability
of this proposal to a real vehicular environment.
In order to estimate the storage needs (see Table 8.9), it is necessary to determine
the amount of incoming beacons. Such amount is determined by the density of
vehicles that are around a given one in its connectivity range. Given that the
maximum range of the vehicular (i.e. DSRC) connection is one kilometre, it is
necessary to establish the amount of vehicles in a square kilometre. In a urban
environment, where vehicular densities are expected to be higher than in regular
highways, such value ranges from 40 vehicles / km2 (in a very sparse situation) to
320 vehicles / km2 (in a highly dense one) [83]. Taking into account that beacons
are sent every 100 ms. ([59]), vehicles may be receiving from 400 to 3200 beacons
per second. For each one, a total amount of 18 bytes is necessary for its storage – 2
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d = 40
vehicles /
km2 (very
sparse)
d = 80
vehicles
/ km2
(sparse)
d = 160
vehicles /
km2 (mod-
erate)
d = 240
vehicles
/ km2
(intense)
d = 320
vehicles
/ km2
(highly
dense)
Beacons received
per second
400 800 1600 2400 3200
Storage needed
per second (bytes,
considering 18
bytes per beacon)
7200 14400 28800 43200 57600
Storage needed
for a one-hour
trip (Mbytes)
25,92 51,84 103,68 155,52 207,36
Table 8.9: Witness storage needs for one-hour trip under different vehicular densities
bytes for the speed value, 10 bytes for the positional (latitude, longitude, elevation)
information, 4 bytes for the vehicular identifier and 2 for the time mark [59]. This
leads to the amount of storage required for one second. Generalizing this value
for a one-hour trip (which seems to be reasonable for an urban environment), the
maximum storage required in the worst case (i.e. higher density) is 207,36 Mb. It
should be noted that the real value could be lowered if the network reliability were
considered, as some data losses could happen.
Apart from this information, it is necessary to store the testimonies that have
been sent in the whole period, as they may have been lost in the vehicular channel.
The storage needs for each testimony is 24 bytes in the worst case (i.e. position
testimonies), considering the testimony contents (recall Section 7.4.1) and data sizes
(Table 8.7). However, the amount of testimonies is significantly smaller than that
of beacons at stake. Considering 100 testimonies in the aforementioned trip, the
required storage would be 2400 bytes.
At the light of these values, the storage needs are reasonable for the vehicular
context. However, if such storage need were not suitable for the future early devel-
opment of the vehicular devices, other protocol designs could be proposed. Two of
them are introduced following. First, a probabilistic approach could be adopted for
implementing a deletion policy in a witness. Thus, the witness will delete a given
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record from a previous beacon with a given probability. In this case, the proposed
protocol should be changed to allow a ’unknown requester’ answer in the testimony
exception handling procedure.
The second approach could be to limit the storage period of beacons to the
time required to receive the request from the requester, taking into account typical
values for the vehicular computational and network cost for the requester (Section
8.4.2) and tgap, i.e. the time gap between the offence and the notification (Section
8.4.2). In such a case, it could happen that once the exception handling procedure
is launched, the witness does not have the data to build the testimony. However,
such testimony should have been created in the moment in which the request was
received. The only way for an uncooperative node to avoid participating in this
protocol should be to argue that it did not receive the request from the requester.
However, it may be defined a maximum amount of allowable times in which such
justification could be used. Particularly, using the relationship between packet
delivery ratio and sender-receiver distance shown in [74], it is possible to proba-
bilistically determine the plausibility for a given message to be lost in the network.
Beyond that threshold, the Authority would call to the vehicle for maintenance in
order to check up its communication devices.
Vehicular storage needs for the requester
In the time interval between the offence and the notification (tgap), the requester
has to store (1) its in-vehicle sensor information and (2) the set of received beacons.
The first information is needed to evaluate whether the received notification is
fair or not based on its perceived driving behavior. The second information is
required to build the evidence header, as the beacons of purported witnesses have
to be included in such structure. It should be noted that the second information is
different to that required to the witness – in this case, not only the beacon sensorial
data must be stored, but the whole beacon itself. The storage costs for both types
200 Chapter 8. Evaluation
of data is illustrated below. Apart from these data, the requester has to store the
evidence headers that have not been acknowledged. However, it is estimated that
this storage need is negligible compared to the previous ones, as it is only necessary
when an evidence is to be created and only if the vehicular channel transmission is
not successful.
Concerning the storage of sensorial information, it depends on four factors –
the amount of sensors nsen, their sampling speed samsp, the size of the sensorial
values svali and the time mark of each sample tmark, and tgap. Particularly, the
requester storage RqSt is given by Equation 8.20.
RqSt = tgap
samsp
⋅ (tmark + nsen∑
i=0 svali) (8.20)
For the context of this contribution, only position and speed sensors will be
considered (nsen = 2). Concerning the sampling speed, it is desirable that it is
not higher than the rate at which beacons are sent. In this way, every beacon
contains fresh (i.e. not repeated) sensorial data. For these calculations, the value
samsp = 100 ms. will be taken, which coincides with the beaconing rate assumed
in current standards. The size of the sensorial value is 2 bytes for the speed value
(sval0) and 10 bytes for the positional information (sval1). The time mark size
tmark is 2 bytes [59]. Concerning the interval tgap, the values 5, 30, 60, 180 and
300 seconds will be considered. At the light of these values, it may be seen that in
the most favourable case (tgap = 5) RqSt = 700 bytes while in the worst case (tgap
= 300) RqSt = 42000 bytes.
With respect to the storage of received beacons, the calculation follows an anal-
ogous reasoning as that presented in the previous subsection. The difference is that
in this case it is necessary to store the whole beacon, but only during the period
tgap. According to standard SAE J2735, the beacon data size without considering
optional parts is 49 bytes (recall Figure 5.1) [59]. As it is assumed to be signed,
the public key certificate and digital signature (125 and 56 bytes respectively, ac-
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d = 40
vehicles /
km2 (very
sparse)
d = 80
vehicles
/ km2
(sparse)
d = 160
vehicles /
km2 (mod-
erate)
d = 240
vehicles
/ km2
(intense)
d = 320
vehicles
/ km2
(highly
dense)
Beacons received per
second
400 800 1600 2400 3200
Storage needed per
second (bytes, con-
sidering 230 bytes
per beacon)
92000 184000 368000 552000 736000
Storage (Mbytes)
needed for tgap =
5 s (best case)
0,46 0,92 1,84 2,76 3,68
Storage (Mbytes)
needed for tgap =
300 s (worst case)
27,6 55,2 110,4 165,6 220,8
Table 8.10: Requester storage needs for beacons considering tgap = 5 s. (best case)
and tgap = 300 s. (worst case) scenarios
cording to IEEE 1609.2 [8]) must also be considered. Thus, each beacon requires
230 bytes of storage. Considering this value and the previous ones for tgap, Table
8.10 summarizes the results for the storage needs in different scenarios. It may be
seen that in the less favourable context (i.e. the highest vehicular density and the
greater time interval between offence and notification), the requester has to store
220,8 Mb.
Experimental evaluation
In order to assess the amount of evidences and testimonies per evidence that may
be achieved in a road scenario, several simulations have been conducted using the
NS-2 simulator. This evaluation will focus on the viability of the proposed proto-
col assuming that the computational devices have enough resources to perform the
required computation. Thus, there are no bottlenecks caused by the inherent exis-
tence of several time-consuming tasks, such as beaconing signatures or safety-related
ITS services. In the same way, delays introduced by other underlying procedures
(such as public key certificate updates, plausibility checks over the received infor-
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mation, certificate revocation list downloading, etc.) are not considered in these
experiments.
The main simulation parameters are shown in Table 8.11. The transmission
parameters are derived from the expected performance of DSRC communications
including their data rate, reception range and channel reliability [81]. With respect
to the routing strategy, in this evaluation the use of a one-hop broadcast has been
chosen. As this is the most basic dissemination strategy (as there is no forwarding
between nodes), it avoids introducing delays caused by a routing strategy, as well
as routing errors. It should be noted that routing in these networks is a matter of
open research, so the election of a given strategy could have a great impact over the
results [71]. For the purpose of this evaluation, it will be assumed that all vehicles
are equipped with non-compromised vehicular platforms.
In order to assess the suitability of the proposal to the changing reality of vehic-
ular situations, five representative scenarios have been considered, namely a urban
section from the city of Eichsta¨tt, a highway stretch, a highway crossing section,
a secondary road and a Manhattan-like map. In each one, 250 vehicles have been
simulated over 600 seconds.
The vehicle movement has been created using both SUMO [84] and CityMob
[85] mobility traces generators. Particularly, the considered vehicular speeds are
up to 10 km/h higher than the current speed limit. From our point of view, this
situation adequately reflects the current driving practices. It should be noted that
this decision leaves out those vehicles that are significantly speeding. This fact is
irrelevant for the vehicle that is requesting for testimonies because, if it was really
speeding, the fine notification would be considered as fair and therefore the whole
evidence generation process would not be started. However, this could have an
impact over the reachability of witnesses – if they were actually speeding whereas
the requester were not, they could get out of range in a shorter time. From our
point of view, this decision should not have a significant impact on the evaluation
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Parameter Value
Data rate 6 Mb
Reception threshold 300 m
Wireless frequency 5.9 Ghz
Routing protocol None (broadcast)
Table 8.11: Simulation parameters
results, because (1) the proportion of speeders is usually not very high, and (2) it
is not likely that a vehicle which is committing an illegal action would be willing to
participate as a witness. Nevertheless, an extended evaluation taking into account
this issue is left to future work.
An intuitive assumption is that the smaller tgap is, the closer (consequently, the
more reachable) the Witness may be from the Requester. Therefore, this analysis
will be focused on determining the effect of tgap in (1) the proportion of valid
witnesses that are reachable and (2) the amount of testimonies that will be sent
for each offence. The first indicator shows the relationship between the potential
witnesses and the actual witnesses, whereas the second one shows the total amount
of actual witnesses. In this way, it is possible to characterize both the achieved and
missed testimonies.
Figure 8.6 shows the ratio of available witnesses in each scenario, using 5, 30,
60, 180 and 300 seconds for tgap. Except from the highway, around 90 % of the
witnesses are available if tgap = 5 s. On the contrary, for tgap = 300 seconds this
proportion drops below 30 %. For the intermediate value of tgap = 60 seconds, all
scenarios except the Manhattan map allow for a proportion of around 50 %. There
are two facts that should be analysed separately. First, the highway scenario never
offers a ratio higher than 52 %. This is due to the high speed of vehicles, along
with their potential greater speed differences, making it more probable to get out
of range very soon. Second, the ratio offered by the Manhattan map gets lower
faster than the remaining ones, significantly before tgap = 30 seconds. This fact
is a consequence of the map definition – once a vehicle turns in a street, it starts
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Figure 8.6: Ratio of available witnesses for different tgap values
driving in a perpendicular direction to the other one.
On the other hand, Figure 8.7 shows the amount of available testimonies in each
scenario for the aforementioned values of tgap. The highway scenario is the most
convenient one, as it offers the maximum amount of testimonies for all values of
tgap. Remarkably, 38 testimonies are collected for tgap = 5s. This may be explained
by the multi-lane feature of such kind of roads, which enables more vehicles to
be in range. On the contrary, the Manhattan map is the one that offers the lower
amount. This fact may be due to the fast dispersion of vehicles in this map according
to the considered mobility pattern. Although the amount of required testimonies
to endorse a given claim is up to the Adjudicator, we assume that having less than
10 testimonies may be inconvenient. Based on such assumption, this protocol may
be used in highways for every tgap, whereas in secondary roads it is not suitable for
tgap = 300 s. In the Eichsta¨tt and highway crossing settings, it is only suitable for
tgap ⩽ 180 seconds. The proposed protocol is not suitable for the Manhattan map
under this criterion.
-+-
--
-
-
-+-
8.4. Evaluation of EVIGEN 205
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
5 30 60 180 300 
N
u
m
. T
e
st
im
o
n
ie
s 
Interval between offence and notification (seconds) 
Average Testimonies per offence 
Manhattan 
Eichstatt 
Highway 
Highway crossing 
Sec. Roads 
Figure 8.7: Average amount of testimonies per offence for different tgap values
8.4.3 Security requirements analysis
This Section evaluates whether the imposed requirements are fulfilled and, conse-
quently, if all threats have been countermeasured. Table 8.12 summarizes the anal-
ysis presented herein, capturing the countermeasures adopted against each threat
for every message. In such table, apart from the data structures introduced in Sec-
tion 7.4.1, the evidence header acknowledgement is also considered because of its
relevance in the process.
Correctness. The Evidence verification algorithm enforces that the evidence
contains at least one supporting testimony (condition 1). In this way, evidences
based on false claims by R are removed, as there would be no supporting testimonies.
Moreover, the semantic checks ensure the consistency between at least one of the
testimonies and R’s claimed value (condition 2). The time consistency (condition 3)
is also checked in the verification process. It must be recalled that this verification
is possible since vehicles are assumed to be synchronized by means of the integrated
navigation system. The verification process also checks that all pseudonyms at stake
belong to a different entity (condition 4), and that the Wi identified by R (i.e. listed
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in the evidence header) is the one that generates one of the supporting testimony
(condition 5).
Concerning the threat of messages never created or lost, the use of a resilient
channel (once the vehicular one has failed) contributes to mitigate it for all mes-
sages except from requests (see Table 8.12). In such case, the Testimony exception
handling enables collecting the testimony even if the request was not received by
the witness. Therefore, even if the request is lost, the correctness is not threatened.
With respect to the message alteration, the use of digital signatures (which
have been created in a secure environment) makes it possible to detect this threat.
The same mechanism avoids the chance of impersonation, which may be seen as an
alteration of a legitimate message.
Confidentiality. All messages exchanged in the vehicular environment are en-
crypted to its intended receiver – the request (encrypted to each Wi), the testimony
and the evidence header (to the EM). Moreover, the created evidence is sent en-
crypted to Adj. Moreover, these data are securely managed by their respective
receivers (SAEWi, EM and Adj, respectively).
Authentic requests. The contents of the request ensure that R is the same
entity to which the evidence has to be referred, as it has one part digitally signed
under such identity (R(toff )). Moreover, another part is signed under its current
identity (R(treq)), which prevents third parties to issue requests referred to others.
The time mark toff introduced in the first part counters the potential threat posed
by replay attacks.
Authentic testimonies. The verification process checks the plausibility of a
given testimony. In this way, sensor errors (accidental or on purpose) are prop-
erly handled if such checks offer a reasonable reliability. Therefore, the proposed
approach satisfies this condition to the same extent as real-life Court situations –
witnesses may be good-willing but they may offer wrong testimonies as a result of
their perception errors.
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Message Threat Countermeasure
Request
Not created / Lost Testimony exception handling process over an opera-
tional channel (this countermeasure solves the conse-
quences of this circumstance, but not this issue itself).
Altered / Created by
unauthorized party
Digital signatures (using the private keys related to
R(treq) and R(toff )) using a secure device (HSM) in
a trusted environment (OVERSEE). Supported by a
secure build-up management process. Message verifi-
cation operations performed by the witness.
False data (e.g. un-
related to an on-
going offence)
Out of the scope (irrational attack).
Eavesdropping Encryption using every witness’ public key.
Testimony
Not created/ Lost Testimony exception handling process over an opera-
tional channel.
Altered / Created by
unauthorized party
Digital signature using a secure device (HSM) in a
trusted environment (OVERSEE). Supported by a se-
cure build-up management process.
False data (sensor
failure or malicious
manipulation)
Plausibility checks.
False data (non-
present witness)
Secure Location Verification service.
Eavesdropping Encryption using EM’s public key.
Evidence header
Not created Out of the scope (irrational attack).
Lost Evidence header exception handling process over a re-
silient channel.
Altered / Created by
unauthorized party
Digital signature using a secure device (HSM) in a
trusted environment (OVERSEE). Supported by a se-
cure build-up management process.
False data (modified
witness list)
Neighbour list is managed in the trusted environment
(SAE). Digital signatures may only be performed in
genuine HSM (secure build-up management process)
and only upon request from the SAE (trusted envi-
ronment). Therefore, it is not possible to create a
well-formed message with an invalid neighbour list.
False data (unrealis-
tic claim)
Evidence verification will discover no supporting tes-
timonies, so the evidence will be discarded.
Evid. header ack
Lost Evidence header exception handling process over an
operational channel.
Altered / Created by
unauthorized party
Digital signature in a trusted environment.
Not created / False
data
Not possible (EM is trusted).
Evidence
Lost Sent by a trusted entity (EM) through a resilient net-
work, to the Adjudicator.
Altered / Created by
unauthorized party
Digital signature in a trusted environment.
Not created / False
data
Not possible: EM is trusted and plausibility checks
are conducted to verify the data.
Eavesdropping Encryption using Adj public key.
Table 8.12: Requirements and threats evaluation for each data structure
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Moreover, the Secure Location Verification process, along with the beacons con-
tained in the evidence header, ensure that the witness was present when the offence
was committed. As the cryptographic material is securely loaded into the HSM,
and given that such device is firmly attached to the vehicle, only such vehicle (which
is necessarily different to R) is able to correctly sign a message. As testimonies are
digitally signed, there is no chance for impersonating the witness.
8.5 Comparison of the contributions against previous
works
8.5.1 Analysis of the proposed model
The improvement of the road traffic enforcement process has received several con-
tributions. Most of them are the result of European research projects.
The ESCAPE project analyzed the process at an European level and identified
its effects, measures, needs and future [4]. The enforcement weaknesses pointed out
by this project, as well as its suggestions to introduce new technologies on this field,
is a starting point for the work developed in this thesis.
The FAIR (Fully Automatic Integrated Road control) project aimed to improve
the enforcement by using different surveillance technologies along the roads [86].
Achieving an immediate feedback for the offender (which, in the end, is the intended
consequence of the goal O3 of this thesis) was pointed out by FAIR as a future
research issue.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the enforcement process was the focus of the
PEPPER (Police Enforcement Policy and Programmes on European Roads) project
[87]. This project pointed out that ITSs could improve the enforcement process,
although there were several legal, technical, and operative issues that should be
addressed first. One of the goals of this thesis (goal O1) is to design a model
that helps on understanding this process, clarifying how ITS technologies may be
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integrated in this context.
Finally, the European architecture on ITS (already introduced in Section 3.5)
provides support for the enforcement process, particularly for the Starting phase
[48]. Even if it introduces interactions with the vehicle to get some data, the
problems considered in this thesis (see Section 3.4) are not addressed in the current
version of this architecture.
8.5.2 Analysis of the proposed covert reporting mechanism
To the best of the knowledge of this thesis’ author, there are no previous contri-
butions on applying steganography in the vehicular context. However, in order to
determine the novelty of this contribution, it is necessary to analyze other previous
works that are related in some way to the proposal.
As compared to the watermarking schemes proposed by Fang et al. [32] and
Zhang et al. [33], the contribution presented in this thesis tries to achieve a different
goal. In their case, modifications to sensor data are performed to authenticate them.
In the proposed approach, the modifications are introduced with a totally different
purpose (reporting a misbehaving vehicle) which is not related to the sensorial data
at stake.
Concerning the scheme of Sion et al. [34], the contribution presented herein is
similar in that both have a common definition of usability for a given value. Sion
et al. defined an usability metrics, whereas in the presented contribution there is
a reliability interval that establishes the maximum amount of data that may be
embedded into a given data field.
8.5.3 Analysis of the proposed notification protocol
In the context of vehicular networks, there are several ITS applications that have
two points in common with the notification process described so far – (1) that
the message arrives to the vehicle and (2) that it is possible to attest this issue
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for an eventual dispute resolution process. Two representative examples of these
applications are introduced below.
First, the electronic signage (i.e. the electronic transmission of traffic signs to
the vehicle) has been identified as a beneficial application, especially for old drivers
[88]. In a future scenario in which the traffic signs were transmitted exclusively in
this way, it could be necessary to ensure that the vehicle received this information
in order to punish offenders.
Second, the Enhanced Driver Awareness (EDA) application enables the driver
to receive sensorial data from other vehicles and infrastructure elements [89]. Again,
if the driver takes a decision which leads to a traffic incident, and if it is against
the data received through EDA, the liability attribution could be more severe than
that of an unexpected incident.
Despite the prior description, and to the best of the author of this thesis’ knowl-
edge, none of these applications have addressed the scenarios in which the message
does not arrive to the receiver or there is no proof on the correct reception by the
vehicle. The contribution presented in this thesis takes both issues into account by
(1) establishing a retransmission scheme that fights against the unreliability of the
vehicular channel and (2) using a trusted third party over a reliable connection for
the cases in which the vehicular network is not enough. However, it should be noted
that the use of such reliable connection occurs after a significant time interval. As
opposed to what happens with the notification, such interval would not be suitable
for the aforementioned applications. Thus, sending a traffic sign that was in force
for a previous road stretch would be useless, as well as receiving EDA information
that applies to a former traffic scenario.
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8.5.4 Analysis of the proposed cooperative evidence generation
protocol
The small amount of contributions related to evidence generation in vehicular sce-
narios were already introduced in Section 3.3.3. In this Section, each of these
contributions is confronted with the one presented in this thesis.
First, compared to [43], it should be noted that the contribution developed in
this thesis takes into account not only the own vehicle’s sensor measurements, but
also data coming from the surrounding vehicles. Taking into account that it would
now be required for an attacker to compromise (or to collude) the surrounding
vehicles, the chance of such attack is lower than that of the proposal in [43].
Second, in comparison with the security framework presented by Lin et al. [44],
they consider as an evidence a signed message sent by a given vehicle, using ID-based
cryptography and group signatures as the underlying cryptographic mechanisms.
In the contribution presented in this thesis, the evidence is the result of signing a
given (also signed) claim by the requesting vehicle, along with a set of supporting
(signed as well) testimonies. Furthermore, the cryptographic approach is based on
public key cryptography according to the IEEE 1609.2 standard.
Finally, group communications could be envisioned as a means to select wit-
nesses. Group formation has been previously studied by Raya et al. [90]. Neverthe-
less, the requesting vehicle in the contribution presented in this thesis is requiring
information of a moment in the past. Given the volatility of the group formation,
it could be possible that current group members were not present at the requested
time. For this reason, in this work the use of group communications have been
discarded, as this choice would not always be suitable.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
This Chapter contains the thesis conclusions and final remarks, and summarizes
the contributions achieved. A critical discussion on the developed work is also
presented. Additionally, future research directions that derive from the thesis results
are proposed.
9.1 Conclusions and summary of contributions
The work developed in this thesis has been focused on the improvement of the road
traffic enforcement process. Such process is critical to ensure that every offence is
rapidly reported by the Authority. In this way, drivers feel that the probability of
being caught is high, thus forcing them to drive more responsibly.
Despite the relevance of the enforcement process, current implementations suffer
from a high bureaucracy and a low degree of participation of regular citizens. In
order to contribute on these issues, this thesis has focused on creating new mech-
anisms of communication between the Authority, the offender and the potential
victims or witnesses. For this purpose, a new technological trend called Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) has been considered. ITS consist on the application
of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) on the vehicular environ-
ment, thus enabling vehicles to communicate among them in a real-time fashion.
The main conclusion of the work developed in this thesis is that the use of ITS
technologies is an interesting approach to contribute on improving the enforcement
process.
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Prior to creating any mechanism, it is necessary to have a comprehensive model
that clarifies the participant entities and their relationships. The first contribution
of this thesis has been to develop such model (see Chapter 4) for speeding offences
based on the results of a related European project called VERA2. Thanks to this
model, the phases, the data at stake, the data exchanges and the underlying security
considerations have been described. With such a clear vision on the process, the
integration of ITS technologies in this context is clarified.
Based on the aforementioned model, three mechanisms have been proposed for
different steps within the process phases. The first one (see Chapter 5) is related to
the automatic reporting of an offending vehicle by its surrounding vehicles. In this
way, detecting offences is not a task almost exclusive for the Authority, but instead
any citizen is able (in a practical way) to report their occurrence. To avoid the
potential retaliation by the offender to the reporter, the use of steganography has
been proposed to secretly embed the report within regular ITS-related messages.
Particularly, the most frequent message structure, called beacon, has been selected
as the carrier for such reports.
Once a traffic offence has been detected, the second mechanism is intended to
improve the immediacy on the notification step, that is, to formally inform the of-
fender on the legal consideration of the committed fault. The proposed notification
mechanism (described in Chapter 6) enables delivering the message to the offend-
ing vehicle while keeping the legal provisions related to its validity. Furthermore,
under the assumption that the vehicle will force the driver to take a decision on the
notification (the next time he/she attempts to use the car, at the latest), the chance
for ignoring the notification (i.e. the so-called passive behavior) is countered.
The third and last mechanism is related to those undesirable situations in which
the reported driver finds that the received fine is not fair. This is the case when,
for example, a speeding offence is reported while the driver claims that it was not
speeding. Similarly, it may happen that the reported speed is higher than that
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claimed by the driver, leading to a more severe punishment than that expected by
the driver. In fact, this could be the result of an inaccurate report created using
the first mechanism proposed. Such third mechanism (see Chapter 7) enables the
reported driver to gather the viewpoints from surrounding vehicles, using them as
witnesses. In this way, it is possible to obtain a more complete vision of the facts,
leading to a more fair enforcement system.
Globally, the aforementioned contributions enable a more active participation
of all citizen stakeholders of an enforcement process – the offender, the potential
victims and the surrounding witnesses. Such contributions have been shown to
be feasible under realistic assumptions over computation devices, communication
networks and road traffic scenarios.
The aforementioned contributions have been published in several papers. Annex
B shows the list of publications. The relationship between each contribution (using
the numbers given in the aforementioned Annex) and the corresponding publications
is shown in Table 9.1. It should be noted that publications 4, 5 and 7 are not related
to any contribution in particular, but instead they are previous works that served
as a basis to develop these contributions.
Contributions Publications
C1. Complete enforcement process
model
1, 6, 8
C2. Steganography-based protocol
for covert reporting of misbehaving
vehicles
9
C3. Protocol to send an offence no-
tification to the offending vehicle
10
C4. EVIGEN protocol for coopera-
tive evidence generation
2, 3
Table 9.1: Relationship between contributions and publications
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9.2 Critical analysis on the developed work
The work developed in this thesis is focused on improving different aspects of the
enforcement process. Even if the existence of problems in such process was already
detected by previous European projects, there are not indicators on the size of these
problems in a practical system such as the Spanish enforcement one. Therefore,
there are not figures on the amount of voluntary reports created by citizens, so it
will be not possible to determine the degree of improvement achieved by the inter-
vehicle reporting protocol. Concerning the notification protocol, it enables a fast
delivery of such message. However, there are not official measurements (only rough
estimations) on the current delay of the notification step, making it impossible to
determine the benefits of the proposed mechanism. Related to this point, having a
faster notification mechanism may help on decreasing the number of reports that
expire. However, it is unknown (at least, not publicly available) the current amount
of reports that expire before they have been processed. Similarly, there are not
indicators on the amount of evidences presented by citizens, which makes difficult
to measure the benefits of the evidence generation protocol.
As an addition to the previous point, the lack of implementation in a real sys-
tem of the proposed mechanisms makes it difficult to estimate their impact in a
real-world environment and, particularly, their potential misuses. Concerning the
inter-vehicle reporting mechanism, it should be noted that it could be used mali-
ciously – for example, a given vehicle may falsely report others just to make harm.
Similarly, the evidence generation protocol could be used to create false testimonies
by coalitions of drivers. In both situations, it is necessary to develop a trustworthi-
ness analysis procedure, which has been identified in this thesis but left to future
work. Even if the work developed in this thesis enables the implementation of
the proposed mechanisms, having such analysis procedures is a prerequisite for the
practical use of the developed contributions. It should be noted that the evidence
generation may serve as a conceptual deterrent for such a lack of trustworthiness in
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reports. Thus, in case that a false report is issued, the set of testimonies supporting
the reported driver’s argument will serve to lower the reliability of the aforemen-
tioned report.
The aforementioned lack of real implementation also affects to the accuracy of
the evaluation conducted on this thesis. In general terms, the evaluation is almost
fully theoretical. In order to obtain experimental measurements, simulators (or
performance figures of commercial vehicular devices) have been used. Although the
employed simulator (NS-2) is well-known, the realism of the created mobility trace
has a direct impact on the applicability of the results to a real-world environment.
Therefore, even if it is a widespread way of validation for ITS-related proposals,
the evaluation should be extended to confirm the suitability of the proposed mech-
anisms. Furthermore, it should be confirmed that the impact of speeding vehicles
(especially in the evidence generation protocol) is not significant for the evaluation
results.
Regarding to the evaluation settings, there are two issues that should be revised.
First, the processing capabilities of Road Side Units (RSUs) have been assumed to
be enough to perform the required operations. However, this issue should be con-
trasted with practical devices. Second, it should be measured the performance of
the proposed mechanisms in more complex vehicular scenarios where several ITS
services are coexistent. Additionally, it should be taken into account the potential
impact of different routing protocols (AODV, geocasting, etc.) or even addressing
techniques (WAVE Short Messages Protocol, IPv6, etc.). Specifically for the pro-
posed evidence generation protocol, the analysis has been based on ideal conditions
where there was no other workload different from that of the studied protocol. Such
analysis should be extended to ensure that it is suitable even in a real vehicular
scenario where several applications are running at the same time.
Most of the considered legislation which forms the legal basis of this work is
the Spanish one. Although the underlying principles should be very similar to
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other countries, this election may have caused that the developed mechanisms are
only fully applicable (in their current form) in Spain. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that the VERA2 model that served as a basis for the proposed model was
already defined in the European context, and only a small amount of refinements
was required to adapt it to the Spanish current legislation.
Concerning the application of steganography in this context (for the inter-vehicle
reporting mechanism), there are not unique, well-known analysis on the degree of
randomness of the in-vehicle sensor measurements error. In its current form, the
proposed mechanism assumes that such error is fully random. This situation is
the most convenient one (from the steganographic point of view), as it enables the
maximum capacity for each sensor data field (according to the definition of capacity
shown in Chapter 5). However, it is necessary to perform an experimental validation
of this issue in order to determine the actual capacity of these fields.
As an addition to the previous point, the use of steganography by altering the
sensorial data in beacon messages may be seen as unacceptable by road traffic safety
experts. It must be noted that these messages are defined to help the driver to have
a wide vision on the road traffic status. Thus, introducing errors (even smaller)
in such messages may be seen as an unnecessary source of uncertainty, which may
lead to a low acceptance by manufacturers or even governments.
One issue related to all the mechanisms proposed in this thesis is that they
have been developed without the supervision or guidance of the National Traffic
Authority (Spanish DGT). In this way, it is not possible to determine whether
the proposal fits within the practical realizations of the enforcement system, or
even if they are suitable to the vision of such Authority on the road traffic safety
mechanisms. It must be noted that the implementation of the proposed mechanisms
may require additional investments, which may be not well-accepted taking into
account those already performed in this issue (e.g. ESTRADA processing station,
the use of PDAs by policemen, etc.)
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Last but not least, the use of Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) has been
adopted as a root of trust throughout this thesis. This assumption, which is
also shared by other research initiatives such as the OVERSEE European research
project, is beneficial in that it constitutes a basis over which the remaining security
mechanisms may be built. However, achieving such level of reliability in a single
physical device constitutes a technical challenge. Therefore, it is interesting to dis-
cuss the impact on the proposed mechanisms of decreasing the assumed reliability
of HSMs.
Related to the reporting protocol, the lack of a secure key storage would enable
that the reporting device could impersonate others. This scenario could make such
reports impractical – in case that a given report is said to be false, there would be
no reliable way to reveal the identity of the real reporter.
Concerning the notification protocol, without such a trusted component there
would be no way of ensuring that notifications will be delivered to the vehicle only
when their receiving person is able to gather them. Furthermore, the time in which
the notification is received or accessed could be forged, which may be of interest for
a driver, trying to delay as much as possible the starting time of the legal period for
building counterevidences and allegations. Apart from the previous points, the lack
of secure management of the private keys would enable to transfer (or copy) them
to other vehicles, which could impersonate the former. In this case, it is important
to note that it would threat the confidentiality of the notification message.
With respect to the evidence generation protocol, the aforementioned lack of
secure storage would lead to an undesirable scenario in which a single vehicle could
(1) self-generate as much testimonies as it wishes, using identities obtained from
other vehicles, (2) hand-craft the list of available neighbours, thus forming groups
of preferred witnesses which are even not in the surroundings, (3) act as witness on
behalf of a third vehicle.
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9.3 Challenges and future research lines
The work developed in this thesis opens the door to several innovative research lines
(with their associated challenges), which are mainly focused on complementing the
approach or even extending it to other related areas.
Concerning the model proposed, the first challenge is to generalize it in order
to be suitable for other kinds of enforcement processes (different from the admin-
istrative one covered in this work) and for other traffic offences (different from the
speeding one). The goal is to make it suitable across Europe, but it requires to
identify the common issues (and also different) among different countries.
On the other hand, due to the practical application of the mechanisms described,
the challenge is to implement them in a real environment. For this purpose, the
collaboration of the Spanish Traffic Authority is critical, as it is the entity that
would be managing the resulting system. The practical challenge resides on the
adaptation of current systems (mainly, the ESTRADA processing station) to the
expected workload that would be derived from the proposed mechanisms. The
resulting time gap between the offence and notification should be carefully analysed
in order to quantify the level of improvement. At the same time, the degree of
impact in the driver’s attitude should also be studied.
Additionally to the previous point, it is also critical to research on the best way
of presenting the message to the driver. Such procedure should fulfil two (potentially
opposed) goals, namely to ensure the maximum educational effect of the punishment
(which usually requires raising a significant level of awareness) without interfering
in the driving task (thus avoiding distractions).
Continuing with the improvement of existing practices, it is interesting to anal-
yse if the offender identification can also be improved by means of ITS-related
technologies. Current offences detected by automatic devices are firstly referred to
the vehicle keeper because there is no way to reliably identify the offending driver.
However, as an extension to other research projects (e.g. Spanish PRECIOUS,
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undertaken by the Security on information technologies research group of the Uni-
versity Carlos III of Madrid), the existence of an Electronic Driving License could
allow performing an electronic authentication of the actual driver. Notwithstand-
ing, the privacy protection of such person must be ensured, especially avoiding the
risk of tracking (i.e. determining the path followed by a given person). For this
purpose, it is critical to analyse the specifications on this issue made by recent
standards, specially ISO 10711:2012 [91].
Concerning new alternatives for the proposed approach, it is worth to consider
the growing amount of connected mobile devices. They may be connected to the in-
vehicle network and, at the same time, to other devices either through short range
technologies (e.g. Bluetooth) or long range ones (e.g. satellite communications).
Even if they cannot be used while driving, they may act as a substitute of OBUs.
Moreover, cryptographic capabilities introduced in some SIM cards make them more
interesting as an active part of data exchange protocols that require such kind of
operations (as those proposed in this thesis).
There are three main ways in which the approach presented herein may be ex-
tended. First, the steganography-based reporting mechanism could be adapted to
enable cooperative reports. In such a new scenario, several vehicles could covertly
share their vision about a third (suspicious) one. If they agree on that it is a of-
fender, they may create a combined report. In this way, offences that involve a set
of dangerous actions could also be detected. It must be noted that the severity of
an offence that comprises a group of actions is sometimes greater than the mere
sum of that of these actions. For example, reckless driving is a severe offence which
is usually composed by a set of dangerous actions that have been committed over
different victims. Similarly, this mechanism could be extended to cope with contin-
uous infractions. Thus, a speeding offence committed over a stretch of 5 kilometres
should receive a higher punishment than that performed at a single moment. Sec-
ond, the impact of cross-border enforcement over the proposed mechanisms should
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be studied. The extent of validity of reports made by a citizen from a country in a
foreign one remains as an open issue. At the same time, presenting a notification
message in the driver’s native tongue, even if she is driving in a foreign country, may
be achieved by different ways. Third, the non-repudiation needs detected for the
notification mechanism are, at least in theory, similar to those ITS services where
liability attribution may arise. This is the case of in-vehicle signing (i.e. sending
electronically road traffic signs directly to the vehicle). It is necessary to clarify
the extent of this need (particularly on the consequences of a failed delivery of such
messages) and introduce the appropriate mechanisms to address it.
In the notification protocol it has been assumed that it is possible to deter-
mine the set of potential locations in which a vehicle may be some time after the
offence has been detected. Such estimation requires an in-depth analysis of the
vehicular movement and traffic conditions, in order to calculate the minimum set
of locations (to avoid overloading more RSUs than strictly necessary) without loss
of effectiveness (to ensure that the receiving vehicle is in one of those locations).
Related to both the reporting and notification mechanisms, the use of a simple
repetition scheme has been selected as a means to promote the correct transmission
of the messages at stake through the vehicular (unreliable) channel. Thus, the use of
existing error correction codes (recall Section 5.6.1) or the potential development of
other equivalent mechanisms that are suitable for this context is a matter of future
research. Such mechanism must face the fact that the message may be received by
not only one entity (i.e. a single RSU) but by a set of independent entities, as it
was explained in the reporting protocol. This issue should be taken into account
as it enables re-sending a given message or its error correction codes. This could
simplify the complexity of the required operations to calculate the code, as the error
rate could be lowered by this re-sending operation.
On the other hand, the threat of collusion has been left out of the scope of the
evidence generation protocol. Such a threat affects to the data trustworthiness.
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Developing an evaluation procedure for this issue is a matter of future research,
considering the particular conditions of vehicular mobility and the reliability of
data provided by sensors. Such trustworthiness analysis will serve to expand both
the proposed reporting mechanism and the evidence generation protocol.
Finally, the proposed mechanisms have been defined taking into account the
high-level features of the VANET communication technology (i.e. DSRC). Despite
that this technology is suffering a great evolution, it is expected that such features
will not be changing significantly. Therefore, the evaluation of the performance and
robustness of the proposed mechanisms is expected to be valid. Nevertheless, a
future research issue is focused on analysing the impact of low-level decisions that
are currently evolving, such as channel access control techniques or specific packet
formats.
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Acronym Term
AA Allegation Analyser
Adj Adjudicator
ApA Appeal Analyser
ARI Appeal Result Issuer
CA Certification Authority
CEA CounterEvidence Analyser
CSA Controle et Sanction Automatise´e
DCP Designated-as-offender Contact Point
DEV Direccio´n Electro´nica Vial
DPDM Designated-as-offender Personal Data Manager
DR Data Requester
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communications
EA Evidence Analyser
EC Evidence Collector
EM Evidence Manager
ESTRADA EStacio´n de TRAtamiento de Denuncias Automatizadas
EUCARIS EUropean CAR and driver Information System
EVIGEN EVIdence GENeration protocol
FFI Final Fine Issuer
HMI Human-Machine Interface
HSM Hardware Security Module
IFI Initial Fine Issuer
IntFI Intermediate Fine Issuer
ITS Intelligent Transport System
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Acronym Term
LDA Liable Driver Analyser
MI Message Issuer
N Notifier
NAdS Notification Advertisement System
NMan Notification Manager
NP Notification Provider
NR Notification Receiver
NRS Notification Receiving System
NS Notification Sender
OBU On-Board Unit
PA Process Analyser
PDM Process Data Manager
RSU Road-Side Unit
SAE Secure Application Environment
TPM Trusted Platform Module
VANET Vehicular Ad-hoc Network
VDM Vehicle Data Manager
VERA2 Video Enforcement for Road Authorities 2 project
V2I Vehicle to infrastructure communication
V2V Vehicle to vehicle communication
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1 begin
2 Any witness stakeholder → Evidence collector (EC) : initial
evidence (Traffic environment detection)
3 EC → Process data manager (PDM), Evidence Analyser (EA) :
initial evidence (Initial evidence transfer)
4 if the offence is not reported by a police officer then
5 EA → Vehicle Data Manager (VDM): Vehicle identifier (e.g.
number plate, EVI) (Vehicle and owner / usual driver data request)
6 VDM → EA: Vehicle data, owner or usual driver identifier (Owner
or usual driver data response)
7 EA → Designated-as-offender personal data manager
(DPDM) : Owner or usual driver identifier (Personal data
completion request)
8 DPDM → EA: Owner or usual driver personal data: name, address,
type of driving licence. Offending record(s): infringed rule(s), demerit
points credit. (Personal data completion response)
9 EA → Initial Fine Issuer (IFI) : initial evidence, Vehicle data,
Offending record(s), Owner/usual driver personal data, evidence
analysis result (Initial evidence verification result)
10 else
11 EA → DPDM: Offender identifier (Personal data completion
request)
12 DPDM → EA: Offending record(s): infringed rule(s), demerit points
credit. (Personal data completion response)
13 EA → Initial Fine Issuer (IFI) : initial evidence, Offending
record(s), evidence analysis result (Initial evidence verification result)
14 IFI → Notifier → PDM, Offence-related stakeholder : Initial fine
(Fine notification)
Algorithm 12: Process starting
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1 begin
2 # Allegation identifying another person as the offending driver
3 if the vehicle owner or usual driver was identified as the designated-as-offender
and she is not the offending driver then
4 Vehicle owner/usual driver → Designated-as-offender contact point
(DCP) → Liable Driver Analyser (LDA): Allegation identifying the
offending driver (Offender identification request)
5 # The following action only happens if the LDA determines that it is a
plausible identification. Otherwise, the criminal law may be applied
6 LDA → Initial Fine Issuer : Offending driver personal data (Offender
identification transfer)
7 GO TO else case in Starting algorithm
8 # Counterevidence creation and transfer. This part should be repeated if
multiple counterevidences are involved
9 Any offence-related stakeholder → Data Requester (DR) → Selected
witness stakeholder:
10 Offender data: Designated-as-offender id. or vehicle number plate,
11 Offence characterization: date, time, place.
12 Requested counterevid. description: type (testimony, graphical proof, probatory
element), witness stakeholder identifier (Data request)
13 Selected witness stakeholder → DR → Offence-related stakeholder :
Requested counterevidence data, witness stakeholder identifier, time of evidence
(Counterevidence data retrieval)
14 Offence-related stakeholder → Designated-as-offender Contact Point
(DCP) → Process Data Manager (PDM), CounterEvidence Analyser
(CEA) : Counterevidence (Counterevidence transfer)
15 # Allegations are autonomously created by the offence-related stakeholder. They
are also transferred for evaluation
16 Offence-related stakeholder → DCP → PDM, Allegation Analyser
(AA) : Allegation (Allegation transfer)
17 # Counterevidence/allegation analysis. First part: additional data retrieval (if
needed)
18 CEA / AA → DR → Selected witness stakeholder: Additional data
request: Offence subject (one of: offence context, offender behaviour or road
traffic status), offence context (place, date, time, offender vehicle identification),
witness stakeholder identifier. (Additional test for contrasting the counterevid.
and alleg. (request))
19 Affected witness stakeholder → DR → PDM, CEA / AA: Additional
data response: Witness stakeholder identifier, requested data, time of response.
(Additional test for contrasting the counterevid. and alleg. (result))
20 # Counterevidence/allegation analysis. Second part: assessment. Intermediate
fine issuance
21 CEA / AA → Intermediate Fine Issuer (IntFI) : Counterevidence(s),
allegation(s), additional requested data, evaluation result of these elements and
their legal relevance (Assessment transfer)
22 # This only happens if additional data retrieval was needed
23 IntFI → Notifier → PDM, Offence-related stakeholder: Intermediate fine
(Intermediate fine notification)
Algorithm 13: Preliminary investigation
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1 begin
2 if the Intermediate fine was notified to the offender (see Algorithm 13)
then
3 Offence-related stakeholder → Designated-as-offender
Contact Point (DCP) → Process Data Manager (PDM),
Process Analyser (PA) : Allegation (Allegation transfer)
4 PA → PDM : Legal process identifier (Process data retrieval (request))
5 PDM → PA : Initial fine, intermediate fine, allegation(s),
counterevidence(s), Additional data retrieved in the preliminary
investigation. (Process data retrieval (response))
6 PA → Final Fine Issuer (FFI): Process revision, including the recent
allegations (if any) and assessment of their relevance in the process
(Allegation evaluation)
7 FFI → PDM, Notifier → Offence-related stakeholder: Final fine
(Final resolution notification)
8 if the offence is considered as serious then
9 # According to the Spanish legislation, it must be annotated in the
Designated-as-offender personal data manager in case that is
considered a serious (i.e. not minor) offence [92].
10 FFI → Designated-as-offender personal data manager
(DPM) : Offender identifier, legal process identifier, infringed rule,
demerit points credit (Offence record annotation)
Algorithm 14: Process resolution
1 begin
2 Offence-related stakeholder → Designated-as-offender Contact
Point (DCP) → Process Data Manager (PDM), Appeal
Analyser (ApA): Appeal (Appeal transfer)
3 ApA → PDM : Legal process identifier (Process data retrieval request)
4 PDM → ApA : Initial fine, intermediate fine, final fine, allegation(s),
counterevidence(s), Additional data retrieved in the preliminary
investigation. (Process data retrieval response)
5 ApA → Appeal Result Issuer (ARI) : Appeal, Appeal assessment:
reasoned appeal relevance evaluation. (Appeal evaluation transfer)
6 ARI → Notifier, PDM → Offence-related stakeholder : Appeal
result (Appeal resolution notification)
Algorithm 15: Process appealling
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